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The dissertation addresses the mind-body problem, and in particular, 
the problem of how to fit phenomenal consciousness into the rest of reality. 
Phenomenal consciousness - the what it’s like feature of experience - can 
appear to the scientifically inclined philosopher to be deeply mysterious. It is 
difficult to understand how the swirl of atoms in the void, the oscillation of 
field values, the firing of synapses, or anything physical can add up to the 
smells, tastes, feelings, moods, and so forth that comprise our phenomenal 
experience. There is a series of arguments - the so-called “Conceivability 
Arguments” - that spells out this puzzlement. If this arguments are successful 
then there is no place for phenomenal consciousness in a completely 
physical reality. The main conclusion of this dissertation is that the 
Conceivability Arguments are all dependent on a flawed premiss, and that 
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therefore these arguments - perhaps the most powerful among anti-
physicalist arguments - all fail.  
Conceivability Arguments begin with the premiss that we can conceive 
of any physical or functional facts obtaining without there being any 
phenomenal experience at all. This is sometimes expressed by saying that 
zombies (i.e., beings that are our physical and functional duplicates, but 
possess no phenomenal experiences) are conceivable. The claim that 
zombies are conceivable does not have to do with our powers of imagination, 
or our  psychological abilities, but rather with the nature of physical and 
phenomenal concepts. The reason that zombies are claimed to be 
conceivable is that each person’s thinking about phenomenal properties is 
completely dependent on her first person acquaintance with her own  
experience. From this assertion of conceivability  it is inferred that zombies 
are genuinely possible. And this conclusion is incompatible with physicalism 
as that doctrine is usually understood. 
I argue that these arguments all fail; they are refuted by a master  
argument  that I call “the Zombie Refutation.” The reason they fail has to do 
with the very nature of phenomenal concepts that gives rise to the 
conceivability of zombies. Because of the special nature of these concepts, 
the principle underlying the Conceivability Arguments - that principle that 
links conceivability and possibility - turns out to be self-refuting. Thus, the 
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zombies that the Conceivability Arguments supposedly demonstrate to be 
possible, return to undermine those very arguments; a fitting revenge.  
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The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and 
rain-process: how does it come about that this does not come into 
the considerations of our ordinary life? This idea of a difference in 
kind is accompanied by slight giddiness - which occurs when we 
are performing a piece of logical sleight-of-hand. 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, §412)  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Phenomenal consciousness - the what its like1 feature of experience - 
can appear to the scientifically inclined philosopher to be deeply mysterious. 
It is difficult to understand how the swirl of atoms in the void, the oscillation of 
field values, the firing of synapses, or anything physical can add up to the 
smells, tastes, feelings, moods, and so forth that comprise our phenomenal 
experience. One might be tempted to declare just on the basis of this thought 
that physicalism is false; that is, that it is false that every contingent fact, 
including those concerning phenomenal consciousness is, or is realized by, 
or is constituted by, physical facts. But it is one thing to declare that 
physicalism is false and quite another to argue that it is.  
                                                 
1The expression is coined by Thomas Nagel (1974). 
 
 
 
4 
This dissertation concerns the  most important arguments - the so-
called “Conceivability Arguments” - for the claim that there is no place for 
phenomenal consciousness in a completely physical reality. Conceivability 
Arguments, which go back at least to Descartes (Sixth Meditation, in:  
Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch 1984, Vol II, pp. 50-63), begin with the 
premiss that we can conceive of any physical or functional facts obtaining 
without there being any phenomenal experience at all.2 This is sometimes 
expressed by saying that zombies (i.e., beings that are our physical and 
functional duplicates, but possess no phenomenal experiences) are 
conceivable.3  From this assertion of conceivability  it is inferred that zombies 
are genuinely possible. And this conclusion is incompatible with physicalism 
as that doctrine is usually understood. 
The claim that zombies are conceivable does not have to do with our 
powers of imagination, or our  psychological abilities, but rather with the 
                                                 
2Sometimes it is argued that the opposite is also conceivable, i.e., that 
it is conceivable that mental facts, especially experiences, occur without any 
physical or functional facts occurring. Cf. Descartes, ibid. It is not necessary, 
however, for the arguments under consideration, that conceivability should 
go both ways.  
3I will use the term 'experience',  'phenomenally conscious state', and 
'phenomenal state' interchangeably. The phenomenal aspect of a mental 
state is the same as its experiential character, or, in Nagel's (1974) words, its 
'what it’s like' feature. 
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nature of physical and phenomenal concepts. The relevant notion of 
conceivability is this:  
(Con)  A statement S is conceivable, if it is logically consistent with the 
totality of  conceptual truths, i.e., if -S is not a conceptual truth. 
 
Conceptual truths (or analytic truths) are truths in virtue of meaning.4 It is 
usually assumed that if S is conceivable then it is knowable a priori that S is 
conceivable. That is, it is assumed that someone who can entertain the 
thought that S, can come to know whether or not S is conceivable without 
empirical investigation. Failure to detect a priori any contradiction in S is a 
defeasible reason to hold that S is conceivable. It is defeasible since further 
a priori reasoning may lead one to see that S is inconsistent with conceptual 
truths after all.5  
The reason that zombies are claimed to be conceivable is that each 
person’s thinking about phenomenal properties is completely dependent on 
                                                 
4The nature of concepts, what determines whether a statement or 
thought is true in virtue of meaning, and even whether there are any 
conceptual truths at all are vexed and disputed matters (see Fodor 1997). 
Since the proponents of Conceivability Arguments rely on the notion of 
conceptual truth I will as well. For more on concepts in general, see Chapter 
One. On the question of the nature and existence of conceptual truths, see 
the discussion of two-dimensional semantics, and the Explanatory Gap 
Argument in Chapter Three. 
5The claim that whether or not S is conceivable is always knowable a 
priori is not quite correct since logical consistency is not effectively decidable 
and, if the underlying logic is higher order, not even effectively axiomatizable. 
But this observation has no effect on the Conceivability Arguments. 
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her first person acquaintance with her own  experience. When I think I have 
a headache, I apply that concept to myself directly; not in virtue of the 
referent satisfying certain behavioral, physical, or functional characteristics.  
There are no conceptual connections between first person applications of the 
concept headache and physical, behavioral, or functional concepts.  
Some philosophers have denied this: they claim that our concepts of 
various kinds of phenomenal states, e.g., our concept pain, are physical, 
functional, or behavioral concepts.6 For example, a crude functionalist 
account of the concept pain is that it is the concept an internal state typically 
produced by stimuli associated with harm which typically causes avoidance 
behavior. Of course, if it is analytic that an internal state satisfying a certain 
functional specification is a pain, then zombies are impossible.  
                                                 
6See, for example Lewis (1966), Ryle (1949),White (1986), Levin 
(1986). 
Others claim that, while concepts of kinds of experience, e.g., pain, 
nausea, etc. do not have functionalist analysis, the concept conscious 
experience does. For example, Shoemaker (1981) holds that zombies are 
conceptually impossible but inverted qualia is conceptually possible. This is 
an interesting view, but as we will see, this view will not block the 
Conceivability Arguments.   
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It seems to me that behaviorist and functionalist analyses of 
phenomenal concepts are quite implausible. When I think (same, I submit, 
for you) I am in pain, I am not thinking that I am behaving or disposed to 
behave in a certain way; or that I am occupying some particular 
neurophysiological state or functional state. Of course, this is not to say that 
the property of being in pain is not a physical or functional property, but 
rather that the concept pain is not a physical or functional concept. Whatever 
the ultimate nature of phenomenal experience, when I judge that I am having 
an experience of particular sort on the basis of having that experience, the 
concept I invoke is not a physical, behavioral,  or functional concept. Rather, 
it seems to be a concept that I apply directly and spontaneously to the 
experience.7  
There is another line of reasoning that can be seen as aiming to show 
 that zombie-worlds are inconceivable. I have in mind Wittgenstein’s 
infamous private language argument.8 The argument relies on certain a priori 
considerations concerning the nature of meaning. The argument is quite 
                                                 
7Loar (1997) characterizes phenomenal concepts as “direct 
recognitional” concepts. I will discuss this view in Chapter Two. 
8Wittgenstein (1953), §§ 207-384. The argument is usually invoked in 
the discussion of “other minds.” But of course the question of whether 
another being has a mind is just the question of whether or not she is a 
zombie. 
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obscure, but the basic idea is that first-person direct uses of phenomenal 
concepts presuppose that the concept has links with publicly observable 
behavior (or other physical phenomena) that provide criteria for third person 
uses. These criterial connections are alleged to preclude zombie worlds. But 
it would be an enormous understatement to say that there is no consensus 
as to exactly what the argument is, let alone whether it is sound.  Current 
discussion of the conceivability arguments for the most part ignore it so I will 
as well. In the following, I will assume that there is nothing in our concept of 
consciousness that would allow us to rule out a priori the existence of 
zombies; zombies are conceivable.  
From the premiss, considered a priori true, that zombies are 
conceivable, it is further argued that their existence is a genuine 
metaphysical possibility. This is a powerful  result. If it is correct, and if, as I 
will assume throughout the dissertation, there are phenomenal facts, then 
physicalism is false. For it would mean that the totality of physical  facts 
obtaining in our world, including the laws of physics, does not necessitate the 
phenomenal facts that obtain in our world. 
Without further elaboration, the Conceivability Argument seems to 
commit a simple fallacy. On the face of it, the mere fact that it is conceptually 
possible for an F to exist without  its being G  does not entail that it is 
metaphysically possible for an F to exist without being G. After all, it seems 
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that we can conceive of water existing without being composed in part of 
hydrogen even though  being composed in part of hydrogen is 
metaphysically necessary for being water.  But during the past three 
decades, work on the semantics of modality and referring expressions (see, 
especially, Kripke 1972) has clarified the relationship between conceptual 
possibility and metaphysical possibility so as to  take these objections into 
account.  
This has lead to a revival of interest in Conceivability Arguments, and 
sophisticated versions of these arguments have been developed by Kripke 
(1972, pp. 144-155), Nagel (1974), Robinson (1993), Jackson  (1982, 1993 
and 1995, Lecture 2 and 3), Chalmers (1996, especially pp. 56-123), and 
others. Like their predecessors, these arguments rely on there being a link 
between conceivability and metaphysical possibility, but the formulation of 
this link now takes into account that conceivability does not always imply 
possibility. The proponents of these Conceivability Arguments claim that, 
while the conceivability of water not being H2O fails to imply that it is 
metaphysically  possible for water not to be H2O, the conceivability of certain 
other statements, e.g., that there is a zombie world and that pain is not 
identical to C-fibre firing does imply their metaphysical possibility.9   
                                                 
9Of course, they will argue that the difference is between kinds of 
statement. The claim is, as it will soon be clear, that there is a kind of 
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As we will see, the link between conceivability and possibility invoked 
by Conceivability Arguments entail that modal facts are ultimately reducible 
to facts about what is conceivable, and ordinary empirical facts that play a 
role in fixing the references of our concepts. In this way, the link provides a 
very attractive picture of the metaphysics and epistemology of possibility. In 
this picture, the truth makers of modal claims are not a realm of possible 
worlds, but rather facts about our concepts and ordinary empirical facts. And 
modal truths are knowable by a combination of a priori reflection on our 
concepts, and empirical investigation.  In fact, the promise of this account 
may be the strongest reason for accepting some form of the conceivability-
possibility link. 
                                                                                                                                     
statement for which conceivability implies possibility. The statement that a 
zombie world exists is supposed to fall under this kind. 
There is a close cousin of the Conceivability Arguments thought up, 
but not endorsed, by Joe Levine (1983, 1993).  This argument involves what 
Levine calls “the explanatory gap” between physical and phenomenal 
descriptions. Levine observes that, given a  physical description of a person 
who is having certain experiences, we are completely left in the dark as to 
the phenomenal nature of those experiences. In other words, there appears 
to be an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal 
descriptions. At one time there was also an explanatory gap between, for 
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example, ordinary talk of  transmission of traits of parents to their offspring, 
and physical and biochemical descriptions. But that gap has mostly been 
bridged by genetic theory and molecular genetics. We, or at least molecular 
geneticists, have a pretty good understanding of how biochemical processes 
can provide the mechanisms that underlie the transmission of traits from 
parents to children.   
Levine observes that the case of consciousness seems different. He 
argues that no current accounts bridge the gap, and that there are reasons to 
think the gap is in principle unbridgeable. The reason that the gap is 
unbridgeable  is that we do not conceive of our own conscious states as 
satisfying some role - causal or otherwise -, but rather  we grasp them 
directly. Because of this, knowledge of physical truths does not explain 
phenomenal truths. Now one can argue, although as I mention Levine seems 
agnostic about this, from the existence of this epistemological gap to the 
conclusion that there is an unbridgeable metaphysical gap between physical 
facts and phenomenal facts; i.e., that a zombie world is metaphysically 
possible. 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to survey and evaluate 
Conceivability and Gap Arguments against physicalism. I aim to give them 
the strongest and most sympathetic formulations. But ultimately I will argue 
that they all fail; they are refuted by a master  argument  that I call “the 
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Zombie Refutation.” The reason they fail has to do with the very nature of 
phenomenal concepts that gives rise to both the conceivability of zombies, 
and to the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical. 
Because of the special nature of these concepts, the principle underlying the 
Conceivability Arguments - that principle that links conceivability and 
possibility - turns out to be self-refuting. Thus, the zombies that the 
Conceivability Arguments supposedly demonstrate to be possible, return to 
undermine those very arguments; a fitting revenge.  
I will show that this special nature of phenomenal concepts explains 
the explanatory gap as well. That is, it is the nature of these concepts, i.e., 
the fact that we directly apply them to phenomenal properties that explains 
why no perspicuous physical explanation of phenomenal properties can be 
found. The explanatory gap is generated by the way we conceive of our 
phenomenal states; but it is conceptual in nature and is not indicative of any 
metaphysical gap. There is no need to suppose that physicalism is false in 
order to explain the explanatory gap; physicalism itself has the resources to 
do that.  
The order of discussion is as follows:  In Chapter One Physicalism is 
formulated and defended. Chapter Two discusses the nature of phenomenal 
consciousness and the concepts we apply to it.  In Chapter Three I formulate 
the Conceivability Arguments due to Descartes, Nagel, White, Kripke, 
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Jackson, and Chalmers, and the argument suggested by the existence of the 
explanatory gap advocated by Levine. In Chapter Four I develop the Zombie 
Argument that refutes all the extant, and I believe every possible, 
Conceivability Arguments, as well as the Gap Argument, and defend it 
against  objections. Chapter Four also further develops the account of 
phenomenal experience and phenomenal concepts proposed in Chapter 
Two that shows why the explanatory gap exists, and why  most of us find 
Physicalism so incredible. The fact that Physicalism can explain why we find 
it incredible goes a long way toward disarming objections to it. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PHYSICALISM 
 
 
 
1.1 PRELIMINARIES 
 
It will be useful to begin with a brief discussion of how I will be using 
certain words throughout this dissertation. The key words are “property”, 
“possible world”, “metaphysical necessity”, “concept”, and “conceptual 
necessity.” 
 
Properties 
By “properties” I will mean language independent entities that can be 
multiply instantiated. By calling them “language independent”, I mean that 
what properties there are is independent of whatever languages exist. 
However, properties are the semantic values, or the references, of 
predicates. A simple sentence, e.g., “Socrates is wise”, is true just in case 
the semantic value of “Socrates” instantiates the semantic value of “is wise”; 
i.e., the property wisdom.10 
                                                 
10Throughout, I will indicate that I am talking about  properties with 
bold face type, and concepts with italics. 
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Some philosophers hold that not every predicate refers to a genuine 
property. On this view properties are sparse and only those  predicates that 
satisfy certain further conditions, e.g., occur in the formulation of scientific 
laws, refer to properties. But I find it more useful to suppose that properties 
are abundant so that every meaningful predicate that can be used to express 
a truth evaluable thought  refers to a property. We can call these abundant 
properties “common properties.” Elite properties are ones that are special, 
e.g., are constituents of laws. On this usage “is grue” and “has negative 
charge” both refer to common properties  but only the second is elite. 
Properties like grue are, relative to elite properties, like has negative 
charge, highly disjunctive properties of interest only to philosophers.  
Following Lewis (1983) and Armstrong (1978) I will assume that some 
elite properties are fundamental (or perfectly natural), and others are 
constructs out of fundamental properties. Like them, I will not have much to 
say about what makes a property “fundamental”, except to assume that the 
sciences are our best guide as to what the fundamental properties of our 
world are. Lewis and Armstrong also both agree that fundamental properties 
are categorical, that is, that they are individuated independently of laws and 
causal relations. This contrasts with the view that fundamental properties are 
individuated in terms of nomological connections (see Shoemaker 1979). On 
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this view laws, at least the fundamental ones, are expressed by necessary 
truths. I do not take a stand on this important issue here. 
Non-fundamental properties are logical constructs out of fundamental 
properties.  Among these are higher order or functional properties. A 
functional property F is a property that is instantiated by something x just in 
case x’s appropriate parts, or x together with some other entities, instantiates 
properties P1, P2...Pn, and these instantiations are related to each other in 
certain specific ways; e.g., by causation. Clearly not every pair of properties, 
even fundamental properties, are co-instantiable by the same individual or 
individuals related to each other in certain ways. No particle, it appears, can 
have, for example, both positive and negative charge. I will say that property 
instantiations that can be co-instantiated are “compatible” instantiations. 
 
Possible Worlds 
 A state of affairs is a collection or sum of compatible property 
instantiations. Possible worlds correspond to maximal states of affairs.11 This 
account is purposely vague since I have not said anything about what makes 
                                                 
11The reader will note that basic individuals are absent from my 
possible world building. I am assuming that individuals are constructs out of 
property instantiations across possible worlds. This is certainly a 
controversial thesis, but will facilitate our discussion. Everything I will say 
about possible worlds is adaptable, with straightforward modifications, to the 
view that individuals are basic constituents of possible worlds . 
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a state of affairs maximal or what makes property instantiations compatible. 
Later we will look at an account of possibility, spelled out by Jackson (1995) 
and Chalmers (1996), that is based in conceivability and explicates the 
notion of compatible property instantiation in terms of conceivability.12 For 
our discussion of physicalism this vague account will do. 
 
 
Thoughts and statements 
Thoughts13 and statements possess truth values at possible worlds. A 
statement (or thought) S is metaphysically necessary, i.e., S is true, iff S is 
true at every possible world. S is metaphysically possible, ◊S, iff S is true in 
at least one world. The notions of property, possible world and  metaphysical 
necessity are interrelated. ‘x is P’ and ‘x is Q’ refer to the same property iff 
they are necessarily coextensive. That is, they refer to the same property  iff 
the statement ‘(x)(x is P iff x is Q)’ expresses a metaphysical necessity iff 
‘(x)(x is P iff x is Q)’ is true at every possible world. 
                                                 
12 The account is neutral between views on which possible worlds are 
concrete (Lewis 1986a) and views on which they are abstract.   
13On the general semantic outlook I adopt, the meaning of the 
linguistic entities (statements and terms)  is derivative on, and can be 
accounted for, in terms of the meaning of the corresponding mental entities 
(thoughts and concepts). I will switch back and forth between the two, as the 
exposition requires. 
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Concepts 
Concepts are mental representations. I will assume that there is a 
Language Of Thought (LOT), and that concepts can be thought of as “words” 
in this language. Concepts are constituents of thoughts. On the LOT 
hypothesis, thoughts are certain sentences in the LOT. They are what is 
believed, known, judged true, etc.  
A concept, e.g., the concept cat refers to a property, cathood, by 
presenting it in a particular way. This is sometimes expressed by saying that 
concepts are or have modes of presentation. Concepts typically possess 
certain intrinsic properties (i.e., morphological features),14 syntactic structure, 
conceptual role, and reference. Conceptual role is comprised of the 
inferential dispositions involving thoughts containing that concept, as well as 
causal relations connecting the concept to other intentional states, including 
phenomenal states. Conceptual role is idiosyncratic in that it is immensely 
likely that no two thinkers will have exactly the same inferential dispositions. 
                                                 
14For words in LOT these intrinsic features can be thought of as being 
like the spelling of a word in a natural language. (By saying this I do not want 
to beg the question against Dualism; the intrinsic features in question might 
be non-physical.) And there may be other kinds of representations, e.g., 
images that possess other kinds of intrinsic features. 
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It is a controversial question which aspect of concepts (some intrinsic 
property of concepts, syntactic structure, conceptual role, or a combination of 
the above) is or determines its mode of presentation. Frege thought that 
sense, i.e., mode of presentation,  is some primitive, possibly non-physical 
property of concepts that we directly grasp. Fodor (see, e.g., Fodor 1997) 
identifies the mode of presentation of concepts with morphological and 
syntactic features. Specifically, Fodor holds that conceptual role plays no role 
in individuating concepts (and so is no determinant of mode of 
presentation).15 Others, however (see, e.g.,  Block 1986, and Peacocke 
1992), accept that the conceptual role of a concept is a determinant of its 
mode of presentation. Proponents of this view divide among those (see 
Block 1986) who think that the totality of a concept’s inferential role is 
individuative, and those (see Peacocke 1992) who hold that some inferential 
relations are special. These special inferential roles are thought to be 
meaning constituting, i.e., part of the concept’s mode of presentation, while 
the rest of a concept’s inferential roles are irrelevant to mode of presentation. 
                                                 
15Fodor excepts logical concepts and, or, etc. For these concepts 
conceptual role is individuative. 
It is also usually thought by proponents of this view that it is a priori 
knowable to a thinker who possesses the relevant concepts exactly which 
inferential roles are meaning constituting.  Underlying this assumption is the 
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idea that the meaning, or mode of presentation, of one’s concepts is a priori 
available. For example, a thinker may be inclined to infer from ‘x is a cat’ 
both ‘x is an animal’ and ‘x likes liver’, but the thinker will know that only the 
former is individuative of the concept cat. If it is further assumed, as 
proponents of this view typically do, that such inferences are truth preserving, 
then this will make the inference ‘x is a cat’ therefore ‘x is an animal’ analytic, 
i.e., meaning constituting and a priori. 
I will say that a thought that is true in virtue of  the meaning 
constituting inferential roles of its constituent concepts is a conceptual truth. 
A thought that is logically compatible with all conceptual truths is 
conceptually possible, or, for short, conceivable.  
I myself will remain agnostic in this dissertation on the correct theory 
of concepts, and specifically on the issue of whether or not inferential role 
plays a large part in individuating concepts. But later I will argue that there 
are certain features of the role of phenomenal concepts that are what makes 
these concepts phenomenal. Moreover, since the Conceivability Arguments 
are arguably all committed to conceptual role being at least partly 
individuative of concepts, and to there being many conceptual truths, for the 
sake of the argument I, too, will take that for granted for large parts of the 
dissertation. 
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The distinction between properties and concepts will be very important 
to my discussion. Properties are in the world, while concepts are in the mind 
(which is a small part of the world). Distinct concepts, however these are 
individuated, may refer to the same property. For example, the concepts 
triangular and trilateral refer to the same property since it is metaphysically 
necessary that whatever instantiates one instantiates the other. In this case 
the thought that all and only triangular things are trilateral things is both 
metaphysically and conceptually necessary. Its conceptual  necessity derives 
from the fact that the inferential roles of the two concepts alone determine 
that the concepts corefer. But this is not always the case. For example, the 
concepts water and H2O refer to the same property, even though the thought 
that Water is H2O is not conceptually true. We can conceive of one and the 
same property via two very different modes of presentation. Exactly how 
different concepts can be and still corefer is an interesting issue in general. 
But clearly they can be quite different. Thus scientific concepts like molecular 
motion and everyday folk concepts like heat can corefer. Some concepts 
involve indexical modes of presentation, e.g., that kind of plant. Such 
concepts and non-indexical scientific concepts can also corefer.  
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1.2 FORMULATING PHYSICALISM 
 
Physicalism is a metaphysical view of the basic constitution of the 
universe. It is variously expressed as the view that the world is nothing but, or 
nothing over and above the physical world; that a completed physics 
(presumably an improved version of present-day physics) will give us a 
comprehensive and correct theory of the universe; that the complete story of 
the world is the physical story;16 or, more colorfully, that all God had to do to 
create our world is to create the distribution of fundamental physical 
quantities in space/time and to create the laws of physics; all true 
propositions are true in virtue of these. A formulation of physicalism purged 
of theological references is due to David Lewis (1983)17:   
P*. Among worlds where no natural property alien18 to the actual 
world is instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; 
any two such worlds that are exactly alike physically are 
duplicates simpliciter. 
 
                                                 
16That, of course, does not mean that all our language can be finitely 
translated into the language of physics. 
17To help the reader I included two appendices for easy reference to 
definitions and arguments appearing in the text. 
18A property, according to Lewis, is alien to a world iff it is not 
analyzable as a Boolean construct out of natural properties all of which are 
nomologically possible to be instantiated by inhabitants of that world.  
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P* is a substantial metaphysical claim, since it privileges physical 
properties as fundamental. Another obvious virtue of P* is that it is 
contingent, since there are worlds at which it is false. We want a formulation 
of physicalism to allow, for  example, worlds with ghosts, where physicalism 
fails. If the actual world contained instantiations of ectoplasmic properties, 
then physicalism would be false. P* gets this right: the actual world would 
have a physical duplicate that is not a duplicate simpliciter, since it would fail 
to contain the ectoplasmic individuals.  
The reference to alien properties serves to rule out  worlds which are 
physical duplicates of the actual world but contain extra non-physical 
properties from the range of relevant possible worlds. If the restriction was 
dropped from P*, then, even if only physical properties were instantiated at a 
world w, the mere metaphysical possibility of worlds that are physically just 
like w, but contain some extra, say, ectoplasmic19 individuals, would render 
physicalism false at w. A world which is exactly like w all physical respects 
but where there are ectoplasmic entities, would differ from w without differing 
physically, and it would not be a duplicate of w; therefore P* would not 
capture physicalism if the reference to alien properties were dropped.20  
                                                 
19‘Being ectoplasmic’ is a stand-in to refer to a non-physical 
fundamental property. 
20Horgan (1982) has a definition similar to Lewis's; it also relies on the 
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Physicalism appears to be a strong and possibly, but not obviously, 
true (or false) claim about the nature of our world. To the contrary, Crane and 
Mellor (1990) have argued  that “there is no question of physicalism”, since it 
is either obviously false or trivially true. They claim that if “physical” in P* 
means “properties and laws  expressed by current physical theory” then P* is 
very likely false since it is very likely that  current physics does not provide a 
complete or completely correct inventory of physical properties and laws.21  
No complete description of a world in the language of current physics is 
plausibly a description of the actual world.  
                                                                                                                                     
notion of "alien" property. Jackson (1994) and Chalmers (1996) also gives a 
formulation along these lines; instead of alien properties, however, Jackson’s 
formulation uses the notion of a minimal physical duplicate, and Chalmers 
talks about copies of a world. It does not make much difference from the 
point of view of the discussion at hand which definition we use; I will stick to 
Lewis’s formulation. 
21It is generally thought that current physical theory cannot be the last 
word since there are conflicts between quantum theory and both special and 
general relativity theory. 
The natural  response to this problem is to appeal to idealized 
physics.  The ideal physical theory is the theory that correctly describes the 
structure of space/time, the motions of all macroscopic objects and the laws 
governing these motions, as well as the laws governing whatever other 
entities and properties exist. Crane and Mellor claim that this characterization 
renders physicalism trivially true, since it would obtain as long as there is an 
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ideal physical theory even if that theory contains intentional and phenomenal 
predicates. Of course, such an idealized theory is not what physicalists have 
in mind. If it turns out that to account for paradigm physical events (motions 
of particles, changes in field values, etc.) mental predicates must be 
employed, then physicalism is false.  
One way of responding to this worry is to produce a positive 
characterization of “physical predicate.” In current physics, atomic predicates 
and function expressions are micro-physical. They apply to points of some 
appropriate space/time structure. For example, fields are specified by 
functions assigning values to points of space/time. Mental predicates are 
certainly not like this. But it would be rash to assume that anything that would 
count as physics must be like this. Fortunately, for the purposes of 
discussing the conceivability arguments, a negative characterization of the 
language of ideal physics will do. We should simply require that the ideal 
physical language not contain any mentalistic predicates as atomic 
predicates.22 Fodor makes the point effectively: 
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the 
catalogue they have been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible 
                                                 
22Some physicists (see, e.g., Wigner 1967) have proposed that, to 
account for the supposed “collapse” of the wave function when a system is 
measured, appeal must be made to consciousness or the intentions of the 
measurer. If so, then the ideal theory would not be a physical theory and 
physicalism would be false.  
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properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and 
charge will perhaps appear on their list. But aboutness surely won’t; 
intentionality simply doesn’t go that deep.  (1987, p. 96) 
 
I would only add that phenomenal consciousness properties won't be on the 
physicists list either. 
We can then formulate a successor to P* as follows: 
P Among worlds where no property alien to the actual world is 
instantiated, any  two that are exactly alike with respect to their 
complete descriptions (including specification of the 
fundamental laws) in the language of the ideal fundamental 
physical theory are duplicates simpliciter.  
 
In P, none of the atomic predicates of the  language of fundamental 
physics are  intentional or phenomenal  predicates.23 The descriptions 
referred to in P will be infinite, specifying perhaps the values of all fields at 
every point of space/time. The full physical description also includes a 
specification of  the laws of physics, stating that they are the laws. This latter 
statement may, depending on the correct account of laws, not be 
conceptually entailed by the rest of  the full physical description.24  
                                                 
23This condition does not preclude there being logically complex 
predicates which are intentional or phenomenal predicates in the language of 
ideal physics. Making P work requires characterizations of  intentional and 
phenomenal predicates. I do not offer that here, but in Chapter Two I discuss 
the nature of phenomenal predicates. 
24On Humean accounts of laws (Lewis 1986b, Loewer 1997), the 
distribution of non-nomic properties conceptually implies which 
generalizations are laws. In contrast, on non-Humean accounts (Armstrong 
1980, Dretske 1977), what laws there are is not so implied. 
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1.3 SUPERVENIENCE PRINCIPLES 
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If  K* is a statement in ideal physics, and T is a truth (not necessarily 
in the language of physics), then truths of the form (K*⊃T) are called  
“physical supervenience principles”. They specify how non-physical 
statements supervene on physical statements. There is an important 
consequence of P that we will need later. Suppose that T is some truth about 
the actual world, and K is the complete, true description of the actual world in 
the language of ideal physics. Then one might think that if P is true then 
(K⊃T) is true, since worlds just like the actual world physically (worlds at 
which K holds) must be worlds where T  is also true. In other words, if 
physicalism is true, every actual truth supervenes on  the complete physical 
description. Typically truths will supervene on much less than the entire 
physical description. So, for example, that there is an ice cube in a certain 
region R of space/time will supervene on fundamental physical descriptions 
of that region. Physical  facts concerning what is going on outside of R are 
metaphysically irrelevant to whether or not there is an ice cube in R. 
Similarly, it is plausible that statements about a person’s phenomenal 
experiences supervene on her neurophysiology. What is going on outside 
her brain is metaphysically irrelevant.25   
                                                 
25It is now widely accepted that intentional content often does not 
supervene on neurophysiology. Theories that hold that phenomenal 
experience is identical to, or partly constituted by, intentional content may 
reject this supervenience claim. 
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Interestingly, even though P is true, there are some statements for 
which (K⊃T) fails. It fails for those statements that, intuitively, depend on 
the totality of the distribution of fundamental properties. I will call such 
statements “global statements”. An example is ‘there are exactly n  electrons 
in the history of the universe’. K may metaphysically imply  that there are at 
least n electrons in the history of the universe, but it will not imply that there 
are exactly n of them. We need to add a conjunct saying that K is the 
complete physical description of the universe. Call this statement C.  
There is another difficulty. Suppose that Q expresses a functional 
property that can be realized non-physically, and suppose further that the 
statement ‘There are n Qs’ is true. Then, even if P is true, (K⊃there are n 
Qs) will not be true, since there are worlds at which K is true which contain 
extra physical realizations of Q. For this reason we need to add another 
conjunct to K saying that all fundamental properties are physical properties.26 
Call this statement F. With these amendment we obtain  
(E) For any true statement T, 
(K&C&F⊃T), 
 
which is equivalent to P. 
If P is true then, for most true statements T, (K⊃T) will be true. 
Those truths for which this does not hold are, as we mentioned, “global” 
                                                 
26This corresponds to the stipulation about alien properties in P. 
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truths, in that their truth depends on the global distribution of fundamental 
properties. It is clear that positive phenomenal properties, e.g., being in pain, 
are not global. 
Most physicalists would deem P too weak to fully express  
physicalism. It is compatible with there being anomalous physical events, 
and even with there being emergent laws involving higher level properties. 
Further, as Kim (1990) observes, it does not succeed in capturing the idea 
that all facts obtain in virtue of physical facts. For example, P could be true in 
virtue of some strange set of  “quizzical” properties that underlie both 
physical and non-physical property instantiations (see Witmer 1997, p. 137). 
But for our purposes, we can stay with P. Any version of physicalism worthy 
of the name entails P; and it is by trying to refute P that the Conceivability 
Arguments are trying to refute physicalism. It will be enough then to show 
that the Conceivability Arguments have not succeeded in this to show that 
they have not refuted physicalism. Further, in the next section I will say  a bit 
more about how  physicalism can capture the idea that mental descriptions 
are true in virtue of physical facts. 
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1.4 REDUCTIONISM 
 
P entails that every truth is metaphysically implied by truths in the 
language of physics.27 But it does not entail that languages or conceptual 
systems other than that of fundamental physics are dispensable.  There are 
many different levels of description, many different conceptual systems, that 
we employ in thinking about the world. Some concepts - those that conceive 
of middle size objects in terms of typical shapes, colors, etc. - are easy for 
humans to correctly apply on the basis of perception; e.g., is a tree, is a rock, 
etc. Other concepts may require specialized instrumentation or theories to 
apply, e.g., is a virus.  It is not consequence of P that these concepts are 
either definable in terms of physical concepts or fail to pick out genuine 
properties.  Statements in higher level vocabularies are typically more salient 
to us than statements in the language of ideal physics. Indeed, even those 
who have the requisite concepts to understand statements in ideal physics 
will not be in a position to employ those statements in ordinary discourse. 
Further, our understanding, to the extent we have it, of physical concepts 
plausibly presupposes the possession of higher level concepts.   
                                                 
27That is, if we set aside the difficulties mentioned in the last section 
involving global properties. From now on I take it for granted that this is how 
we proceed. 
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As far as I can see, all this is compatible with P. It is also compatible 
with P that there are true counterfactuals and laws couched in higher level 
vocabularies and that higher level statements can be confirmed. Thus it is 
compatible with P for there to be special sciences that develop more or less 
autonomously from physics. All that is required by P is that any truth 
including truths involving laws, counterfactuals, confirmation, etc. is 
metaphysically entailed by statements of ideal physics.28 
What is the status of supervenience principles? Some philosophers 
have observed that they should not be thought of as expressing brute facts. 
To treat them as such would be to make supervenience an entirely 
mysterious relation. One would like the supervenience relations required by 
P to themselves be explained.  As Terry Horgan29 says 
unless psychophysical supervenience facts are themselves 
explainable, the instantiation of mental properties is not explainable 
on the basis of physico-chemical facts, but only on the basis of such 
facts plus metaphysically fundamental inter-level, supervenience 
facts. (p. 478) 
 
Now, in fact, there are explanations of some physical supervenience 
principles and it is generally thought that only complexity stands in the way of 
                                                 
28P places some restrictions on the special sciences, since the laws 
and causal processes posited in the special sciences must be implementable 
by physical causal processes.  
29See the entry "Physicalism" in Guttenplan (1994). 
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producing explanations of many others. These explanations involve   
perspicuous reductions of higher level predicates (and concepts) to lower 
level and, in some cases, physical predicates. I take it that the reductive 
relation relates concepts, and not the properties they refer to, since it makes 
no sense to speak of a property being reduced to itself.  
A paradigm case of perspicuous reduction is the reduction of water to 
H2O. According to the usual account, our concept water is the concept of 
that actual substance that happens to be a clear liquid, quenches thirst, fills 
the oceans, etc. It is an empirical fact that the compound H2O (the substance 
referred to with the concept H2O) satisfies this specification. This justifies the 
statement that water is identical to H2O. Given this reduction, we are in a 
position to explain a supervenience principle of the form  
(...H2O...⊃...water...). 
I call such an explanation ‘perspicuous reduction’ since, once the explanation 
is given, it is perspicuously clear that the proposed supervenience claim is 
true; it would not make sense to doubt its truth any more. 
Functionalism provides another example. We can see how the facts 
expressed in the higher level discourse might supervene on the facts 
expressed in the lower level discourse if we see that all there is to the 
satisfaction of higher level predicates is  the playing of a certain causal role. 
Any lower level description that displays the appropriate causal relations 
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between the properties referred to, will thereby be a reductive account of the 
higher level description. Successful functional reductions abound in, e.g., the 
biological sciences; an example is the reduction of genes to configurations of 
DNA-molecules. 
If, e.g., analytic functionalism about the mental was true, then we 
could see how the mental is reducible to the physical. Analytic functionalism 
is the view that mental predicates can be specified as referring to properties 
having a certain causal role vis a vis sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and 
other mental states.30  Any neuro-physiological description of a brain-state 
that satisfied that causal role would then serve as a reductive account of the 
mental state in question. But it is a wide-spread view that analytic 
functionalism is not an adequate account of mental properties, at least as far 
as phenomenal properties go. More on this later. 
                                                 
30A physical property, e.g., realizes a functional property iff it plays the 
causal role specified in the functional definition. The majority view is that 
psychological properties, like higher level properties in general, are multiply 
realized. For a classic treatment of the subject see Fodor's "Special 
Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", in Fodor 
(1975), pp. 9-25. 
This, of course, does not require that every metaphysically possible 
instance of a functional property would be realized by an instance of a 
physical property. Functionalism allows not only for multiple physical 
realization, but also for worlds where, e.g., mental properties are realized by 
non-physical properties, or even where mental properties are basic.  
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Functionalism about certain higher level predicates allows for the 
failure of Physicalism, since functional properties can be realized by non-
physical properties as well as physical properties. But it is also compatible 
with it, and the physicalist’s bet is that in all the nomologically possible worlds 
functional properties are always realized physically.  
Property identity, and functionalism are both examples of reductive 
accounts of higher level predicates. ‘Reductive’ is used here in a revisionist 
sense. Classical reductionism demanded identity between the properties 
referred to by higher level and lower level predicates. For our purposes, 
however, it will be useful to introduce the concept of reduction broadly so that 
a functional account of a higher level predicate will also count as a reductive 
account, since it can be easily seen how a functional property can be 
realized by lower level (ultimately, physical) properties. I want to leave the 
question open whether property identity and functionalism (or perhaps 
structuralism) exhaust the possible varieties of a reductive account, or there 
are hitherto unthought-of ways in which lower level properties might be able 
to realize higher level properties. 
An  important question is whether all supervenience principles can be 
given a perspicuous reductive explanation. This is a question that I will return 
to when I consider the Conceivability Arguments in Chapter Three and Four. 
For now, I want to argue that even if there is no perspicuous reductive 
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explanation of  a supervenience principle, it does not mean that the principle 
expresses a brute fact.  
To say that a statement expresses a brute fact is to say that what 
makes that statement true cannot be accounted for in terms of the properties 
and individuals that constitute the fact. The reduction of water to H2O was 
based on the observation that the concept water is associated with a 
contingent reference fixing description ‘the substance that is a clear liquid, 
quenches thirst..etc.’ But it may be that a concept refers to a property but not 
via a descriptive mode of presentation like this. Suppose, for example that 
concepts C and D are not associated with contingent reference fixing modes 
of presentation but refer directly to the same property, E. I am not now 
arguing that this is a possibility, but only that if it is then the fact expressed by 
C is D is perfectly un-mysterious, even though it cannot be explained in the 
way we explained Water is H2O. A similar point applies if C refers to a 
functional property C and D refers to a property D that realizes C, and C and 
D directly refer. Dx⊃Cx will then be true, and the fact it expresses will be 
entirely un-mysterious. It is just a realization fact and as such is necessary.  
In fact some hold that functionalism is true about mental properties, 
even though mental predicates cannot be analyzed in functional terms.  
Functionalism as a metaphysical doctrine says that what makes a state a 
particular mental state is just the fact that that state is of a type such that it is 
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related to sensory input, other mental states and behavior in some specified 
way. A metaphysical functionalist does not have to be an analytic 
functionalist as well; she can have almost any view about the semantics of 
mental terms as long as she maintains that the nature of the phenomena 
referred to by those terms is functional.31 
If these cases are possible, we can say that metaphysical 
reductionism holds between the higher and lower level predicates. Even 
though the semantics of the predicates, together with contingent facts, does 
not reveal the identity relation or the functional realization relation holding 
between the properties referred to, identity or the realization relation can still 
hold. So a reason to think that some form of the identity theory or 
functionalism holds in the metaphysical sense would be a reason to think 
that there is an explanation for the supervenience facts. 
P entails  supervenience principles. But it does not by itself entail that 
supervenience principles can be reductively explained  or that they are 
grounded in the natures of properties. For all P says these principles might 
be brute. If we were forced into such a view then I think that would be reason 
to doubt P. But I will argue that there is no reason to think that there are true 
                                                 
31See, e.g., Putnam (1967), Block and Fodor (1972) p.240. 
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supervenience principles that  cannot be accounted for in either of the two 
ways we have discussed. 
1.5 THE JUSTIFICATION OF PHYSICALISM  
Why should we believe physicalism?  There are primarily two kinds of 
reasons that physicalists have provided. Both depend on the astonishing 
success of physics to date. The first reason is provided by the particular 
reductions of higher level predicates to lower level, and ultimately physical 
predicates that have either been carried out or which, it is claimed, it is 
reasonable to believe could be carried out. As we saw, such  reductions 
ground and explain certain instances of E that are required by P. The most 
developed examples are the  reductions of thermodynamic and chemical 
predicates and processes to quantum mechanics and the reductions of 
certain biological predicates and processes to chemical predicates and 
processes (e.g., biochemical accounts of photosynthesis, cell growth, 
genotype transmission). For macro-processes other than those involving 
mentality there is little reason to doubt that such reductions exist.  
These reasons for physicalism are not overwhelmingly strong. Anti-
physicalists might grant that non-mental macroscopic properties are micro-
physically reducible but claim that mental properties are different; that there  
are in principle reasons why they are not reducible in the manner of non-
mental macroscopic predicates to physical predicates. The conceivability 
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argument is supposed to establish just this. But I think it is fair to say that, 
pending a persuasive anti-reductionist argument, the successful reductions 
that have been produced provide reason to believe that the truth of 
statements involving mental predicates is not incompatible with physicalism. 
The second argument for physicalism is stronger. It begins with the 
premiss that physics is causally closed.32  To say that physics is causally 
closed is to say that every physical event has as a full causal explanation in 
terms of prior physical events and the laws of physics.33 If F is a higher level 
property which has different physical effects depending on whether or not it 
is instantiated, e.g., a physical detector of the presence or absence of F in a 
region is physically possible, then it can be shown that  if F is instantiated at 
some time t in  R then the complete physical description of the world 
metaphysically entails that F is instantiated at t in region R. The argument is 
a reductio. Suppose that F’s being instantiated at t fails to supervene on the 
                                                 
32The idea behind the argument is suggested by McGinn (1982, p. 29) 
and formulated in slightly different ways by Papineau (1993b, pp. 17-20) and 
Loewer (1995). An error in their line of reasoning is found by Witmer (1997, 
pp.195-304) who makes the needed repairs. 
33By “physical event” I mean the values of fundamental physical 
quantities in a region of space at a time (I am ignoring relativistic 
complications). If the fundamental laws are indeterministic, then causal 
closure says that prior physical events and laws specify the probabilities of 
physical events and these probabilities remain the same in the face of 
conditionalization on statements not couched in the vocabulary of 
fundamental physics. 
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physical facts at t. Then whether or not F is present can make no causal 
difference to the subsequent physical events, since they are determined (up 
to objective indeterminacy) by the physical facts at t. Since it is plausible that 
every genuine property, including intentional and phenomenal properties, 
does make a causal difference to physical events, it is plausible that  every 
property, and so every truth, supervenes on the complete physical 
description of the world.34 
What would it be like if phenomenal properties failed to supervene on 
physical facts? These seem to be three possibilities: 
1. P is false, but physics is causally closed. In this case phenomenal 
properties are epiphenomenal with respect to physical events. 
(Epiphenomenalism) 
 
2. P is false and  physics is not causally closed. Phenomenal 
properties have their own causal powers that are not derived from 
supervenience relations on physical properties. (Dualist 
interactionism). 
 
3. P is true, but phenomenal properties are not instantiated. 
(Eliminativism) 
                
                                                 
34The complete physical description, of course, have to includes the 
laws. 
None of these positions are attractive. Epiphenomenalism makes it 
puzzling how we can come to know whether the epiphenomenal property is 
exemplified. And, in any case, phenomenal properties, e.g., being in pain, 
certainly seem to have physical effects. Dualist interactionism has been 
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proposed to deal with the measurement problem in quantum theory and for 
other reasons as well. It is probably correct to say that we do not  know for 
certain that it is false. On the other hand, there is no evidence whatsoever in 
favor of it, and there are no interactionist theories even sufficiently articulated 
to test. Eliminativism is difficult to take seriously. I will put off doing so to 
Chapter Two.  
In any case, an argument would have to be very compelling to lead 
one to accept one of the above alternatives. The conceivability arguments 
claim to compel us to do just this. But before turning to them I want to look a 
little more closely at the nature of consciousness. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 
 
 
2.1 KINDS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 
Consciousness is a complicated phenomenon involving a number of 
different aspects. Ned Block (1994a, 1994b) provides a useful taxonomy. His 
main distinction is between what he calls “cognitive consciousness” and 
“phenomenal consciousness.” Cognitive consciousness involves a mental 
state’s possessing a particular kind of representational content or a particular 
cognitive role. Block distinguishes among various kinds of cognitive 
consciousness. A state is  access conscious if its content is inferentially 
"promiscuous", in the sense that it freely enters into reasoning involving other 
propositional attitudes, and is available for the rational control of behavior 
(verbal behavior included). A mental state is self-conscious if it involves a 
first-person representation of one's self. It  is reflectively conscious if one has 
a "higher order" thought about that state to the effect that one is in that 
state.35 According to Block, when we say of some thought that it is conscious 
we might mean any of these aspects. 
                                                 
35Subpersonal mental representations posited by cognitive 
 
 
 
43 
Phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand, involves experiential quality, 
the “what it’s like” feature possessed by some mental states and processes. 
For example, when listening to, e.g., a Bartók string quartet, there are 
various auditory and other sensations, feelings of excitement, agitation and 
so forth that partly make up my experience. On any particular occasion, there 
is something it’s like to have these experiences. Phenomenal consciousness 
is a determinable - there being something it’s like -, with various kinds of 
determinates, i.e., the specific ways it is like. In the philosophical literature on 
consciousness these determinate kinds of phenomenal consciousness are 
called ‘qualia’.36 There are qualia associated with the various senses, i.e., 
auditory qualia, visual qualia, etc., and also distinctive kinds of qualia 
associated with various emotions, reflective thinking, meditation and so forth.  
A typical human conscious episode, say the pain a person 
experiences when she has a headache, involves both phenomenal and 
                                                                                                                                     
psychologists in theorems of language processing (see, e.g., Chomsky 
1975), vision (Marr 1982), etc., are unconscious in all of the above ways. 
Mental states posited by Freudian theory are not access conscious (access 
is available only with the help of your analyst)  but may be self-conscious and 
reflectively conscious. It is not implausible that my cat’s mental states are 
access conscious but not self or reflectively conscious. 
36‘Qualia’ is used to refer to both determinate phenomenal qualities, 
and to token instances of determinate phenomenal qualities. I will mostly use 
the term to refer to the property. Occasionally, I will also use ‘qualia’ in an 
adjectival sense, as in ‘qualia property’, to point to the determinable (i.e., 
phenomenal property).  
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cognitive consciousness. There is the phenomenal feeling of the headache: 
there is something it’s like to have it. This feeling will typically involve 
different sensations and will change over time. The state is typically access 
conscious, since it may cause her to decide to take an aspirin, and typically 
self and reflectively conscious since she will judge that she is experiencing a 
headache. 
For all I have said so far, cognitive and phenomenal consciousness 
may be two aspects of the same phenomena, or involve phenomena that are 
metaphysically or nomologically linked. However, Block  argues that cognitive 
and phenomenal consciousness can be pried apart and are not just two 
aspects of the same phenomenon. He claims that it is possible for a mental 
state to be, say, access conscious, but not phenomenally conscious, and 
vice versa.  
One of his arguments for the possibility of access without phenomenal 
consciousness involves  blind sight. Certain people who are blind in that they 
experience no visual sensations, still apparently can obtain information about 
their environments via vision. In such cases Block thinks it is plausible that 
there is at least partial access to visual information, but there is reason to 
think that it is not accompanied by phenomenal consciousness since the 
subjects report that they experience no visual sensations. 
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The existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive 
consciousness is more speculative. One of the tentative examples Block 
(1994) gives of phenomenal consciousness unaccompanied by access 
consciousness has to do with reports of phenomenally conscious events 
under general anesthesia. Patients claim that the operation hurt. Another 
example comes from a study done on pilots during WW II by American 
dentists. The un-pressurized cabins caused the pilots to experience 
sensations in their teeth that could be interpreted as some kind of recreation 
of the pain of previous dental work. The pilots' recreation of previous pain 
would only follow dental work done in general anesthesia; procedures done 
in local anesthesia do not leave such "bodily memories". 
While it seems that it is metaphysically possible  (and actual if Block’s 
interpretation of blind sight is correct) for there to be  states that are cognitive 
conscious but not phenomenal conscious 37, the reverse is less obvious. The 
very concept of a phenomenal state that is not accessible and/or not 
available to second order judgements is quite peculiar. How can a state 
possess  what-it-is-like-ness without it being like something for someone? In 
other words, phenomenal consciousness seems to be essentially subjective. 
And that seems to involve that it is available to the subject’s cognitive 
                                                 
37Assuming, of course, contrary to some (e.g., Rosenthal 1990), that 
phenomenal consciousness cannot be reduced to cognitive consciousness. 
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system.38 To think otherwise, i.e., that there are phenomenally conscious 
states that are not access conscious is to countenance cognitively isolated 
“islands” of phenomenal experience. There would be little more reason to 
say that they belong to a particular person rather than to her toes. There 
seems no reason to say that they are part of her mind. 
 
Be that as it may, the important point is that it is phenomenal, and not 
cognitive consciousness that is relevant to the Conceivability and 
Explanatory Gap Arguments. The concept of cognitive consciousness is the 
concept of something that fulfills a certain role. Assuming that 
representational content poses no problem for physicalism - a big 
assumption -, there seems to be no special problem for physicalism posed 
by cognitive consciousness. The problem is the usual one of finding those 
physical, plausibly neurophysiological, structures and processes that 
implement the cognitive consciousness roles.  
                                                 
38Jennifer Church argues along these lines in an unpublished talk; 
Rutgers 1996. 
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But this would not solve the problems posed for physicalism by 
phenomenal consciousness. An account of cognitive consciousness does 
not, by itself, explain the nature of phenomenal consciousness or shed light 
on how it can be physically implemented. In any case, the Conceivability 
Arguments, if sound, would show that phenomenal and cognitive 
consciousness are metaphysically distinct, since a being with cognitive 
consciousness, but lacking phenomenal consciousness, certainly seems 
conceptually possible.39 
 
 
2.2 PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Human beings, and no doubt other creatures, are capable of 
experiencing an enormous number and variety of qualia. Below is a very 
incomplete list to remind us of the enormous richness of phenomenal 
experience. 
                                                 
39 The fact that it may seem (pace the argument I gave above) that it 
is conceptually possible for there to be phenomenally conscious states that 
are not cognitively conscious may encourage the thought that this is a 
genuine metaphysical possibility. This is an instance of the kind of 
conceivability argument that I will be discussing and undermining in 
subsequent chapters. 
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A) Bodily sensations: pains, aches, itches, tensions, tickles, tingles, 
pleasures. 
 
B) Perceptual sensations: the smell of a rose, the sight of a cloudless 
sky, the sound of a middle C, the taste of a ripe apricot. 
 
C) Images: dream images, fantasy  images, memory images, after 
images. 
 
D) Feelings: rage, longing, contentedness, boredom. 
 
E) Moods: amusement, elation, anxiety. 
 
I want to investigate now what we can say about qualia in the spirit of 
asking how they seem to us, while recognizing that we might be mistaken 
about some of the features that we are inclined to attribute to them. I have 
gleaned these from the philosophical literature, but they also mostly strike 
me as what a non-philosopher would say; if not quite in these words. 
 1) Determinateness of what it’s like. I, and I am sure every other 
person, have the impression that qualia are  determinate properties with 
respect to what it’s like to instantiate them. For example, in experiencing a 
toothache there seems to be a determinate property of that toothache, and it 
also seems that I can experience toothaches of the same type at other times 
and that other people can experience toothaches of the same type. Further, 
it seems to me that other toothaches may be more or less similar to this one 
with respect to what this toothache is like; i.e., in qualitative content. Qualia 
seem to exhibit a complicated structure of similarities and differences in 
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qualitative content. Headaches are more like toothaches then visual 
experiences of red, while the latter are more like visual experiences of green 
than like headaches; tastes are more like each other than like visual 
experiences and the taste of a lemon is more similar to the taste of a 
grapefruit than to the taste of Hungarian sausage. 
2) Subjectivity. Qualia are subjective properties. An experience is 
always an experience for someone; it is an experience  from the subject’s 
point of view.  
3) Asymmetric epistemology. Each person has epistemic access to 
her own phenomenal states via introspection, but to other peoples 
phenomenal states only via behavioral or other physical intermediaries. 
Further, one can know what an experience is like only by having that 
experience.  
4) Intrinsicness. Qualia appear to be intrinsic properties of mental 
states. It is a very strong intuition that a brain in a vat or a swampman can 
experience exactly the same qualia that I am experiencing now.  
5) Categoricalness. Qualia appear to be categorical properties. By that 
I mean  that they are properties that are not individuated in terms of their 
causal and nomological dispositions. A paradigm non-categorical property is 
solubility. Its instances are grouped together in virtue of a causal 
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disposition, i.e., to dissolve in water. Qualia do not seem to be like that. 
Instances of qualia are grouped together in virtue of similarity of quality. 
6) Intentionality. Qualia, or at least many types of qualia, seem to be 
essentially intentional.  The visual qualia I experience when looking at the 
sunset seem to have intentional content. They represent colored expanses in 
my visual field and via them they represent the setting of the sun. Further, it 
is not merely that these qualia contingently, or conventionally represent what 
they do in the way, for example, the word “red” represents red. The 
representational features seem to be essential to the qualia. 
7) Collapse of appearance/reality distinction. For qualia, the usual 
distinction we make between the way something appears and the way it 
really is, collapses. For example, there is a distinction between it appearing 
to me that there is a cat at my feet, and there being a cat at my feet. Either 
may obtain without the other. But the situation seems different with qualia. If 
it appears to me that I have a headache then I have a headache. Of course, 
to avoid misunderstanding, I should say that I am using “headache” to 
characterize a kind of qualia intrinsically with no implication as to what its 
causes are. So understood, to appear to have a headache is to have a 
headache.  
8) The conceivability of zombies and inverted spectra. No matter what 
physical information I have about a person, about her brain states and 
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processes, her functional structure and dispositions to behave, there seems 
to be no contradiction in her being like that and yet instantiating no qualia. 
Also, there seems to be no contradiction in there being two persons who are 
physical duplicates but who instantiate inverted qualia. In particular, where 
one person experiences phenomenal green, the other experiences 
phenomenal red and vice versa. 
9) Qualitative character. One of the most obvious features of qualia is 
that there is something it’s like to have them; they have a certain specific 
phenomenal feel.  
 
 
 
Eliminativism  
Reflection on the characteristics we are inclined to attribute to qualia 
leads some philosophers to think that no physical or functional property can 
possess them.40 If one thinks that and is also committed to physicalism then 
                                                 
40The conceivability arguments are intended to establish that qualia 
are not physical or physically realizable. But even without argument, one may 
well wonder how there can be no distinction between appearance and reality 
for any physical property. In fact, the problem doesn’t really have to do with 
physics but rather with objectivity.  Any property for which no 
appearance/reality distinction can be made must be very different from 
familiar properties. Their subjectivity must be essential to them and it is hard 
to understand how any property can be like that. So this consideration does 
 
 
 
52 
one might endorse Eliminativism; the view there are no qualia or that qualia 
are not instantiated. 
                                                                                                                                     
not favor dualism over physicalism; it rather supports the idea that qualia 
must be eliminated. 
However, the proposal that there are no qualia is likely to strike all but 
the most sophisticated philosophers as absurd. The reason that  
eliminativism strikes one as absurd is that our acquaintance with qualia - our 
knowing what various experiences are like - is direct. Because of this we 
cannot explain it away as mere appearance. It is appearance. Contrast this 
with, for example, the apparent immobility of the earth and the revolution of 
the sun around the earth. We can explain why the earth appears to be still 
(though it moves) and why the sun appears to orbit the earth (though it is the 
other way around). Even thought it is ”obvious”, or at least it was to our 
ancestors, that the earth does not move there is logical distance between the 
thought that the earth does not move and the thought that it appears that it 
does not move. Because of this we can understand how it may really be that 
the earth  moves even though it appears not to.  
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But in the case of qualia it makes no sense to say that I merely appear 
to have them but really don't.  If I know anything, I know what my 
experiences are like.  Further, qualia are absolutely central to one’s life. if I 
thought that, as of midnight, my physical and functional organization would 
be similar to how it is now, but that  I would no longer have qualia, I would 
regard that as death, or a kind of living death.41 My body would go on living 
as a zombie, but I would be no more.         
Eliminativism then is a non-starter. There are qualia. But accepting 
that there are qualia does not commit  one either to qualia actually being 
everything they appear to be or to their being scientifically important 
properties. It may be that some of the ways that qualia appear, e.g., their 
appearing to be categorical is mere appearance.  What cannot be mere 
appearance is that there is something it is like to have a headache, see a 
cloudless blue sky, etc. 
                                                 
41This thought may, of course, express a metaphysical impossibility. 
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Qualia are important properties from a subjective point of view. They 
are, as we mentioned above, absolutely important to our lives. But that is 
entirely compatible with their being not very important from a scientific point 
of view. On the abundant conception of properties, not every property will be 
scientifically important; occur in laws or scientific explanations. Some 
philosophers seem to think that by showing that the property has no role to 
play in science, in particular, is not invoked by any explanatory theory, one 
has thereby shown that the putative property does not exist (and so does not 
have instances). This may be a reasonable stance if one has a sparse (or 
elite) conception of properties.42 But  on that conception it is unreasonable to 
say that a thought of the form There are Fs is true only if F refers to an (elite) 
property. And you still have to give an account of what makes thoughts of the 
form There are Fs true. 
If there are qualia, and if physicalism is true then true qualia thoughts 
are made true by physical facts. But how are they made true? A completely 
satisfactory way of answering this would be to specify a physical or functional 
property and then show for each condition on our list either that this property 
satisfies that condition, or, if it fails to satisfy the condition, explain that away 
as mere appearance. There are a number of attempted reductions in the 
                                                 
42 Recall the discussion of properties in Chapter One.  
 
 
 
55 
literature identifying qualia with certain neurophysiological, computational, 
and representational properties. At best, some of these theories provide 
partial accounts . None provides a persuasive account of how the what it’s 
like feature of qualia  results from arrangements of properties that are not 
qualia. So, rather than examining these accounts of the nature of qualia, 
here I want to look at an account of the nature of qualia concepts due to 
Brian Loar (1990, 1997).43  
Loar’s suggestion is that many of the characteristics, especially the 
most problematic ones, that we are inclined to attribute to qualia are actually 
due to the way we think about our own qualia; to the nature of the concepts 
that we employ to pick out our own qualia.  
 
                                                 
43Sturgeon proposes ideas similar to Loar in Sturgeon (1994).  
2.3 THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS 
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Phenomenal concepts are concepts that a person applies directly to 
her qualia. They are tokened when, for example, a person  sips a red wine 
and notices first sensations of tanginess and then a sensation of sourness. 
Loar (1990, 1997) says that phenomenal concepts belong to a wide class of 
concepts he calls “recognitional concepts.” Recognitional concepts are those 
that enable their possessors to  perceptually recognize instances of the 
concept under certain circumstances.44 Thus recognitional concepts are 
connected, via their inferential roles, with basic perceptual concepts,  
sensory inputs, images, etc.  Loar says that recognitional concepts have the 
general structure “is of that kind” where the demonstrative purports to refer to 
a kind as exemplified through a perception or image of an instance of the 
concept.  
Here is an illustration. Jerry sees a platypus for the first time in the 
zoo, and forms the concept  animal of that kind, where the demonstrative is 
focused on its reference by his perception. His  concept is connected with 
                                                 
44Fodor argues that there are no recognitional concepts, not even red 
(Fodor 1997, Ch. 4). Fodor’s arguments against recognitional concepts 
depend on considerations of compositionality. He thinks the features that 
supposedly make a concept recognitional do not compose, and so cannot 
really be constitutive of the concept. But even if that is correct about 
concepts in general, I will argue that phenomenal concepts (like indexicals, 
demonstratives, and logical terms) are different, in that they are hard-wired to 
occupy a certain conceptual role, which underlies the recognitional capacities 
associated with them.  
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other concepts that constitute the  beliefs he forms on the basis of the 
perception. For example, it is connected to the concepts web-footed, aquatic, 
brownish, etc. Possessing this concept, he is able to recognize other 
instances. 
Loar mentions a number of features of typical recognitional concepts 
that are important to mention.  
1) they are demonstrative and perspectival; 
2) they enable a thinker to recognize their instances via perception; 
3) the perceptual concepts via which they are applied are typically 
conceived of as contingently connected to the kind referred to by the 
concept. 
 
Phenomenal concepts are a special kind of recognitional concept. 
Their basic application is to one’s own phenomenal states as they occur, 
e.g., itch again. Of course, we also apply phenomenal concepts in memory 
and in reasoning and to other people. These applications are derivative, 
depending on the first person, present tense applications, so I will describe 
the basic application first.   
Unlike other recognitional concepts, a phenomenal concept does not 
refer via a continent mode of presentation. Instead, it is applied directly to an 
internal state. Loar suggests that a phenomenal concept  has a mode of 
presentation that is essential to its reference. What he seems to have in 
mind is that when tokening a phenomenal concept, the reference is focused 
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or determined by a token of that very kind of phenomenal state. The mode of 
presentation is then the very property referred to. For example, when 
tokening pain, the mode of presentation is the painfulness of the token of 
pain to which the concept is applied. Thus the mode of presentation is 
essential to the referent.45 
There is a puzzle about the preceding account. If a phenomenal 
concept, e.g., pain, has reference only in virtue of the occurrence of a painful 
state, then it looks as though referenceless basic tokens of pain, or rather, of 
a concept just like it except  for not having a reference, are possible. In that 
case, a person could token a concept pain# that is just like pain, minus the 
phenomenal state. It could even appear to the person that she is in pain, and 
the tokening of pain# might cause pain behavior, beliefs, memories, etc. It 
seems as thought on the account so far sketched, the relation between a 
phenomenal concept and its reference, though close, is not yet sufficiently 
intimate. As we mentioned earlier, in the case of qualia, the 
appearance/reality distinction collapses (this is feature 7 on our list).46 If, 
                                                 
45The mode of presentation of a concept, as we mentioned in Chapter 
One, is how the thinker conceives of  the concept’s purported reference. It is 
a determinant or partial determinant of the concept’s reference. For most 
concepts it can be characterized descriptively. But for phenomenal concepts, 
it is the reference. 
46This is sometimes expressed by saying that our phenomenal 
judgements are incorrigible.  
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however, the tokening of the concept pain (or rather, the internally 
indistinguishable concept pain#) can come apart from instantiations of the 
property pain, then the appearance/reality distinction applies to phenomenal 
concepts just as much as to every other concept.  
Here is a suggestion to overcome that. Suppose that a phenomenal 
concept of a given type is identical to its reference, e.g., the concept pain is 
identical to the property pain.. A particular token of the concept pain is a 
particular painful state. On this account phenomenal concepts are self 
referring; something of the sort internal state of the phenomenal kind which I 
exemplify.47  This is, in a way, in agreement with Dennett when he declares: 
“You seem to think there’s a difference between thinking (judging, deciding, 
being of the heartfelt opinion that) something seems pink to you and 
something really seeming pink to you. But there is no difference.” (1991a, p. 
364)48 
                                                 
47The pronoun “I” is intended to be understood as the concept 
referring to itself. The suggestion that phenomenal states are self-referring 
phenomenal concepts bears some similarity to Tyler Burge’s (1988) account 
of self-knowledge. According to Burge, certain judgements about the 
intentional contents of one’s states are self-certifying. Take for example, I'm 
now judging that I am thinking that cats purr. In order to make the judgment 
one has to do the thinking so the judgment must be true. On my proposal, in 
order to token the phenomenal concept (in the basic way), one has to token 
the phenomenal state to which it refers. 
48Of course, his view is that what this means that there are no qualia, 
that qualia are not real. As he puts it, “[t]here is no such phenomenon as really 
seeming - over and above the phenomenon of judging in one way or another that 
something is the case.” (ibid, p. 364) My view is that qualia are perfectly real, 
and that our qualia-judgements are constituted, at least partly, by our qualia-
states. 
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Of course, a given phenomenal state will exemplify many phenomenal 
properties. The suggestion is that it refers to the most determinate qualia it 
exemplifies.49 Note that the suggestion is not that all there is to phenomenal 
concepts is that they are self-referential. They have other intrinsic properties 
and conceptual roles. It is these other features that distinguish various 
phenomenal concepts (and phenomenal states, as these are phenomenal 
concepts) from each other.  The preceding proposal is speculative and not 
part of Loar’s account. But it seems to have the advantage that it can 
account for most of the apparent features of qualia, listed in 1-8 above. 
                                                 
49Or perhaps it refers ambiguously to each of the qualia it exemplifies. 
What about non-basic applications of phenomenal concepts? Clearly, 
a person can token a concept that refers to pain without herself literally 
experiencing pain as when she replies to her dentist’s question by “I am not 
in pain” or when one sees another person stub her toe and thinks that must 
really hurt. These concepts must be distinct from basic phenomenal 
concepts. Here is a suggestion concerning how they work. A person forms a 
memory of a basic tokening of, e.g., pain. This memory contains a concept 
that refers to the basic tokening, i.e., to the particular pain. The derivative 
concept pain has the content same phenomenal property as that where the  
demonstrative demonstrates the memory of pain.       
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The preceding account of phenomenal concepts has some interesting 
consequences. I will list these below, matching them with our list of 
properties that qualia appear to possess. 
1) Determinateness of what it’s like. Phenomenal concepts present 
their references as determinate properties. Instances of, e.g., appears blue, 
all seem to have something phenomenally in common, and seem more 
similar to instances of appears turquoise than appears red. 
2) Subjectivity. Phenomenal concepts present their references from a 
subjective point of view. The basic concepts can apply only to a state of the 
subject, and derivative phenomenal concepts make reference to the basic 
applications. 
3) Asymmetric epistemology. The nature of phenomenal concepts  
accounts of unique epistemic access each person has to her own qualia.  
4,5) Intrinsicness, categoricalness. Basic phenomenal concepts 
present their references as intrinsic and categorical. A phenomenal concept 
is plausibly a relational and dispositional property since it is constituted in 
part by its causal relations to other concepts. Even so, it presents its 
reference, i.e., itself, without disclosing these relations or dispositions. And it 
gives the impression that its instances are grouped together in virtue of 
qualitative similarity (since they are instances of the qualia), not causal 
dispositions. 
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6) Intentionality. Qualia are intentional since they are concepts that 
self-refer. This, in a way, captures our intuition that qualia are 
representational, although it is important to point out that the fact that qualia 
concepts are representational in the way I am suggesting, is not a priori 
available to us.  Further, the fact that they represent themselves (or rather 
the phenomenal property they exemplify) does not preclude them from 
representing other properties as well. Thus, a visual sensation of blue may 
represent the qualia blue, as well as the blueness of the sky. The account 
also makes for a unified theory of mind on which all mental states are 
intentional. One problem with theories on which qualia are not intentional 
states is understanding how they can be part of the mind any more than 
other bodily properties.  
7) Collapse of appearance/reality distinction. It explains the collapse 
of the appearance/reality distinction. Since qualia are self-referential there 
can be no distinction between, e.g., a state appearing to be painful (when 
tokening the basic concept  pain) and its really being painful! Finally, we can 
see why we find eliminativism - the idea that phenomenal concepts have no 
reference - so absurd. If phenomenal concepts are self-referential and we 
have even an implicit appreciation of that then the proposal that they lack 
reference will be defeated merely by tokening a phenomenal concept.  
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But this does not mean that phenomenal concepts denote scientific 
properties. It may be that the various tokens of a phenomenal concept, e.g., 
the concept tickle have very little in common from a neurophysiological point 
of view. While tickles are grouped together in a particular way on the basis of 
our phenomenological judgements of similarity, the states judged similar 
phenomenally may be a physical hodgepodge. So the view I have sketched 
is compatible with eliminativism if that doctrine  is understood as claiming 
that phenomenal properties will find no special place and no important place 
in scientific theory. But who would have thought otherwise? And their not 
being important from the point of view of science hardly means that they are 
not important at all even to the scientific enterprise.  
8) The conceivability of zombies and inverted spectra. It  explains why 
zombies and inverted spectra are conceivable. The reason lies in the fact 
that basic phenomenal concepts are direct recognitional concepts (and 
derivative phenomenal concepts make reference to their direct cousins). 
Because they are direct recognitional concepts a subject applies them 
directly to her internal states and not in virtue of those states satisfying 
certain other features, e.g., satisfying some functional role or being related to 
physical phenomena in such and such a way. Because of this, there are no 
constitutive conceptual connections between phenomenal concepts and 
behavioral, functional, etc. concepts that are sufficient to yield a conceptual 
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entailment from a physical-functional description to a phenomenal 
description. Further, on this account it may be that distinct qualia, e.g., 
appears red and appears green possess perfectly symmetric conceptual 
roles. If so then qualia inversion will be conceptually possible.  
So far as I can see, Loar’s original account of phenomenal concepts 
also explains why we are inclined to attribute the conditions on our list to 
qualia; except  6 and 7, intentionality and incorrigibility, which my version 
helps explain better. There is one item on the list however, which neither 
account explains. This one is the most significant: the qualitative feel of 
qualia, e.g., that there is something it’s like to see a cloudless blue sky (9 on 
our list). But, as we will see, the accounts explain why we cannot provide a 
satisfactory reduction of qualitative feel. I return to this in the conclusion.  
Loar’s account of phenomenal concepts is neutral concerning whether 
or not qualia are physically realized properties. They are, if the account is 
correct, at least partly functional properties since they are concepts and 
concepts are partly functional properties. But they may have other intrinsic 
features incompatible with physicalism. The account is, we might say, a 
double edged sword. On the one hand it accounts for many of the features of 
qualia in terms of the way we conceive of them. This is quite favorable for 
physicalism.  On the other hand, it provides an account of phenomenal 
concepts that implies that zombies are conceptually possible. This is the lead 
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premise  of the conceivability arguments. If these arguments are sound then 
phenomenal concepts do not refer to physically realizable properties. So we 
now turn to examine the conceivability arguments to determine whether or 
not this double edged sword is capable of cutting the “World-knot” as 
Schopenhauer termed the Mind-Body Problem. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENTS 
 
 
In this chapter I will be outlining and explicating expositions of the 
Conceivability Argument, as well as a close cousin of them, the Gap 
Argument. I will be pointing out the common assumption that runs through 
these arguments; this will prepare the ground for the Master Argument which 
will be adaptable to refute all of the Conceivability Arguments. I will be critical 
in my exposition; however, I will not present a refutation of these arguments 
at this point. The refutation of all the Conceivability Arguments will be the 
subject of Chapter Four. 
 
3.1.  DESCARTES’ ARGUMENT FOR THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MIND AND 
BODY 
 
  Descartes has been the originator of a long line of arguments called 
the Conceivability Arguments for Dualism. Descartes famously argued (Sixth 
Meditation in: Cottingham 1984, II. p. 54) that since it is possible to conceive 
of his mind and body existing separately they are really distinct. Descartes 
made the connection between conceivability and possibility via the notion of 
essence.  
Certain philosophers, among them Descartes, hold an essentialist 
view. They hold that things, events, and properties have a nature that they 
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necessarily have: it is metaphysically necessary, for example, for material 
bodies to be extended, for minds to be thoughtful, or, as modern 
essentialists hold, for water to be composed of two hydrogen and one 
oxygen atom, as it is of their nature to be so. The notion of a nature of things, 
events, properties, etc., has played an important role in the philosophical 
investigation of what there is, how entities are constituted;  recently it plays a 
role in understanding and explicating  theoretical reduction, and many other 
subjects. Conceptual possibility, and necessity, on the other hand, concerns 
what is coherently conceivable, not as a matter of psychological fact, but 
rather as a matter of our concepts.  
Descartes made the connection between conceivability and 
necessity/possibility in the following way. He thought that when we conceive 
of, e.g., a substance, clearly and distinctly, we have a complete conception 
of that substance. Having a complete conception of a substance means that 
we conceive of it through its essence, and, importantly, through its whole 
essence. He thought that when we conceive of bodies clearly and distinctly, 
we see, by our very conception of bodies, that their  whole essence is to be 
extended, and when we conceive of minds clearly and distinctly, we see that 
their whole essence is to be thoughtful. Descartes then argued that we can 
conceive of bodies clearly and distinctly without the property of thought, and, 
reversely, we can clearly and distinctly conceive of minds without extension. 
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This, however, means that it is possible for minds to be disembodied, and 
reversely, for bodies to exist without minds, since it is of the essence of 
minds to be thoughtful, but it is not of the essence of bodies to be so; and, it 
is of the essence of bodies to be extended, but not of the essence of minds 
to be so.50Minds and bodies are really distinct.  The argument, reconstructed 
from the Sixth Meditation,  goes like this:51  
1) Whatever I can clearly and distinctly understand can be brought about 
by God. 
 
                                                 
50Actually, strictly speaking, he only argues that if he has a body, then 
it is separate from his mind. A plausible way to read his argument is that he 
was trying to prove that he (or his mind) could exist in the absence of 
anything else existing. 
51I am using Margaret Wilson’s interpretation of the argument (see 
Wilson 1978). 
2)  If α belongs to the essence of A and β belongs to the essence of B, 
and  I can clearly and distinctly understand B to exist without α and A 
to exist without β, then I can clearly and distinctly understand A to 
exist without  B  and B to exist without A. 
 
3)   Thought belongs to the essence of my mind, extension belongs to the 
essence of body. 
 
4) I can clearly and distinctly understand body to exist without thought 
and my mind to exist without extension.  
 
5) By (1), (2), (3) and (4), my mind can exist apart from body. 
 
6) If A can exist apart from B, and vice versa, A is really distinct from B. 
 
7) Hence, by (5) and (6), mind is really distinct from body. 
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This is a classic statement of Dualism.52 First, notice that questions 
about the existence of God are important for Descartes' overall position; 
however, from the point of view of this argument these questions are 
irrelevant. The argument could be stated without invoking claims about the 
power of God: the possibility of God's bringing about something can be 
thought about in terms of possibility simpliciter. Premiss 1 in this  
interpretation would then simply state that conceivability implies possibility.  
The most controversial premiss, and the one that has gotten the most 
attention is premiss 1. Many philosophers deny that conceivability implies 
possibility.  Descartes was criticized early on by Arnauld for assuming that 
the essential properties of his mind and body do not go beyond what he is 
aware of: 
                                                 
52Descartes' argument appeals to mentality as a homogeneous 
phenomenon. In the more current literature the argument is usually 
formulated with respect to a particular aspect of the mind: i.e., the 
experiential, qualitative aspect. Other aspects, like intentionality, seem to 
pose less of an  insurmountable problem for naturalization. 
How does it follow, from the fact that he is aware of nothing else 
belonging to his essence, that nothing else does in fact belong to it? 
(in John Cottingham; Robert Stoothoff; Dugald Murdoch 1984, Vol II, 
p. 140) 
 
Descartes did assume that clear and distinct perception delivers the sole 
essence of substances. He held that our clear and distinct perception of 
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substances is, in a certain sense,  transparent. Let’s call it the Cartesian 
Transparency Thesis (CTT):  
(CTT) When you clearly and distinctly perceive of substance A and 
substance B, that is, you conceive of them through their whole 
essence,  and still do not see that they are the same 
substance, then they must be different.  
 
This assumption, however, is contentious; Arnauld’s  objection has to 
be addressed. In different forms, but this very same objection applies to all 
the Conceivability Arguments, and the inability to answer satisfactorily will be 
their ultimate undoing. However, I defer detailed discussion until later. 
There is another argument in Descartes that we might call the 
Argument From Doubt. In the Second Meditation he suggests that Dualism is 
true since he can suppose  that his body does not exist, at the same time 
that he is certain his mind exists. The argument is the following.  
1) I am certain that my mind exists. 
2)  I am not certain that my body exists. 
3) My mind is diverse from my body.53 
 
                                                 
53Descartes actually runs the argument a little differently. He starts by 
observing that he is certain he himself exists, whereas not certain that his 
body exists. However, since he thought he knew that he was essentially a 
thinking thing, a mind, my formulation, I hope, preserves the spirit of his 
argument. 
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This argument, as presented, is obviously invalid. A further premiss, 
like, e.g., that  
2') If I am certain of the existence of a, but not certain of the existence of 
b, then a cannot be identical to b.  
 
is needed to derive 3. However, this premiss is hard to defend. Nagel (1974) 
and Jackson (1982) developed similar arguments recently54; the problems 
they face are also similar. I will deal with these problems in detail in the 
following chapters. 
Much  of the contemporary discussion surrounding the metaphysics of 
mind originates in Descartes’ work. He put the conceptual and 
epistemological rift between the mental and the physical center stage in his 
philosophy; and he was the first to draw  clear ontological conclusions from 
it. 
 
 
                                                 
54The similarity is in the basic structure of the argument. All of these 
arguments move from the assumption that a certain type of knowledge-claim 
does not imply another to the conclusion that the subject-matter of the 
knowledge-claims is different. 
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3.2 NAGEL’S BAT ARGUMENT 
 
In an article that is perhaps more famous than well-understood, Nagel 
(1974) presents a number of considerations that are meant to lead to the 
conclusion that we cannot see how phenomenal consciousness, or the 
subjective character of experience, could be reducible to any objective, and a 
fortiori, any physical feature of the world.  
It is not completely clear what Nagel means by 'reducible' here. 
Reductive accounts, like identity theory, or functionalism, can be, as we have 
seen earlier, perspicuous, or non-perspicuous, merely stating a metaphysical 
relation. If Nagel’s claim is that there is no perspicuous reduction of qualia, 
he is right, but this does not strictly imply Dualism. On the other hand, if he 
wants to argue, as I think he does, that there is no reduction, perspicuous or 
not, of qualia, his argument is not strong enough to support that claim. More 
on this as we proceed. 
The title question, "What is it like to be a bat?"55, urges us to reflect on 
the fact that in some sense of the word, we will never be able to know what 
certain experiences are like.56 The experiences he cites in support of this 
                                                 
55I am going to call this paper, informally, the BAT. References to this 
paper will be to the version reprinted in Nagel (1979). 
56One of the differences between Descartes’ argument and the BAT is 
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claim belong to creatures quite alien to us, viz., bats, but this seems to be 
incidental to his argument. The point seems to be that the type of experience 
in question is in some way inaccessible to us. Jackson's Mary, for example, 
as we will see in the next section,  is in the same situation with regard to the 
experience of seeing red as we all seem to be with regard to, say, the bat's 
experiences associated with echolocation. And this is to say that we could be 
in this situation vis a vis any experience, possibly familiar or alien.  
                                                                                                                                     
that while Descartes was concerned about substances, Nagel is concerned 
about properties, i.e., qualia properties and physical properties. 
This reflection on inaccessible experience eventually is supposed to 
convince us that phenomenal properties are, at least seemingly, irreducible 
to physical properties. The reasons that he gives for this claim seem to have 
to do with the radical conceptual breach between phenomenal concepts and 
physical concepts. Nagel puts the point by insisting that we cannot imagine 
what it’s like to be a bat. But, as Jackson argued, one cannot get an 
argument against Physicalism based on a claim about our imaginative 
powers (Jackson 1982, p. 131). The point is not about our imaginative 
faculties, it is about our conceptual endowment. Nagel’s point really is that 
we do not (and cannot) have the right concepts that are needed to describe 
that bats' experiences, and so that we are not able to know what bats' 
experiences are like. 
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It appears to me that there are two strands of argument that run 
through the paper.  Both arguments depend on a distinction between what 
Nagel calls 'subjective', and 'objective'. This is a distinction that keeps 
cropping up in all of Nagel's later writings as well (Nagel 1986, 1993). 
Nagel spells out the distinction, as Colin McGinn (1987, p. 264) 
emphasizes, in at least two different ways. At one place, Nagel says:  
"It is beliefs and attitudes that are objective in the primary sense. Only 
derivatively do we call objective the truths that can be arrived at in this 
way." (Nagel 1986, p. 4)57 
 
And then he proceeds to spell out what the objectivity of belief consists in: 
 
"To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or 
the world, we step back from our initial view of it and form a new 
conception which has that view and its relation to the world as its 
object...The old view then comes to be regarded as an appearance, 
more subjective than the new view, and correctable or confirmable by 
reference to it. The process can be repeated, yielding a still more 
objective conception."58 (p. 4) 
 
In other words, as Colin McGinn puts it,  
                                                 
57Although he is more explicit on this in Nagel (1986), the same 
distinction applies to the BAT-paper as well. 
58There are also places where Nagel seems to imply that the 
subjective\objective distinction is really a distinction between appearance and 
reality. However, it is never spelled out how this distinction would figure in an 
anti-reductionist argument. It seems that there is no interpretation of the 
appearance-reality distinction that is helpful in this respect. We can either 
take this as a distinction between sense-data and physical objects, or we can 
take this as a distinction between veridical and non-veridical perceptual or 
belief states; but I cannot see in either case a ready tool to further the anti-
reductionist cause. 
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SC\OC  "a conception is subjective if it represents a fact from a specific 
point of view, exploiting that point of view as a medium of 
representation; otherwise it is objective". (McGinn 1987, p. 
264) 
On the other hand, it might be said that  
 
SM\OM  a fact or property is subjective if "it is part of (or essentially 
involves) a specific point of view", otherwise it is objective.59 
(McGinn 1987, p. 264).  
 
We can call the two notions of subjectivity\objectivity S\OM and S\OC, 
respectively (M for metaphysical, C for conceptual).  
Let's now see the argument. Nagel asks us to try to contemplate the 
inner life of a bat. He observes that 
1*) "...these experiences...[the sonar experiences of bats]... have... a 
specific subjective character, which is beyond our ability to conceive." 
(Nagel 1979, p. 170) 
 
Nagel is going to draw a conclusion about what kinds of facts exist on the 
basis of this premiss. He draws the moral in the following way: 
2*) "Reflection on what it’s like to be a bat seems to lead us... to the 
conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of 
propositions expressible in a human language." (p. 171) 
 
                                                 
59In fact, the subjective-objective distinction spelled out in terms of 
points of view might not capture the sense of the distinction in which it has to 
do with experience and qualia. One might argue that there could be 
creatures that have perceptual concepts and beliefs but that have no 
experiences at all. Such creatures could have SC concepts and SM states, 
without having anything that we might want to call subjective experience. 
However, in the following I will ignore this point, since it will not effect my 
main criticism of Nagel. 
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2*) has very important consequences. Since there are, according to 
this line of thought, facts that the human conceptual repertoire is not rich 
enough to express, there are facts that go beyond basic physical facts (since 
we seem to possess no analogous handicap vis a vis physical facts).60 The 
conclusion seems to be that there are more facts than physical facts. 
Reflection on the existence of experiences that we cannot conceive of, 
seems to lead Nagel to the denial Physicalism. 
Let's try to reconstruct the argument a little more precisely. 
 
1) There are no physical facts that do not consist in the truth of 
propositions expressible in a human language. 
 
                                                 
60Nagel is talking about the reducibility of properties and facts, 
whereas I introduced the notion of reducibility vis a vis concepts and 
thoughts (or terms and statements). I think talking about property reduction is 
misleading, since it commits us to saying that the property water reduces to 
the property H2O, i.e., to itself. Better to say that the concept water reduces 
to the concept H2O. I will ignore this difficulty. 
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2) There are experiences that we cannot conceive of. 
 
3) Having an experience is a fact. 
 
4) If there are facts that we cannot conceive of then there are facts that 
do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible61 in a human 
language. 
 
Lemma (by 2, 3, and 4): 
5) There are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions 
expressible in a human language. 
 
So, by 1and 5, 
6) There are non-physical facts. 
 
Does this argument work? Nagel himself seems to be hesitant to draw 
this strong conclusion. In a later passage in the same article he puts his 
findings in the form of a cautious conditional:  
"...if the facts of experience - facts about what it’s like for the 
experiencing organism - are accessible only from one point of view, 
then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be 
revealed in the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a 
domain of objective facts par excellence - the kind that can be 
observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals 
with differing perceptual systems." (Nagel (1979) p. 172) 
 
                                                 
61The expressibility Nagel has in mind here is not relative to human 
capabilities. A proposition that no human is capable to express might still be 
a proposition that is in principle expressible in a human language. 
In other words, his final conclusion is not that experience is 
irreducible, but that it is unfathomable how it could be reducible. It means 
that he does not whole-heartedly embrace his conclusion. What explains this 
vacillation? 
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The answer seems to lie in the ambiguity of 1.  
1) There are experiences that we cannot conceive of. 
If "conceive" an experience here means "have an SC concept" of the 
experience, then 1 is rather uncontroversial. We definitely do not have a 
conception that represents the bat's sonar experience "from a specific point 
of view, exploiting that point of view as a medium of representation" (McGinn 
1987, p. 264). A fortiori we do not have the appropriate phenomenal 
concepts; which is a statement that few would contest. This construal of 1 
will now be called 1'. 
1') There are experiences we cannot have an SC concept of. 
1', however, provides no support for 3. For 3 to be plausible, an "ability 
to conceive" certain experiences would have to simply mean an "ability to 
entertain (any) concepts that refer to" those experiences. This second 
construal will be called 1". 
1") There are experiences we cannot conceive of through any 
concepts. 
 
The problem is, (1") is not so uncontroversial any more. (1") only follows from 
the uncontroversial (1') under the assumption that the only possible way to 
conceive of an experience (an SM fact) is via a phenomenal (SC) concept62. 
                                                 
62Brian Loar (1990), takes the same line I am presenting here. 
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But no reason has been presented that an SM fact can only be conceived 
through an SC concept. After all, we often conceive of the very same thing via 
very different concepts; think of heat and molecular motion. So the strong 
conclusion follows only if the SC\SM distinction is conflated63.  
Nagel's hesitation to endorse the anti-reductionist conclusion is 
probably a reflection of his awareness of the SC\SM distinction, and an 
awareness of the fact that 1, on the innocuous reading, does not imply 364. 
His conclusion is, as we have seen, not that subjective experiences are 
irreducible, but that we have no idea how they could be reducible.  
It is instructive to see what he says elsewhere of this problem. In 
Nagel (1979) he puts the point like this: the subjective character of 
experience is not captured by any reductive account of the mental  
                                                 
63Another way to put the problem is that Nagel's argument only goes 
through on a transparent reading of 'conceives that'. However, the premisses 
are only plausible on an opaque reading. The Knowledge Argument has a 
very similar problem with respect to the ambiguity of our concept of 
knowledge. More about it in the next Section. 
64At least it is so in the earlier works, like the BAT. In the later works, 
like Nagel (1986) and Nagel (1993), he abandons his caution and comes to 
endorse anti-reductionism. It appears that his arguments in these works are 
tainted by a failure to appreciate the very same distinction an appreciation of 
which originally kept him from coming down on the side of the stronger 
conclusion: the SC\SM distinction. I will not be able to argue for this in detail 
here.  
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"for all of them  are logically compatible with its absence. It is not 
analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or 
intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata 
that behaved like people though they experienced nothing... The 
reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected 
with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective 
physical theory will abandon that point of view." (Nagel (1979) p. 166)  
 
What Nagel appears to be saying in this  passage is that because of a 
radical lack of connection between our subjective conception of experiences 
and our objective conception of physical or functional states, it will always 
seem possible that a physical (or functional state) occurs without the 
putatively reduced experience occurring. This means that the failure of any 
proposed reductive account will always seem possible. And so, even if the 
failure of the proposed account is not possible, we will never be able to see 
why. This, however, is a different argument from the one we have been 
examining so far: it sounds more like Descartes' Conceivability Argument, 
except that he does not quite draw the dualist conclusion. Here he argues 
from the apparent conceivability of absent qualia to their apparent possibility; 
whereas in the BAT he argued from his inability to have an adequate 
conception of certain experiences to those experiences being irreducible.  
However, it would be a mistake to think that by the end of the BAT-
paper Nagel gave up on the first line of argument and came down clearly on 
the side of some watered down Conceivability Argument à la Descartes. In 
the main part of the  BAT-paper Nagel does not argue, in Cartesian fashion, 
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that in the case of any experience there is reason to think that it is non-
physical, given that our physical conceptions of things seem to bear no 
relation to our phenomenal conception of things. He rather argues that, as 
long as there are experiences that are inaccessible to us, there is reason to 
think that there are non-physical facts. The argument, of course, depends on 
the non sequitur that we since we do not have a phenomenal conception of 
those experiences we do not have any conception of them. We are told that 
physical terms cannot refer to experiences that we do not have a 
phenomenal conception of. 
If all he had in mind was a Conceivability Argument à la Descartes, 
then ordinary Dualism would have to seem to him a possible solution to the 
mind-body problem. However, Nagel makes it clear that in his view no 
Dualism that does not invoke the SM\OM distinction could provide a solution 
to the mind-body problem. He addresses this point with regard to mental 
substances: 
"The broader issue between personal and impersonal, or subjective 
and objective, arises also for a dualist theory of mind. The question of 
how one can include in the objective world a mental substance having 
subjective properties is as acute as the question how a physical 
substance can have subjective properties." ("Subjective and 
Objective", in Nagel 1979, p. 201) 
 
This view, sometimes called "transcendentalism", only makes sense if 
what generates the mind-body problem, is something like the first line of 
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argument. If your problem is that no matter how many OC concepts you have 
you still cannot seem to be able to conceive of the bat's sonar experience, 
then you will not be content to be told that there is a further OM substance 
beyond the physical, namely, a mental substance that encompasses all 
experiences, the bat's experiences among them. Your problem was that the 
bat's sonar experience did not seem to be an OM fact. If it was an OM fact 
then you should be able to conceive of it, but you cannot and so anti-
reductionism follows.   
I do not endorse this argument but since it has certain close 
similarities with Jackson’s Mary Argument, I will put off a detailed account of 
why it fails until the next section. Still, there is an important moral for the 
physicalist from this discussion: sooner or later one has to address the 
question of why the very idea of scientific reduction seems so problematic in 
the case of subjective experience.  
 
 
3.3 JACKSON'S KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT 
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Frank Jackson (1982) gives an argument that some think was 
anticipated obliquely by Nagel in the BAT-paper. I will try to show in what 
sense this is true. Jackson himself reflects on the connection between the 
two arguments: 
"Nagel speaks as if the problem he is raising is one of extrapolating 
from knowledge of one experience to another, of imagining what an 
unfamiliar experience would be like on the basis of familiar ones. In 
terms of Hume's example, from knowledge of some shades of blue 
we can work out what it would be like to see other shades of blue. 
Nagel argues that the trouble with bats et al. is that they are too unlike 
us. It is hard to see an objection to Physicalism here. Physicalism 
makes no special claims about the imaginative or extrapolative 
powers of human beings, and it is hard to see why it need do so. 
     Anyway, our Knowledge argument makes no assumptions on this 
point. If Physicalism were true, enough physical information about 
Fred would obviate any need to extrapolate or to perform special feats 
of imagination or understanding in order to know all about his special 
color experience. The information would already be in our possession. 
But clearly it isn't." (Jackson 1982, p. 131) 
 
Jackson emphasizes that the problem with qualia is not that we 
cannot imagine unfamiliar ones (as he sees Nagel as claiming), but that 
there is something we cannot know about them, unless we actually 
experience them65. His argument proceeds through a simple thought-
experiment. He ask us to imagine Mary, a brilliant neuro-scientist who is 
forced to live in a black and white room. She maintains contact with the 
                                                 
65As we have seen in the previous section, a more charitable 
interpretation of what Nagel was arguing is that he maid a claim about 
conceptions, rather than imaginative powers. But we need not get into this 
here again. 
 
 
 
84 
outside world and conducts her research via a black and white TV monitor66. 
She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires all the physical 
information there is to obtain about color vision. Now Jackson ask us to 
consider what will happen when Mary is released from her black and white 
room. In particular, he ask us to consider whether she will learn anything 
about color vision. Jackson's answer is that she obviously learns new facts. 
But if this is so, then her previous knowledge was incomplete. However, she 
has all the knowledge there is about physical facts. Consequently, there are 
facts that are non-physical.  
Here is the argument:  
1) Mary knows all the physical facts. 
2) Mary does not know what it’s like to experience red. 
3) What it is like to experience red is a fact. 
Lemma:  
4) There is a fact that Mary does not know. 
Conclusion:  
5) There are non-physical facts. 
                                                 
66Of course, there are some further details that have to be filled out for 
the story to work. E.g., we have to also imagine that she has been raised this 
way, and that her entire environment (including her body surfaces) is entirely 
colorless. 
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Now let's see in what way Nagel was anticipating Jackson's 
Knowledge Argument in the BAT Argument. Where Jackson assumes that 
there is no physical fact Mary does not know (premiss 1), Nagel assumes 
that there are no physical facts that cannot be conceptualized in a human 
language (premiss 1). Premiss 2 in Nagel's argument plays the same role as 
Jackson's premiss 2. Of course, there is a difference. Jackson's claim is that 
Mary does not know some facts, and Nagel claims that we cannot conceive 
of some facts. The function of these premisses, however, is the same within 
the overall structure of the argument; also, both notions lend themselves to 
ambiguities between opaque and transparent readings which will eventually 
undo the arguments. Finally, where Jackson claims that there is a fact Mary 
actually does not know (premiss 4), Nagel is claiming that there is a fact that 
cannot be conceptualized in a human language (premiss 5). The conclusion  
is in both cases that there are more facts than physical facts.67 
Notice also that, understood right, Jackson’s Mary Argument (like the 
BAT Argument) is a transcendentalist argument: if it works, it works against 
not just physicalism, but naturalism in general, i.e., against the view that all 
that exists is accessible from an objective, third person point of view. Let’s 
suppose that what it’s like to see red is a non-physical, irreducibly mental fact 
                                                 
67The difference, as we noted earlier, is that Nagel actually stops short 
of embracing the conclusion of his argument. 
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that can be described in some suitable, objective, mentalistic language. Let’s 
suppose further that Mary in the black-and white room learns all the physical 
and non-physical, irreducibly mental facts (perhaps she reads a 
comprehensive encyclopedia of mentalistic facts and psychology). Mary still 
would not know what it’s like to see red, having never left the black-and-white 
room. 
The problem with Jackson's argument should be familiar by now: just 
like Nagel's argument only went through on a transparent reading of what it 
is to have a conception of a fact,68 it only goes through on a transparent 
reading of what it is to know a fact. So it seems that Jackson has a further, 
implicit premiss: 
1*) ‘Knowing that’ is a relation between a person and a fact. 
                                                 
68On a transparent reading of what it is to have a conception of a fact, 
substitutivity of identicals holds. More precisely,  if F and G are the same 
facts then if one has a conception of the fact that F,  then eo ipso one has a 
conception of the fact that G. The opaque reading this conditional does not 
hold.  
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Defenders of Physicalism locate the problem with this argument in 
different places. David Lewis  (1990) and Laurence Nemirow (1990), e.g., 
objects to 3.69 According to them, what it's like to experience red is not a fact. 
When someone comes to know what it’s like to experience red, the 
knowledge acquired is not of the ‘knowledge that’ type, but the ‘knowledge 
how’ type. 
Bigelow and Pargetter (1990), Dennett (1991), Loar (1990), Neander 
(1992), Papineau (1993) and others object to 1*. According to them, 
'knowledge that' is a relation between a person, a fact, and a mode of 
presentation. This certainly seems right. Lois Lane, e.g., can know (i.e., 
before she knew that Clark Kent is Superman) that  Superman is brave 
without knowing that Clark Kent is brave. The natural thing to say is that 
there is just one fact there, so a difference in facts cannot account for the 
difference in the knowledge claims. There is just one fact there and Lois 
knows it under one mode of presentation (*Superman is brave*70) but not 
under another (*Clark Kent is brave*). Notice that different modes of 
                                                 
69Actually, this answer to the Knowledge Argument is not entirely new. 
Herbert Feigl (1967) gave a version of it, together with a version of the 
Knowledge Argument. He drew a distinction between acquaintance with 
experience, which is not propositional, and knowledge by acquaintance, 
which is.  
70I am using ‘*’ to form names of modes of presentations from 
sentences. 
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presentation may engage action (and other thoughts) differently even though 
they are of the same fact. 
Jackson can reply by granting that 1* is false and replacing it with 
1**) ‘Knowing that’ is a relation between a person, a fact, and a 
mode of presentation.  
 
But now he has to argue that the mode of presentation that Mary acquires 
when she learns what it's like to experience red cannot be of a physical fact. 
So the argument comes down to showing, that, e.g., *This is an experience 
of red* and *This is R-fibre firing* (or *This is an instance of functional 
property F*) are modes which do not pick out the same fact. But so far we 
have not been given an argument for this.71 
Robinson (1993) takes a different tack: instead of showing that the 
two modes of presentations cannot be of the same fact, he tries to extend 
the original considerations to the modes of presentations themselves. He 
argues that the phenomenal mode of presentation of pain, according to the 
physicalist, would have to be itself physical. But, since Mary knows all the 
physical facts, she should know all the facts about the phenomenal mode of 
                                                 
71There is a very different kind of criticism of the Knowledge Argument 
made by, e.g., Watkins (1989). Watkins points out that Jackson's dualist 
conclusion, as Jackson himself admits, implies epiphenomenalism. However, 
if phenomenal properties, like experiencing seeing red, are epiphenomenal, 
how are we ever to know about them? So the Knowledge Argument seems 
to undermine itself. This criticism, as we have seen, applies to all the other 
conceivability arguments. 
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presentation, "including the fact of what that mode of access is 
phenomenally like" (p. 166).  
However, this argument falls prey to the same objection that it tries to 
answer. Even assuming that the phenomenal mode of presentation of pain is 
a brain state type, possessing this brain state (and so knowing what it’s like 
phenomenally to have that mode) is not the same as knowing that it is such 
and such a brain state. And the latter is all that is required to satisfy the claim 
that Mary knows all the physical (and neurophysiological) facts under their 
scientific guises. So the same objection that applied to the original argument 
applies to Robinson's version as well: we can know facts about a mode of 
presentation under different modes of presentation, and knowledge under 
the one does not imply knowledge under the other. This argument (as well as 
the Mary Argument) is inconclusive: nothing it says rules out a priori the 
possibility that an experience, or the phenomenal mode of presentation of 
that experience is physical.  
There are a number of arguments that try to do the job so far undone 
by Mary Argument. If successful, they would show why a phenomenal 
concept and a physical concept cannot refer to the same property. They are  
i) the Property Dualism Argument, ii) Kripke's argument for dualism, iii) the 
Chalmers’ and Jackson’ new arguments. So these are the arguments to 
which we now turn.  
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Before we get to these arguments, let's see a very simple, but 
obviously unsatisfactory argument.  
1) If P and Q  are modes associated with the same state of affairs then it 
is knowable a priori that they are associated with the same state of 
affairs. 
 
2) It is not knowable a priori that *This is an experience of red* and *This 
is P* are associated with the same state of affairs. 
 
3) *This is an experience of red* and *This is P* 
are associated with different states of affairs. 
 
Obviously, this argument is no good. *This is water* and *This is H2O*, 
e.g., are associated with the same states of affair, but that is not knowable a 
priori, so 1 is false. To know a priori that they are associated with the same 
state of affairs, one would have to know a priori that water is H2O under the 
mode *water is H2O*. But that is not knowable a priori, even though water is 
H2O. So, to have a convincing argument, we would have to be able to 
distinguish between those identity statements, like 'water is H2O', which can 
be true in spite of the fact that they are not knowable a priori, and those ones 
(presumably 'what it’s like to experience red is P' is among them) which can 
only be true if they are knowable a priori. This is what the following 
arguments try to accomplish. 
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3.4 THE PROPERTY DUALISM ARGUMENT 
 
The property dualism argument hangs on a particular view of modes 
of presentation. The semantics that is driving the arguments is Fregean in 
origin. On the Fregean view, meaning has two components, sense and 
reference. Associated with each term there is a descriptive sense graspable 
by each competent user of the term.72 Sense is transparent, that is, it is 
knowable a priori whether two tokens are tokens of the same concept (where 
concepts are individuated by sense). Sense also determines reference, or, 
equivalently, sense determines an intension function f:W→R from possible 
worlds to referents. In other words, Frege thought that there are things that 
play both the role of determining reference and the role of distinguishing 
concepts. On his view, no two concepts can have the same reference in all 
possible worlds.  
                                                 
72Fregean sense is the prototype of what we have called ‘mode of 
presentation’; it is a theory of what it is that distinguishes different 
conceptions of the same proposition.  
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Following Frege, White (1986)73 assumes that modes of presentation 
have two roles to play simultaneously. On the one hand, (i) they determine 
reference. On the other hand, (ii) they individuate concepts. He also 
assumes that modes of presentations are properties of the referent through 
which the subject grasps the referent.   
These assumptions, together with the claim that pain is a referring 
expression, add up to the following argument: 
1) A concept refers to an entity via a mode of presentation. The mode of 
presentation provides the route by which the entity is picked out by 
the concept. 
 
2) Modes of presentation are properties of the referent. 
 
3) If the same mode of presentation is associated with two (coreferring) 
concepts, it is knowable a priori that these concepts corefer. 
 
4) The concept pain is a referring expression. 
 
5) Physical or functional concepts have as their mode of presentation 
physical or functional properties. 
 
6) There is no physical or functional concept such that it is knowable a 
priori that such a concept corefers with pain. 
 
Lemma: 
7) No physical or functional property of pain could provide the route by 
which pain is picked out by the concept pain. 
 
8) Properties are either physical, or functional, or irreducibly mental. 
                                                 
73A very similar argument was formulated by Smart (1959). He 
introduced his ‘topic neutral analyses’ of mental terms in response to this 
argument.  
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Conclusion: 
9) Pain has at least one property that is irreducibly mental.74 
 
                                                 
74I present the argument in a somewhat simplified form which I hope 
preserves all the essential elements of the original. However, there is one 
difference. White uses the argument as a reductio for analytic functionalism. 
He attempts to show that the denial of analytic functionalism leads to 
Dualism, and he claims that that is unacceptable. (The same view is 
advocated in Smart (1959).) I treat this argument as an anti-physicalist 
argument because I think that analytic functionalism is extremely implausible. 
However, for a different argument for analytic functionalism, see Levin 
(1986). 
 
Notice that this argument does not beg the question against a 
posteriori identities. Water and H2O  can have their referent in common, 
since the same substance, water, has many different physical and chemical 
properties, and these properties can all serve as modes of presentation 
providing different routes to the referent. But in the phenomenal case there is 
a problem.  If the concept  pain referred via a physical or functional property, 
there would have to be physical or functional concept that would have the 
same mode of presentation as pain has. But that would have to be knowable 
a priori, according to premiss 3. This is not the case. In fact, it seems that 
any thought of the form 
Pain is X, 
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where X stands for a physical or functional concept, is conceivably false.75 
Now Dualism follows since, if the mode of presentation associated with pain 
is irreducibly mental, then there are properties that are neither physical nor 
functional. 
There are a number of problems with the argument. First of all, not 
everybody would share White’s conception of  modes of presentation.  
According to Fodor (1990), e.g., the mode of presentation of the concept 
pain is simply a Mentalese term; it is not a property of the referent, and it 
does not “provide a route” via which the referent is picked out by the concept. 
On Fodor’s view, then premiss 1 and 2 are false. On this account it could be, 
e.g., that the Mentalese term ‘pain’ and the Mentalese term ‘C-fibre firing’, 
e.g., are both causally related in the appropriate way for reference to a 
physical property, without these terms being associated with different 
properties that provide the route to the referent.  
                                                 
75This claim is based on the same intuition as the claim that zombies 
are conceivable. 
The main problem with the argument is premiss 3. It is a relative of 
CTT in Descartes’ argument, in that, while Descartes thesis asserted the 
transparency of clear and distinct perception of substances,  it states that 
mode of presentation is transparent. I will call it White’s Transparency Thesis 
(WTT).  
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(WTT) If the same mode of presentation is associated with two (coreferring) 
concepts, it is knowable a priori that these concepts corefer. 
 
This thesis provides the missing link for the BAT Argument and the Mary 
Argument. The question there was why the mode of presentation of pain and 
the mode of presentation of some physical or functional concept cannot pick 
out the same state (or, in Nagel’s terms, why can we not form a physical 
conception of phenomenal states). WTT can be put to work to answer this 
question.  
Notice that the mode of presentation of both pain, and of physical or 
functional concepts is an essential property of the referent. *Painfulness*, the 
mode of presentation of pain, is an essential property of pain, and the same 
is, presumably true of Piramidal cell activity, or any other physical or 
functional concept.76 The mode of presentation of these concepts does not 
utilize contingent properties of the referent, like, e.g., the mode of 
presentation of water does. But then, if pain and some physical or functional 
concept referred to the same state, their mode of presentation would have to 
be the same. However, then, according to WTT, we would have to be able to 
tell a priori that pain refers to the same property as some physical or 
functional term does. But we cannot, so pain cannot refer to any physical or 
functional property.  
                                                 
76See Kripke 1972. 
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What is the justification for WTT? White offers a reduction in support 
of it. Suppose that two expressions are coreferential, and that this fact 
cannot be established a priori and has not been established a posteriori.  
Suppose further  that there are not two different properties in virtue of which 
the two descriptions pick out the same referent. Then there is a possible 
world where speakers who are epistemically equivalent to us use these 
terms to refer to different objects. As used by these people, these terms 
must pick out their referents in virtue of distinct properties, because unlike 
our terms, theirs pick out different objects. But this contradicts our initial 
assumption that there are not two different properties that serve as the mode 
of presentation of these concepts.  
The argument has a questionable step. Just because it is not known a 
priori that two terms pick out their referent via the same property, it does not 
follow that these two terms might pick out different things in some possible 
world. Even if we accept that modes of presentation involve properties of the 
referent, we might want to deny that these properties exhaust all there is to 
modes of presentations. Properties of the referent might be involved in the 
way concepts pick out their referents; but a certain relation between the 
concept and the referent might be also involved. Different concepts might 
latch on to the same property providing the route from concept to referent in 
different ways. 
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This means that concept individuation, and so a priori knowledge of 
coreference, might be more fine-grained than reference fixation. The 
Fregean assumption on which White’s argument relies, that mode of 
presentation performs both functions at the same time, might be mistaken. 
Mode of presentation, then, in the sense in which it fixes reference, might not 
be transparent, in the sense that it might not be knowable a priori whether 
two concepts have the same mode of presentation. In that case it would not 
follow from the fact that it is not knowable a priori that two concepts corefer 
that there is a possible world in which they do not corefer. In fact, on the 
account of phenomenal concepts given in Chapter Two, we have a model of 
why WTT flounders on the phenomenal case. More on this in Chapter Four.  
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3.5 KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM 
 
Kripke's (1972) argument for Dualism can be seen as another 
suggestion how to answer the question left open by the Mary Argument: it 
can be seen as an attempt to show when two modes of presentation cannot 
determine the same referent. Kripke develops Descartes' Conceivability 
Argument for Dualism, and like Descartes (and White), he is also building the 
argument around a perceived link between epistemology, metaphysics, and 
the conceptual realm.  
Semantics is key to Kripke’s argument, so let me turn to it briefly. 
Kripke's semantics grew out of an opposition to the then prevailing Fregean 
view. He suggested that no single entity can do all the work Frege assigned 
to sense. In particular, no single intension function can fix the reference of all 
concepts for all possible worlds. As Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) 
pointed out, the reference fixer associated with, say, 'water', picks out water 
in our world, but picks out XYZ on Twin Earth. The reference of many 
concepts is determined by different mechanisms in the actual world and in 
counterfactual possible worlds; in the case of rigid designators the reference 
fixing description picks out the referent in the actual world and the reference 
in counterfactual possible worlds is then fixed to be the same as it is in the 
actual world.  
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This picture presents a radical departure from Fregean semantics. In 
addition to Kripke's claims about two-tiered reference fixing for rigid 
designators, there are a number of further differences between his and 
Frege's account of meaning. First, Kripke does not think that reference fixers 
are part of the meaning of a concept. According to him, reference is all there 
is to meaning. He also does not think that reference is always fixed via 
description, and so, pace Frege, he does not think that every competent user 
of a concept has to know some reference fixing description associated with 
the concept. Someone, e.g., might acquire the concept via ostensive 
definition, or just forget the description that initially served to fix the concept's 
reference, or acquire the concept from a competent user without ever 
learning the reference fixing description. Moreover, Kripke seems to think 
that a description might serve as a reference fixer even if it is not even true of 
the referent.  
But the most important point of difference is that according to Kripke, 
reference fixers do not determine the reference of a concept independently 
of the context in which it is used. Water means H2O, but if our environment 
turned out to be Twin Earth, it would mean XYZ. However, for all these 
differences, it seems that Kripke's semantics retained just enough of the  
doctrine of the transparency of meaning to be able to formulate a 
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Conceivability Argument. We are going to see shortly in what sense Kripke is 
a heir of Frege's transparency thesis.77  
                                                 
77Kripke’s reference fixers, in spite of the differences from Fregean 
sense,  still play many of the roles associated with modes of presentation: 
they individuate concepts, and,  at least in the case of those concepts that 
actually have them, they determine reference within a context.  
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There is a certain tradition in philosophy that, pace Kant, identified 
necessity, analyticity and a prioricity.78 The tradition was swept aside by 
Kripke's arguments that the relations between these concepts are much 
more complex than this. Kripke's claims are based on his insights into rigid 
designation and the two-tiered nature of reference fixing. He pointed out that 
there is a large class of necessary statements whose truth is only knowable a 
posteriori.  Water is H2O, given that it is true, is necessary. This follows from 
the fact that both water and H2O are rigid designators. However, it is not 
knowable a priori since, before we discovered that water is H2O, our 
evidence did not rule out that water has a different chemical structure, for 
example, that it is XYZ. 
Conceptual and metaphysical necessity  also seem to be different 
since, e.g., I am here now is conceptually necessary but does not express a 
metaphysical necessity, and There are infinitely many prime numbers 
expresses a metaphysical necessity but does not seem to be true (or 
knowable) solely in virtue of the meanings of its constituent expressions.   
For a priori truths, the justification often consists in conceptual 
matters. So, for example, I know a priori that all bachelors are unmarried 
since my mastery of the concepts unmarried and bachelor involve my 
                                                 
78For example, the positivists and especially Carnap (1955). 
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knowing this; similarly for my knowing that I am here now. But some would 
argue that not every a priori state of knowledge can be justified solely in 
virtue of conceptual matters; e.g. I know a priori that there are infinitely many 
primes. And I know a priori that I am now thinking that my dream of last night 
could have been dreamt by someone else. 
 
The argument 
Kripke, after prying apart metaphysical necessity, conceptual 
necessity, and a prioricity,  presented an argument that actually depends on 
a link between them, and especially between conceivability and metaphysical 
necessity. He develops and modifies the Cartesian claim that conceivability 
is our guide to possibility (and so to necessity).79 It will turn out on Kripke's 
argument that certain propositions could only be true if they are conceptually 
true. More precisely, he will make the assumption that two terms, both of 
which have essential reference fixers that we actually know, can only pick out 
the same things if the synonymy is transparent. The argument takes the form 
of a challenge for the physicalist.  
                                                 
79The classic exposition of his views on the mind-body problem is in 
the last part of Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1972). My reconstruction 
makes the argument a little more explicit than what the text warrants; 
obviously, the following is my, hopefully not too uncharitable, interpretation of 
Kripke. 
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Kripke's idea is the following. He wants to argue from the prima facie 
possibility of pain is not C-fibre firing to its real possibility. Now, there is an 
obvious problem here. Water is not H2O appears just as possible, even 
though we know it to be necessarily false. As Putnam has pointed out,  
we can perfectly well imagine having experiences that would convince 
us (and that would make it rational to believe) that water is not H2O. In 
that sense, it is conceivable that water isn't H2O. (Putnam 1975, p. 
233) 
 
However, as we will see, we can explain away the apparent possibility that it 
is not. Now take a thought like Pain is brain state C-fibre firing. It is, again,  
prima facie possible that pain is not C-fibre firing, but in this case we cannot 
explain away this prima facie possibility. And, if we cannot explain away the 
apparent, or prima facie possibility of the falsity of an identity statement, we 
have identified a real possibility. So, concludes Kripke, pain is not C-fibre 
firing. This argument has the obvious advantage that it takes into account the 
existence of a posteriori identities in a way that the Mary Argument did not. 
Let’s state the argument more formally: 
 
1) It is prima facie possible that C-fibre firing is not pain.80 
 
                                                 
80The argument is formulated to refute the proposition that pain is C-
fibre firing;  but we can treat 'C-fibre firing' simply as a place holder for any 
physical or functional term at all.  
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2) If a state of affairs is prima facie possible, and there is no way of 
explaining away this prima facie possibility, then this state of affairs is 
(metaphysically) possible. 
 
3) There is no way of explaining away the prima facie possibility of C-
fibre firing not being pain. 
 
4) By 1, 2 and 3, it is (metaphysically) possible that C-fibre firing is not 
pain. 
 
5) But if it is (metaphysically) possible that pain is not C-fibre firing, then, 
since both pain and C-fibre firing are rigid designators, pain is not C-
fibre firing.   
 
6) By 4 and 5, pain is not C-fibre firing. 
 
Obviously, the most controversial premisses here are 2 and 3. It is not 
even clear what they are saying. What does the notion of 'prima facie 
possibility' come to? And what is it to "explain away" prima facie possibility? 
Let's first deal with the notion of prima facie possibility. On first approximation 
we can interpret it as conceivability simpliciter, as defined in the introduction:  
(Con)  A statement S is conceivable, if it is logically consistent with 
the totality of  conceptual truths, i.e., if -S is not a conceptual 
truth.  
 
In this sense it is also clearly conceivable that water is not H2O.81 The truth of 
Water is H2O, just like the putative truth of Pain is C-fibre firing is not analytic. 
Just by grasping the meaning of the statement, you cannot come to know its 
truth. 
                                                 
81I.e., under the mode of presentation *Water is not H2O*, and not 
under the mode of presentation *Water is not water*. 
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Yet it is not metaphysically possible that water is not H2O. As Kripke 
famously pointed it out, since both terms are rigid designators, the identity 
statement is necessary,  even though it is a posteriori.  Prima facie possibility 
in itself then does not imply real (metaphysical) possibility. So Kripke has to 
come up with a way to distinguish between those cases of  prima facie 
possibility that do not give us a reason to infer to real possibility (as in the 
water-H2O case), and those that do (as Kripke claims is the case in the pain-
C-fibre firing case). 
Here comes in the idea of "explaining away" prima facie possibility. 
Kripke finds the difference between the two cases in the applicability of a 
certain strategy to explain away the apparent possibility of water not being 
H2O, that is, to explain why certain statements appear to be contingent even 
if they are not. The explanation goes like this. When you entertain a 
proposition, e.g., that water is not H2O, you entertain the proposition via a 
mode of presentation.82 There may be many different modes of presentation 
                                                 
82There seems to be a tension in Kripke's (1972) views on meaning. 
As we have seen, one of the main aims of the book is to debunk the Fregean 
theory of meaning according to which there is a (presumably descriptive) 
sense or mode of presentation associated with each term that determines 
the reference of the term. Kripke proposed instead the theory of direct 
reference advocating a return to the earlier Millian idea that the only 
semantic contribution of expressions is their reference (cf. Mill 1843). At the 
same time, his argument for Dualism seems to rely on the notion of a 
reference fixer (a description sometimes associated with terms that 
determines their reference) which seems to be closely related to the notion of 
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expressing the same proposition in a given context, e.g., *water is not H2O*, 
*H2O is not H2O*, *the substance that is actually grandma's favorite drink is 
not water*, etc.  These modes of presentation correspond to the that-clauses 
used to express belief-attributions.83 
According to Kripke, the concept water is the concept of a substance 
that is actually watery (i.e., the concept water, or rather, the mode of 
presentation associated with water, is a rigidification of the description 'clear 
liquid that fills the oceans, is tasteless, etc.'). This means that the mode of 
presentation *water is not H2O* can be spelled out as the mode *the 
substance that is actually watery is not H2O*84. Now, the explanation of why 
Water is not H2O seems prima facie possible, according to Kripke, is that it is 
possible for someone to have the thought with the mode *the substance that 
                                                                                                                                     
a mode of presentation. Indeed, what could conceivability come to if all there 
was to meaning was reference? A two-dimensional framework for reference 
fixation of general terms (and even, perhaps, for proper names and 
indexicals), as developed later in this chapter, might deal with many of  the 
problems for the description theory raised by Kripke, and so might help 
reconcile Fregean and Kripkean semantics to a large extent. In any case, I 
am assuming that something like a notion of mode of presentation is what 
Kripke has in mind by his term 'reference fixer'.  
83At least there is a rough correspondence. See Loar (1988) for the 
view that thoughts (or, what he calls 'psychological content') only roughly 
correlate with that-clauses. 
84For simplicity, I have not tried to spell out the mode of presentation 
of the concept H2O. All the important work here is done by the mode of 
presentation of water. 
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is actually watery is not H2O* and express a true proposition via that mode. It 
is possible because there is a possible world where the stuff that is actually 
watery is not H2O, but, say, XYZ.85 So conceivability simpliciter is an 
indicator of possibility, but only an indicator that it is possible for a thought 
with the same mode to express a truth is some possible world, considered as 
actual. As things are, the thought Water is not H2O is false in every possible 
world considered as counterfactual,86 i.e., it is not really metaphysically 
possible for water not to be H2O. 
                                                 
85Sometimes Kripke talks as if mode of presentation or thought, in 
addition to being descriptive, were internal. He explains the apparent 
possibility of water not being H2O thus:  
 
although the statement itself is necessary, someone could, 
qualitatively speaking, be in the same epistemic situation as the 
original, and in such a situation a qualitatively analogous statement 
could be false. (p. 150) 
 
This, however, suggests that Kripke identified modes of presentations (or 
reference fixers, as he likes to put it) with what has become known as 
“narrow content” in the literature: his reference fixers determine reference,  
are descriptive and they supervene on  the intrinsic states of the agent. I 
cannot take up the issue here whether the notion of narrow content is a 
workable one; I will have a little more to say about this in connection with 
Jackson’s and Chalmers’ argument. But let me point out that narrow content 
does not seem to be required by the notion of conceivability we will be 
working with here. If modes of presentations were wide content descriptions, 
transparency could still hold.  
86The phrases ‘worlds considered as actual’, ‘worlds considered as 
counterfactual’ are due to Davies and Humberstone (1980). It is a familiar 
notion from two-dimensional modal logic, developed in part on the inspiration 
of Kripke’s account of a posteriori necessity, that thoughts about possible 
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Kripke's idea is that the above considerations help explain away why it 
seems possible that water is not H2O even though it is not really possible. I 
think it is safe to interpret him as concluding that conceivability simpliciter is 
not a sure guide to possibility, it only indicates that there is a possible world 
such that, were it the actual world, a thought which is conceivable would 
express a truth.  We can learn, like in the case of the thought Water is not 
H2O, that it is not really possible for it to be true by looking at some 
contingent background truths that fix the reference of the concept water. 
Once we have learned that H2O is the actual clear liquid that quenches thirst, 
etc., we will no longer think it possible for water not to be H2O. Looking at the 
totality of contingent truths about the world which fixes the reference of our 
terms will help explain away any mere “prima facie” possibility.  
                                                                                                                                     
worlds are evaluated differently depending on whether the worlds are 
considered as actual or considered as counterfactual. More on this in the 
next sections. 
What about the thought Pain is not C-fibre firing? The concept pain 
has the mode of presentation *the sensation that feels painful*. However, 
this mode of presentation is not, so to speak, accidental, as in the case of 
water and *the substance that is actually watery*. In the case of water the 
reference is picked out through an accidental feature of the referent; in the 
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case of pain  it is picked out through an essential feature of it: whatever feels 
painful just is pain, irrespective of the context.  
So let's now suppose that pain is C-fibre firing. Can one explain away 
the prima facie possibility that pain is not C-fibre firing the same way we did 
with the prima facie possibility that water is not H2O? In other words, can one 
entertain the mode *the sensation that feels painful is not C-fibre firing*87, 
and express a true proposition in some world considered as actual, even if 
the thought The sensation that feels painful is not C-fibre firing is necessarily 
false? If pain is C-fibre firing, and so Pain is not C-fibre firing is not possible, 
the answer is obviously no. *The sensation that feels painful is not C-fibre 
firing* could only express a true proposition if Pain is C-fibre firing was false.  
                                                 
87Again, I am not going to spell out the mode of presentation of C-fibre 
firing; however, I assume all along that whatever it is, it is essential rather 
than accidental. As Kripke says:  
 
...'pain' is a rigid designator of the ...phenomenon it designates: if 
something is a pain it is essentially so...The same holds for the term 
'C-fiber stimulation', provided that 'C-fibers' is a rigid designator.... 
The reason is that in any possible world in which we think *the 
sensation that feels painful is not C-fibre firing* we are thinking the very 
same proposition.  The mode of presentation *the sensation that feels 
painful*, as well as the mode of presentation *C-fibre firing*, fixes the 
reference essentially. So we cannot explain away the illusion of possibility by 
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saying that, while the thought Pain (the sensation that feels painful) is not C-
fibre firing is true in some possible world considered as actual, it is neither 
conceivable together with all the relevant background truths that fix its 
reference, nor is it true in any possible world considered as counterfactual. In 
the case of Pain is C-fibre firing it does not make a difference whether you 
think about possible worlds as actual or as counterfactual. Kripke's claim is 
that the prima facie possibility of pain not being C-fibre firing  cannot be 
explained away, and so, by the necessity of identity, pain is not C-fibre firing.  
 
We can see now how Kripke's fills in the gaps in the Knowledge 
Argument.  Our problem there was that to conclude from not K(Mary, *what 
it’s like to see red is R-fibre firing*, that what it’s like to see red is R-fibre 
firing) to the truth of What it’s like to see red is not R-fibre firing, we would 
have to have a way of seeing that *what it’s like to see red*, and *R-fibre 
firing* could not pick out the same kind of state. Kripke supplies an argument 
that, if it succeeds, shows just that. He argues that these modes cannot pick 
out the same kind of state because they are both essential reference fixers, 
and so the prima facie possibility of what it’s like to see red not being R-fibre 
firing cannot be explained away appealing to these modes of presentations 
in the same manner that the prima facie possibility of water not being H2O 
could be explained away. 
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But why is Kripke so certain that if the prima facie possibility of what 
it’s like to see red not being R-fibre firing cannot be “explained away” on the 
same model as we explained away the prima facie possibility of water not 
being H2O, it cannot be explained away at all? Why think that, just because it 
is conceivable that what it’s like to see red is not R-fibre firing, there is even a 
possible world considered as actual such that the thought What it’s like to 
see red is not R-fibre firing is true there? Perhaps conceivability is not a 
guide even to possibility in this weak sense? 
The reason that it is possible for Water is not H2O to be true in some 
possible world considered as actual is that one of the concepts, the concept 
water has a reference fixer that utilizes a contingent property of that referent 
(clear liquid, etc.), and so there are worlds where the reference fixing 
property is instantiated without H2O being instantiated. But if both concepts 
flanking the identity sign have essential reference fixers, all bets are off.  
The only reason to think that, in the case where both concepts have 
essential reference fixers, the mere conceivability of the failure of identity 
shows that the reference fixers are different, is to hold the following 
transparency thesis. I will call it Kripkean Transparency Thesis (KTT): 
(KTT) it is impossible to refer to the same kind of state through rigid 
designators with essential reference fixers that have no 
conceptual connection at all. 
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This is a variant of the Transparency Theses we have seen proposed 
by Descartes and White in their respective Conceivability Arguments. Even 
though much weaker that the transparency thesis advocated by Frege, it is 
strong enough to support a Conceivability Argument. The problem is, it is 
unargued for, and, we will see, can be undone by the very account of 
phenomenal concepts proposed in Chapter Two. Again, I postpone detailed 
discussion till Chapter Four. 
 
 
3.6 THE NEW CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENTS 
 
The Conceivability Arguments we have been looking at so far target 
the two main physicalist accounts of mind: identity theory and functionalism. 
However, even if both the identity theory and functionalism is false, 
Physicalism still could be true if there was an alternative way to account for 
the truth of P. Jackson (1993, 1995) and Chalmers (1996) go further than 
most: they do not just attack identity theory and functionalism, they try to give 
general reasons why P is false. They are trying to show that any physicalist 
account of the mind is doomed to failure.  
Jackson and Chalmers develops the semantic framework proposed by 
Kripke to give the Conceivability Arguments their most sophisticated  and 
 
 
 
113 
well-articulated form. While among the Conceivability Arguments these pose 
the greatest challenge to physicalism, I will argue in Chapter Four that they 
ultimately fail. To show this, I am going to construct a master argument  
called the ‘Zombie Refutation’ that will refute Jackson and Chalmers’ 
argument. I will be able to generalize this argument to refute all other extant 
versions of the Conceivability Arguments, since the argument attacks the link 
between conceivability and metaphysical possibility on which they all rely.  
Jackson's and Chalmers' arguments are similar. Their definitions of 
Physicalism are almost identical, as is the semantical framework in which 
they formulate their arguments. The main difference between their 
arguments if that they employ different formulations of the crucial premiss 
linking conceivability and possibility. But these premisses are still closely 
related. At the end of this section, I will show that Chalmers' main premiss 
implies Jackson's main premiss. This will be important, since then by refuting 
Jackson’s premiss I can refute Chalmers’ premiss as well. I will be explaining 
Jackson's argument first, but I will point out along the way the similarities and 
differences with Chalmers' argument. 
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3.6.1 JACKSON’S ARGUMENT 
Before presenting the argument that I call “Jackson’s argument” I 
should admit that Jackson never explicitly endorses this argument and 
recently he seems to reject its conclusion. Jackson himself presents his 
argument as a challenge for the physicalist, rather than a straight refutation 
of Physicalism. But if, as Jackson's own Knowledge Argument (Jackson 
1982) assumes, and as all other proponents of the Conceivability Argument 
claim, phenomenal concepts do not have the requisite conceptual 
connections with  non-phenomenal concepts, his argument can easily be 
turned into a refutation of  Physicalism. He explicitly argues for a premiss 
that links metaphysical and conceptual possibility in a way that, given the 
unanalyzability of phenomenal concepts, makes the anti-physicalist 
conclusion almost inevitable. 
Jackson’s own view now seems to be that, since anti-Physicalism is 
so implausible, there must be something wrong with the Conceivability 
Argument against Physicalism; but he professes to be uncommitted as to 
what exactly is wrong with it. He calls this position the ‘there must be a reply’ 
reply (Jackson 1996, pp. 134-5).  In what follows, I treat his argument as an 
anti-physicalist argument; but I do not want to make much of attributing the 
conclusion to him.  
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In a nutshell, Jackson's argument  is the following88. Physicalism 
requires that a phenomenal statement, like 'Frank is experiencing a yellow 
sensation', must, if true, be necessitated by truths expressed in the language 
of physics. He then argues that this necessitation must itself be a priori  and 
that such a priori  truths must be grounded in the nature of phenomenal and 
physical concepts. However, phenomenal concepts do not support such a 
prioricities. It follows that if there are true phenomenal statements then 
Physicalism is false.89 Since we are assuming that there are phenomenal 
truths, Physicalism is refuted.  Let us now look at the argument a little more 
closely.  
 
Physicalism 
Jackson observes that Physicalism, at a minimum, requires a 
commitment that  
                                                 
88My presentation is based on Jackson (1993) and (1995). 
89Jackson does not explicitly take this last step, although he does not 
quite say which premiss he thinks might be false. One might take the view 
that phenomenal concepts may have functional or other analyses; he alludes 
to this possibility (ibid, p. 142). However, I want to put this view aside for two 
reasons. First, I find this view very implausible; second, on this view the 
Conceivability Arguments against Physicalism cannot be formulated. I want 
to grant to the proponent of the Conceivability Arguments as much as 
possible before I present my refutation; I do not want our defense of 
Physicalism to depend on such a contentious semantic doctrine. 
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P Among worlds where no property alien to the actual world is 
instantiated, any  two that are exactly alike with respect to their 
complete descriptions (including specification of the 
fundamental laws) in the language of the ideal fundamental 
physical theory are duplicates simpliciter.90 
 
                                                 
90Jackson actually gives a slightly different version of P; the 
differences, however, will not matter in what follows. Chalmers (1996), pp. 
41-42, formulates physicalism in a very similar vein. 
In Chapter One we have seen how this definition makes more precise the 
intuitive idea underlying Physicalism: that there is nothing over and above the 
physical stuff in our world. Jackson also suggests that P is equivalent to the 
claim that every truth T about our world, be it physical, chemical, biological, 
psychological, etc., is necessitated by a statement of physics K that gives the 
full physical description of the world, together with the statement that K is the 
full, fundamental description of our world. This is the Entailment Thesis: 
(E) For any true statement T, 
(K&C&F⊃T), 
 
which is equivalent to P. 
If P is true, for most true statements T, (K⊃T) will be true. Those 
truths for which this does not hold are “global” truths, in that their truth 
depends on the global distribution of fundamental properties. It is clear that 
positive phenomenal properties, e.g., being in pain, are not global. So, for the 
purposes of the arguments to follow, we can use the simplified formulation  
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(E) For any true statement T, 
(K⊃T), 
 
keeping in mind that this is not strictly equivalent to P.             
 
Conceptual explanation 
According to Jackson, the necessities 'K⊃T' cannot be brute facts; 
they need explaining.91 Jackson observes that if T is, e.g., a psychological 
statement then analytical functionalism has a story to tell about why the 
statement is necessary. As he puts it: 
                                                 
91See Section 1.4 for more discussion on this. 
  
....it is the very business of conceptual analysis to explain how matters 
framed in terms of one set of terms and concepts can make true 
matters framed in a different set of terms and concepts. (p. 32) 
 
Jackson's view is that in the absence of a conceptual story of how the purely 
physical makes the psychological true, the entailment would remain an 
"impenetrable mystery".  He thinks that the  explanation has to be, in an 
appropriate sense, conceptual.  
Jackson argues that if Physicalism is true then 'K⊃T' is not only 
metaphysically necessary, but is also an a priori conceptual truth; i.e., he 
argues that if Physicalism is true then all truths are a priori derivable from the 
full physical description of the world. I will call this the  
 
 
 
118 
A Priori Entailment Thesis:  
(APET) if  (E) is true, for any true T, statements of the form 
K⊃T 
are conceptual truths.92 
 
                                                 
92This, of course, is not an arbitrary requirement for Physicalism 
alone. Jackson claims that any metaphysical theory that makes a distinction 
between fundamental and non-fundamental properties, e.g., Berkelean 
idealism, or Cartesian Dualism, has to be able to produce, for any true T, 
appropriate derivations of the respective entailment claims 
K*⊃T,  
where K* is the full description of the world in the language of fundamental 
discourse, and T is any  truth. (In the case of Berkelean idealism, e.g., the 
fundamental discourse is mentalistic, and all the physical truths have to be a 
priori entailed by a complete mentalistic description of the world.)  
The APET plays the same role in the argument as CTT, WTT, and 
KTT, i.e., the respective Transparency Theses played in Descartes’, White’s, 
and Kripke’s argument: it links conceivability and possibility. It is a 
generalization of Kripke’s thesis; it holds not only of identity statements, but 
covers the very supervenience claims that must be true if physicalism is true.  
We have observed earlier that conceivability does not always imply 
possibility. As Kripke (1972) has pointed it out, identity statements containing 
rigid designators, if true, are necessarily true; e.g., water is necessarily H2O. 
It is conceivable, however, that water is not H2O. This shows that mere 
conceivability is not a reliable guide to possibility. Proponents of the new 
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Conceivability Arguments claim to have identified a special class of 
statements for which conceivability does imply possibility. Jackson proposes 
that it is the class of statements which, conjoined with the full truth about the 
world in the language of fundamental discourse, are conceivable, so, if 
Physicalism is true, then it is the class of statements which, conjoined with 
the full physical truth about the world, are conceivable. 
The A Priori Entailment Thesis is really a claim about the link between 
conceivability and possibility. We can see this by showing that the APET is 
equivalent to the  
Conceivability-Possibility Thesis 
(C-P) if Physicalism is true then, for any thought S, if K&S is 
conceivable then it is possible. 
 
Notice that K&S is conceivable iff -(K&S), that is, K⊃-S is not a 
conceptual truth. Notice also that K&S is possible iff (K⊃-S) is false. So 
substituting ‘it is not the case that K⊃-S is a conceptual truth' for ‘K&S is 
conceivable', and 'it is not the case that (K⊃-S) for 'K&S is possible', we get  
if Physicalism is true, then, for any thought S, if (K⊃-S) is true, then 
K⊃-S is a conceptual truth,  
 
which is just the APET. 
Why think that the APET is true? Jackson provides the following 
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considerations. 93 First of all, he claims that many truths conform to it, and 
there is no reason to suppose that some will not; also, it is immune to the 
criticism we made earlier with respect to the naive conceivability-possibility 
principle. Although it is conceivable simpliciter that water is not H2O, it is not 
conceivable consistent with the full physical description of the world.  Building 
 on Kripke’s argument (Kripke 1972, pp. 140-162), Jackson observes that,  
arguably, in all bona fide cases of identity statements where the denial of the 
identity claim is conceivable (e.g., Water is not H2O), there are contingent 
truths such that the denial of the identity statement, in conjunction with them, 
is not conceivable.  
For example, on the assumption, roughly, that H2O is the unique thing 
that plays the water-role, the statement that water is not H2O is not 
conceivable, since it is a conceptual truth that the unique thing that plays the 
water-role is water.94 Jackson generalizes this observation and claims that 
the denial of all bona fide true statements, in conjunction with the full 
fundamental truth about the universe, is inconceivable. The full fundamental 
description of the universe always provides enough background information 
                                                 
93I am going to discuss a more technical, elaborate explanation in the 
next section. 
94That it is a conceptual truth follows from Jackson’s semantics. 
Jackson’s semantics will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
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to fix the reference of any concept in terms of fundamental concepts, and so 
it is always possible to  derive any true statement from it. 
Let’s look at the example involving water and H2O in some detail. 
Suppose the water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth. Then, according 
to Jackson, it can be shown that the statement  
(W) K⊃water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth 
is a priori.  Let's see how. Jackson claims that something like the following is 
an a priori truth 
i) Water is the clear, odorless, etc....liquid around here that fills 
the oceans and lakes, etc. 
 
It follows a priori from i) that 
ii) H2O is the clear, odorless, etc....liquid around here that fills the 
oceans and lakes, etc.⊃Water is H2O 
 
But it is also a priori true that  
iii) (Water is H2O)⊃((H2O covers 60% of the surface of the 
Earth)⊃(Water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth)) 
 
From ii) and iii) we get 
iv) H2O is the clear, odorless, etc....liquid around here that fills the 
oceans and lakes, etc.⊃(H2O covers 60% of the surface of the 
Earth⊃Water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth) 
 
But this is equivalent to 
v) (H2O is the clear, odorless, etc....liquid around here that fills 
the oceans and lakes, etc. & H2O covers 60% of the surface of 
the Earth)⊃Water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth. 
 
If this derivation is correct, we have shown that the statement 
H⊃Water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth, 
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where H is a conjunction of contingent statements about H2O, is a priori.95 
Since, according to Jackson, these contingent statements about H2O are 
similarly  a priori derivable, perhaps through some intermediary steps, from 
contingent truths of micro-physics, we have shown that  
(W) K⊃Water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth 
is knowable a priori. Jackson thinks that most true statements96 can be 
similarly shown to be a priori entailed by the full physical description of the 
world.97 
                                                 
95Of course, the derivation, as it stands, is incomplete. To complete it, 
we would have to have the requisite conceptual truths that link the concept 
‘Earth’, ‘surface’, ‘clear’, ‘odorless’, etc. to terms of lower level discourse, 
and, ultimately, micro-physics. But, according to Jackson, it is rather clear 
that such conceptual truths exist. 
96With the exception of phenomenal statements. But, of course, he 
thinks that even those would be entailed a priori by the full fundamental 
description of the world.  
97One might think that, on the model of our derivation of 'Water covers 
60% or the surface of the Earth', we can derive a priori, e.g., 'x had pain'  
from contingent truths, if we allow just any contingent truths to figure in the 
derivations. For imagine the following argument: 
a) x has C-fibre firing (contingent empirical truth). 
b) Pain is the originating cause of pain-behavior (contingent empirical 
truth). 
c) C-fibre firing is the originating cause of pain-behavior (contingent 
empirical truth). 
from a) and b) we get 
d) Pain is C-fibre firing.  
from a) and d) we get 
e) (x has C-fibre firing & pain is C-fibre firing)⊃x has pain.  
This derivation uses only contingent empirical truths and conceptual truths. It 
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Second, the APET is a very powerful explanatory claim. Modal claims 
of the form  
(K⊃T) 
might seem metaphysically and epistemically mysterious. If correct, the 
APET would explain these necessities in terms of conceptual truths, and it 
would explain metaphysical necessity in general in terms of conceptual 
necessities and contingent truths, since, according to it, the statement  
K⊃M 
where K is the full fundamental description of the world, and M is any 
metaphysical truth, is a conceptual truth. This means that any metaphysically 
necessary truth M can be conceptually derived from K, the totality of 
contingent fundamental truths. This account also provides an epistemology 
for modality. 
To recap, the argument Jackson (and Chalmers) offer for the APET is: 
many putative necessities of the form  
(K⊃T) 
                                                                                                                                     
has the form  
P→x has pain, 
where P is a conjunction of contingent facts of neurophysiology and 
psychology, and is knowable a priori. The problem with this derivation, 
however, is that one of the conjuncts in P, premiss b), is not itself a priori 
derivable from K; and if Physicalism is true, according to Jackson, b) could 
be true only if it were so derivable.  
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do conform to the APET; there is no reason to suppose that there are 
exceptions to it98; and there are good explanatory motivations for it. 
Jackson and Chalmers also supply a much more sophisticated and 
elaborate argument for the APET, based on the so-called two-dimensional 
semantic framework. They seem to suggest that the two-dimensional 
semantics, together with uncontroversial claims, entails the APET. However, 
I will show, they do not ultimately succeed in providing  any additional 
support to the APET. Moreover, the defense for the APET in terms of the 
two-dimensional framework is not strictly necessary for an understanding of 
Jackson and Chalmers’s  statement of the  Conceivability Argument, or my 
refutation of it. Hence, the reader can skip right through to the next 
subsection, the exposition of Jackson’s anti-physicalist argument. 
 
The two-dimensional account 
                                                 
98The main goal of this dissertation is to give such reasons. I will show 
that, contrary to Jackson, there are exceptions to the APET. 
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Jackson, as well as Chalmers, support their claim that conceptual 
truths play a key role in explaining a posteriori necessary truths99 by applying 
two-dimensional semantics to mental representations; i.e., to concepts and 
thoughts.100 On this account, concepts are internally individuated types of 
mental items;  concepts are individuated independently of their referents so 
that we can meaningfully ask, for any world w, what the content of concept C 
would be, were w the actual world.  According to the two-dimensional 
account, every thought or concept (or their linguistic counterpart) possesses 
two intensions - a primary intension and a secondary intension. The notion of 
primary intension is supposed to capture the internal aspect of content; i.e., it 
aims to capture, from an internal point of view, how the thinker conceives of 
the world. This notion presumably plays a key role in psychological 
explanation. The notion of secondary intension, on the other hand,  is just 
another term for what we ordinarily, post-Putnam, mean by a concept’s 
‘content’. For example, according to Jackson, the primary intension of water 
is, very roughly, watery stuff, i.e., clear, odorless, etc...liquid around here that 
fills the oceans and lakes, etc. The secondary intension of water is H2O.  
                                                 
99Similar ideas have been formulated by Putnam (1975). 
100This approach was first formulated by Kaplan (1978), (1979) and 
(1989), although he restricted the framework to demonstratives. It has been 
developed by Stalnaker (1978), Lewis (1979), Evans (1979), Davies and 
Humberstone (1980), and others. 
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To put it more formally, both the primary and the secondary intensions 
are functions from possible worlds to referents of the appropriate type; i.e., 
the primary and secondary intensions of thoughts are functions from possible 
worlds to {T,F}.101 A concept’s primary intension at a world w is evaluated 
without any reference to the actual world; the value of the primary intension 
function is determined by considering what the concept would apply to in w, 
were w the actual world. In this way, primary intension captures the internal 
determinants of content, since, in the absence of determination by the actual 
world “outside of the head”,  primary intension is supposed to be determined 
entirely by matters “inside the head”. So, for example, the value of the 
primary intension of water in w is whatever stuff the concept water would 
apply to at w were w the world that fixes the referent of the concept. The 
primary intension of our concept water can be captured, according to 
Jackson, as watery stuff, i.e., clear, odorless, etc....liquid around here that 
fills the oceans and lakes, etc. If the primary intension of water is determined 
by something like the description  the clear, odorless, etc...  liquid around, 
then the value of the primary intension function at world w  is whatever is the 
                                                 
101Strictly speaking, there is a difference in the arguments of these 
functions; primary intension is a function from centered possible worlds to 
referents, secondary intension is a function simply from possible worlds to 
referents. But for the purposes of the dissertation I will ignore this 
complication. 
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clear, odorless, etc... liquid at w. In the actual world that liquid is H2O, but in 
some other world w, it - if it exists at all - may be different from H2O, e.g., 
XYZ. 
On the other hand, when evaluating a concept’s secondary intension 
in a world w, one takes first the actual world and sees how it fixes the 
concept’s referent, i.e., one first determines what the primary intension picks 
out as referent in the actual world, and then considers, in the light of that, 
what the concept would apply to in w. Secondary intension then coincides 
with the ordinary notion of content. It has an external element since what the 
referent is in counterfactual worlds generally depends on what the actual 
world is like. If Jackson is right that the primary intension of water is 
determined by the description watery stuff, then the secondary intension of 
our concept water is determined by a rigidified description,  dthat (watery 
stuff), where watery stuff is the primary intension of water, and dthat is 
Kaplan's (1979) rigidifying operator, converting the primary  intension into a 
rigid designator that picks out in every possible world whatever the value of 
the primary intension was in the actual world. The value of the  secondary 
intension function of water in the actual world is the actual watery stuff, i.e., 
H2O; and it is also H2O in all other possible worlds, irrespective of what the 
local watery stuff is there. Notice however, that in the actual world the value 
of the primary and secondary intensions of a concept always coincide. 
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The two-dimensional apparatus outlined here is committed to two 
basic ideas as far as primary intension is concerned. One is the idea that 
there is a well-defined function from possible worlds to referents that is 
determined by what a concept or thought102 would pick out as referent under 
different circumstances, taken as if they were actual. Let's call it the Function 
Thesis. The other is the idea that this function represents an aspect of 
content, usually distinct from ordinary content, which is also a function from 
possible worlds to referents. Let's call it the Content Thesis.103  
There is a prima facie difficulty with the Function Thesis; it is not clear 
that the primary intension function has been well-specified. The problem is 
that it is hard to see how to evaluate the primary intension function in 
possible worlds where the concept or thought is not present. After all, the 
two-dimensional account defines primary intension as a function that  is 
determined by what an (internally individuated) concept or thought would pick 
out as referent in different possible worlds, were these worlds the actual 
world. There might be no answer to this question in worlds where the 
                                                 
102Or their linguistic counterparts. 
103There is an obvious sense in which the primary intension of a 
concept is determined just by what is in the head. The actual external 
features of the thinker’s environment are irrelevant. For this reason it has 
seemed to some philosophers that the primary intension of a concept is its 
narrow content. 
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concept is not present. One might reply that we take the concept or thought 
from the actual world, and evaluate it in the possible worlds in question.104 
But how do we do this? After all, two-dimensional semantics is a theory that 
strives to give an account of what concepts are; it cannot take the notion of a 
concept for granted.  
Jackson and Chalmers tries to solve this problem, as well as support 
their respective version of the APET, by introducing further, substantial 
commitments into their version of the two-dimensional account. One way to 
interpret the primary intension function in worlds where the concept does not 
exists, as suggested by both Jackson and Chalmers, would be to 
characterize primary intension as determined or constituted by a description 
associated with each concept  (e.g., ‘clear, odorless...etc. liquid...’). These 
descriptions then pick out the appropriate referent of the concept in each 
possible world considered as actual (e.g., H2O in the actual world, XYZ in 
Twin-universe, etc.); thereby constituting a mapping between worlds and 
referents. Let’s call it the Description Thesis.  
                                                 
104Chalmers takes this view on p. 60, fn 26. He says "I think the 
primary intension is naturally extendible to a wider class of worlds: we can 
retain the concept from our own world, and consider how it applies to other 
worlds considered as actual..." 
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But this is a problematic assumption. Since, as we have seen, the 
actual world105 plays no role in the determination of primary intension, 
primary intension must supervene on what is “in the head”; that is, it must be 
narrowly constituted. But it is quite controversial whether the content of the 
descriptions claimed to account for primary intension is narrowly constituted, 
or can be constructed out of narrowly constituted descriptions.106 Even if 
some descriptions, like, e.g., phenomenal descriptions, are narrowly 
constituted, it is not clear that all of the requisite descriptions can be 
ultimately reduced to such narrow descriptions. One way to circumvent this 
problem is, instead of looking at the alleged conceptual truths one by one, to 
rather look at them as a network. Ramseyfication of our complete conceptual 
net might provide us with conceptual analyses that are both narrow and 
capable of determining primary intension. However, it is far from clear 
whether this suggestion can be carried out, and many philosophers object to 
the idea that there are enough non-trivial conceptual truths for the analyses 
to succeed (cf. Block and Stalnaker 1997).  But I want to put this problem 
aside for now. 
                                                 
105Perhaps more accurately, the actual world minus what is “in the 
head” does not play any role in that. 
106For an account of this strategy, and an indication of why it might not 
be viable, see Loewer (1985). 
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Another way to approach the problem, and this is the way that both 
Jackson and Chalmers seems ultimately to prefer, is to say that  possessing 
a concept means that one has an a priori ability to tell, given some 
(presumably fundamental) description of a world, what (if anything) the 
concept would apply to, were that world the actual world. According to this 
proposal, given any fundamental description of any possible world, one will 
be able to figure out whether, were that the actual world, there would be any 
water, trees, spiders, consciousness, etc. there.107  Let's call this the A Priori 
Availability Thesis (APAT).  
Both the Description Thesis, and the APAT are quite substantial 
theses, and they go beyond the basic two-dimensional framework, that is, 
the Function Thesis, and the Content Thesis. They try to capture the idea 
that primary intension is not only specifiable for the subject from a third 
person point of view; it is also accessible to the subject from the first person 
point of view. 
                                                 
107This, of course, is an idealization; what Chalmers and Jackson have 
in mind is what an ideal logician, not being bound by time constraints, powers 
of physical endurance, etc. could figure out under optimal circumstances.  
It is also arguable that this thesis presupposes the Description Thesis. 
How else would one be able to compute the references of concepts in 
different possible worlds considered as actual? But I leave this question for 
now.  
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We have seen how the Description Thesis and the APAT provides 
support to the Function Thesis. Without accepting either of them, there is 
little reason to subscribe to the Content Thesis either, even supposing that 
the primary intension function exists. It is not clear that a theory which does 
not subscribe to the a priori availability of primary intension, and this includes 
most plausible accounts of content, could count primary intension as an 
aspect of content, as opposed to just a mathematical construction that has 
no particular relevance for semantics or psychology. On some theories of 
content (e.g., Fodor 1990, Chapter 4), the concept water might come to refer 
to just about anything in another possible world, given that things are set up 
right in that world. It is hard to see how, on this view, primary intension can 
be a variety of content.  
However, there are many problems with both the Description Thesis, 
and the APAT. I already mentioned the difficulties of working out the 
Description Thesis. As for the APAT, I only want to point out here that the 
key role that Jackson and Chalmers assign to the two-dimensional 
semantics, and more specifically, to the APAT, in justifying the APET, is 
dubious. The APAT is supposed to provide support to the APET. However, 
while it is both true that the APAT is sufficient, in itself, to establish an anti-
physicalist conclusion, and that the APET does follow from the APAT, it also 
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seems clear that the APAT stands just as much in need of a justification as 
the APET does. 
Let us see first how Jackson uses the APAT to argue for the APET. 
The APAT says that there is something about our concepts that enables us 
to know a priori how the way the actual world turns out determines their 
referents. This does not just mean that we know a priori that the concept 
water refers to water. This knowledge is quite trivial. Rather, in the case of 
water we seem to know a priori roughly that water is whatever is the local 
clear, odorless, etc.... liquid that fills the rivers and oceans, etc. That is, 
possessing the concept water enables one to know a priori how contingent 
facts about the actual world figure in determining what water refers to. It 
follows from this that, once we are given the full fundamental description of 
the actual world, we will know what water refers to, without any further 
enquiry. 
It also follows, unsurprisingly, that before we are given the information 
about the actual world, in some sense we do not really know what our 
concept refers to, even though we understand the concept. Jackson says 
that the sense in which we do not know what our concept refers to is that, 
given a full description of a possible world in the language of fundamental 
discourse, we still do not know how to locate the reference of our concept 
there. Even if we have a full fundamental description of Twin Earth 
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universe,108 we will not know, without  sufficient information about the actual 
world, whether there is water there, since we do not know which substance is 
water in the actual world. What we do know a priori, by virtue of possessing 
the concept, is that there is something there (namely, XYZ) which, were Twin 
Earth world the actual world, would be the referent of our concept water.  
                                                 
108The world I have in mind is Twin Earth universe, taken as distinct 
from the actual world. 
This in turn, according to Jackson,  helps explain how we can 
understand necessary statements without knowing them a priori. 
Understanding  certain statements - on Jackson’s view, most statements - 
does not require that we know their ordinary truth-conditions (i.e., their 
secondary intension), in the demanding sense explicated above. In other 
words, understanding a statement does not require that, given a full 
description of a possible world in the language of fundamental physics  (or, 
more generally, in the language of the fundamental discourse), we should be 
able to tell whether it is true in that world. The reason, of course, is that, to 
evaluate the truth value of a statement at a world described to us, we need to 
know the references of its constituent terms at the actual world, but to 
understand the statement all we have to know is how the actual world 
determines its reference. This explains why we might not know a priori that 
water is H2O, though we understand the claim that water is H2O. 
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What this means, according to Jackson, is that the only reason why 
we sometimes do not know certain necessary truths a priori, even when we 
understand them, is that we lack the contextual information that determines 
their truth-conditions.109 If Physicalism is true then, the APAT tells us, this 
cannot be the case for statements of the form 
K⊃T, 
where K, as we have seen, includes the full physical description of the world, 
and T is any (contingent or necessary) truth. If we understand the statement, 
we have to know a priori that it is true110, since, given Physicalism, we have 
all the contextual information we will ever need.  
This is Jackson's justification for the A Priori Entailment Thesis, i.e., 
the claim that, given the truth of Physicalism, truths of the form 
                                                 
109This argument, incidentally, is a version the argument Kripke gives 
in  (1972), pp. 142-43. Kripke, like Jackson, meant to use the argument to 
pose a challenge to Physicalism. 
110Indeed, that it is necessarily true. 
K⊃T 
will always be knowable a priori. As we will see shortly, the APET then can 
be used to refute Physicalism.  
But there is a shorter route to Dualism via the APAT. The APAT is 
sufficient in itself to establish an anti-physicalist conclusion with respect to 
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qualia. For, if we accept the APET, we would have to conclude that in a 
physicalistic world no qualia properties are instantiated. That means, since 
qualia properties are instantiated in our world, that the full physical 
description of our world could not be the full fundamental description of it. 
That, however, begs the question against Physicalism: it is quite dubious that 
in the case of qualia properties, we should be able to tell a priori, whether in 
a purely physical universe they are instantiated or not. 
 
The important point to note is this. The basic two-dimensional 
framework, defined only by the Function Thesis, and the Content Thesis, can 
be held independently of the Description Thesis, and APAT. For example, 
Fodor (1987, Ch. 2), and Stalnaker (1978), (1990) proposes something like 
this.111 But on this, non-tendentious interpretation, the two-dimensional 
semantics does not provide support for the APET. With the addition of the 
Description Thesis, and APAT, the APET does follow, but the APAT itself is 
just as contentious as the APET itself.  
                                                 
111Of course this means that another solution for the problem with the 
Function Thesis mentioned above has to be found. 
One last point. If APET is true, it has to be necessarily true, and so, 
since it is hard to see what the full physical description of the world could 
have to do  with it, presumably a priori true. However, it does not seem to be 
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a priori knowable. There seems to be nothing incoherent about the possibility 
of a world APET fails, yet the entailment is simply underwritten by 
metaphysical reduction (via identity or realization) between higher level and 
basic physical concepts. again counts against the derivability. 
However, I would like to bracket these problems for the moment. For 
all these problems,  APET could be true.  The refutation of the Conceivability 
Arguments, and, ultimately, of all the Transparency Theses, including APET, 
will be the subject of the last chapter. 
 
The Argument 
I now want to show how the APET can be used to argue that 
Physicalism is false. If the APET is true, the physicalist faces trouble vis a vis 
fitting psychological, and especially phenomenal properties into the physical 
world. The reason is that there are no suitable conceptual analyses of 
phenomenal concepts for the relevant supervenience claim 
K⊃x feels pain (or any other statement expressing a phenomenal 
proposition), 
 
to be a priori. 
The derivation of K⊃Water covers 60% of the surface of the Earth 
depended on the conceptual truth Water is the clear, odorless, etc... liquid. 
The availability of such conceptual truths is essential to the kind of derivation 
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we are considering, since the derivation works by finding a contingent 
thought linking the description to a concept of a lower level theory, and 
ultimately to a concept of micro-physics. Now consider the claim 
K⊃x feels pain. 
To derive x feels pain a priori from K, there must be some conceptual truth 
connecting pain with a non-phenomenal description such that satisfaction of 
the description is a priori sufficient for feels pain. But, arguably, there are no 
such conceptual truths.112 For any such non-phenomenal description we can 
conceive of its being satisfied without anyone feeling pain. Pain is, as we 
                                                 
112One might think that, on the model of our derivation of Water covers 
60% or the surface of the Earth, we can derive a priori, e.g., x had pain  from 
contingent truths, if we allow just any contingent truths to figure in the 
derivations. For imagine the following argument: 
a) x has C-fibre firing (contingent empirical truth). 
b) Pain is the originating cause of pain-behavior (contingent empirical 
truth). 
c) C-fibre firing is the originating cause of pain-behavior (contingent 
empirical truth). 
from b) and c) we get 
d) Pain is C-fibre firing.  
from a and d we get 
e) x has pain.  
This derivation uses only contingent empirical truths and conceptual truths; it 
shows that  
P⊃x has pain, 
where P is a conjunction of contingent truths of neurophysiology and 
psychology, is knowable a priori. The problem with this derivation, however, 
is that one of the conjuncts in P, premiss b), is not itself a priori derivable 
from K; and if Physicalism is true, according to Jackson, b) could be true only 
if it were so derivable.  
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have discussed in detail in Chapter Two, a direct recognitional concept; we 
do not apply the term, at least in our own case, on the basis of any evidence, 
sensory, behavioral, or physical, distinct from what the term picks out, i.e., 
distinct from the experience itself. Pain refers to pain directly, or rather, via 
an essential feature of it, say, painfulness.113 But it follows from the APET 
that if x feels pain cannot be derived a priori from K, then  
(K⊃x feels pain) 
is false, and so if x feels pain is true114, then Physicalism is false.115 To put it 
more formally: 
1) If Physicalism is true, then for any true T, statements of the 
form 
K⊃T 
are conceptual truths. 
2) There are some true statements Q to the effect that 
phenomenal conscious experience occurs (eliminativism about 
phenomenal experience is false). 
                                                 
113In fact,  on a Kripkean direct reference theory, this applies to proper 
names, demonstratives, natural kind terms, etc. The point is that on the  
Jackson-Chalmers view, this feature is unique to phenomenal concepts.  
114Another way to block his argument is to deny that there are 
phenomenal states; see, e.g., Rey (1988). But, again, I put this objection to 
the Conceivability Argument aside, since I do not want a refutation of it to 
depend on such a controversial claim. 
115As we have already pointed it out, Jackson is not explicit about this. 
But in  his (1982) he provides the tools to generate trouble for the physicalist 
from the APET. In that paper Jackson maintained that Mary is not able to 
deduce, even from the full physical description of the world, that a certain 
phenomenal experience, e.g., red phenomenal experience occurs. 
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3) If Q is a phenomenal statement , then 'K⊃Q' is not a 
conceptual truth.  
So 
4) Physicalism is false. 
 
Another, perhaps more intuitive way to formulate the same argument  
is in terms of conceivability. We have shown earlier that  
(C-P) if Physicalism is true then, for any statement S, if 'K&S' is 
conceivable then it is possible 
 
is equivalent to the APET.  
Now the argument can be run like this. Add to (C-P) the claim that  
(Z) 'K&Z' is conceivable, 
where Z is the claim that there are zombies; i.e., that it is conceivable that 
there is a world physically exactly like ours, but where all creatures are 
zombies. It follows from (C-P) and (Z) that the zombie-world is possible; 
which means, on the assumption that we are not zombies, that Physicalism 
is false. For the rest of the dissertation , for expository reasons, I will stay 
with the earlier formulation. 
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3.6.2 CHALMERS’ ARGUMENT116 
 
Chalmers (1996, pp. 65-123) endorses Jackson’s conclusion. He has 
made various claims in its support, and believes he has a refutation of 
Physicalism, although he never explicitly formulated the argument for it in his 
book. His various claims and assumptions can be put together to form an 
argument; this is what I am trying to do here. As we have noted, Chalmers’ 
formulation of Physicalism, and his semantics are essentially the same as 
Jackson’s. However, his crucial premiss is a bit different. In this section I am 
going to give a sketch of Chalmers' argument, and then show that its main 
premiss entails the main premiss of Jackson's argument. This will enable me 
to refute both arguments by just refuting Jackson's main premiss. 
Chalmers builds his argument around the following claim:  
Necessity-Contingency Thesis  
(NCT) the primary intension of a necessary a posteriori thought  must 
be contingent. 
 
                                                 
116The contents of this section are, again, fairly technical and not 
strictly necessary for the understanding of the main argument that follows. 
Readers can skip strait Chapter Four, the refutation of the Conceivability 
Arguments. 
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The primary and secondary intension of a thought both express a 
proposition, and these sometimes differ. This is an extension of the notion of 
primary and secondary intension for concepts. E.g., the primary proposition 
of Water is wet, is, roughly, the proposition that the clear, odorless,....etc. 
liquid that fills the oceans around here is wet,117 whereas its secondary 
proposition is the proposition that H2O is wet.  
The NCT follows from the claim that if the primary proposition of a 
thought is necessary, then the thought is knowable a priori.118 This, like the A 
Priori Entailment Thesis, is a consequence of the A Priori Availability Thesis. 
The APAT, as applied to thoughts, says that, given the full fundamental 
description of a possible world, one can know a priori, for any thought one 
understands, whether the thought were true in that world were that world the 
actual world. So, for example, if one were given a full fundamental 
description of Twin Earth universe,119 one could know a priori that,  were 
Twin Earth universe the actual world, Water is wet would be true. This 
                                                 
117This, of course, on the assumption that something like the 
Description Thesis is correct, which, as we have mentioned, is doubtful. But 
as a rough characterization, this will do.  
118On p. 69 Chalmers writes: "The class of [....]truths [whose first 
intension is necessary] corresponds directly to the class of a priori truths." 
119Twin Earth universe is a possible world where, instead of water, 
there is XYZ on Earth. 
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means that if the APAT is true, one is able to know a priori whether the 
primary proposition of a statement is necessary or contingent.120 But then, if 
the primary proposition of a thought is necessary, since it is also knowable a 
priori that the primary and secondary propositions of any thought coincide in 
the actual world, the thought will be a priori. That is, if the primary proposition 
of a thought is necessary, the thought is knowable a priori; which is 
equivalent to the NCT. 
                                                 
120On the assumption, of course, that the range of possible worlds is 
knowable a priori; i.e., that the full fundamental description of any possible 
world is a priori available. 
Now we can construct an anti-physicalist argument from Chalmers’s 
principle in the following way. Observe that if Physicalism is true then the 
thought K⊃Q, for any true phenomenal thought Q, is necessarily true. The 
thought K⊃Q is quite clearly a posteriori. If follows from the NCT then, that its 
primary intension expresses a contingent proposition. But can the primary 
proposition of K⊃Q express a contingent proposition, given our assumption 
that Physicalism is true?  
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The primary and secondary proposition of K coincide. It is arguable 
that basic physical concepts are picked out by essential properties of the 
referent; especially on the assumption that basic physical concepts are 
functional. If, e.g., electrons are necessarily whatever plays the electron role, 
then electron will have the same primary and secondary intension.121 
If the primary and secondary intension of K coincides, then the 
primary intension of K⊃Q is K⊃Q_.122 But the primary intension of a true 
thought also expresses a true proposition, so if Q is true, Q_ must be true as 
well. From the definition of Physicalism it follows that if Q_ is true and 
Physicalism holds then K⊃Q_ is necessary. So it is not contingent. 
Consequently, on the assumption that the NCT is true, and that there is a 
true phenomenal thought Q, Physicalism is false.123 
                                                 
121Chalmers considers the possibility that physical concepts work 
more like water in that they are rigidified descriptions. So, the concept 
electron would be roughly equivalent to dthat(the entity that plays the 
electron role) (p. 135). In this case the argument would not go through as we 
will see shortly. But I will ignore this possibility for now; what I ultimately want 
to show is that, even if the primary and secondary intensions of physical 
concepts coincide, the argument fails. 
122For any thought S, S_ will stand for a thought expressing its primary 
proposition. 
123See the appendix for a more precise, formal exposition of this 
argument. 
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Here is how Chalmers' NCT and Jackson's A Priori Entailment Thesis 
are related. The APET claims that  
if Physicalism is true then, for any true statement T, the statement 
K⊃T 
must be a priori.  
 
The NCT says that  
the primary intension of a necessary a posteriori statement must be 
contingent. 
 
I am going to show now, along the same lines that Chalmers’ anti-
physicalist argument proceeded, that the denial of the A Priori Entailment 
Thesis entails the denial of the NCT, which is just to say that the NCT entails 
the APET. Suppose that, contrary to the APET, Physicalism is true, but K⊃T, 
where K is the true, complete physical description of the world, and T is a 
true thought, is only knowable a posteriori. Can the primary intension 
associated with K⊃T  be contingent, as the NCT requires? The primary 
intension of K⊃T will be some statement K⊃T_, where T_ is the primary 
intension of T (the primary intension of K, again, is just K). But if T is true, T_ 
is true as well, so K⊃T_ will have to be necessary, given our assumption that 
Physicalism is true. In other words, we have shown that the denial of the 
APET entails the denial of the NCT. 
This result enables me to refute both arguments at the same time. If I 
can show, as I shortly will, that Jackson's principle is false, then, since it is 
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implied by Chalmers's principle, I have thereby shown that Chalmers's 
principle has to be false, too. But before I turn to the refutation of the 
Conceivability Arguments, I would like to discuss an argument which, though 
it does not rely on the same semantic considerations as the Conceivability 
Arguments do, is closely related to them: the Explanatory Gap Argument.  
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3.7 LEVINE’S GAP ARGUMENT 
The Conceivability Arguments discussed in this chapter rely on a 
version of what I called the Transparency Thesis (except the BAT Argument 
and the Mary Argument, which, as we have seen, stand in need of one). The 
first three of them (Descartes’, White’s, and Kripke’s) state, roughly, that 
whenever two concepts have the same reference fixer, it is knowable a priori 
that they do. The corresponding theses in the new Conceivability Arguments 
of Jackson and Chalmers generalize this idea from coreferring terms to 
metaphysical supervenience theses. The Transparency Theses are all 
rooted in a broadly Fregean semantics according to which mode of 
presentation both fixes the reference and individuates concepts at the same 
time. This presupposes that there are many conceptual truths. I do not see 
that the “old” Transparency Theses (CTT, WTT, and KTT), on any 
straightforward interpretation,  entail the APET, so it is not clear exactly how 
many conceptual truths there have to exist for the “old” Transparency Theses 
to hold . But the APET, and, accordingly, the NCT clearly requires that there 
are very many of them, in fact sufficiently many so that they ground the 
APET. On the Jackson-Chalmers view, e.g., the truth of Water is H2O is 
satisfactorily explained by conceptual truths, together with contingent basic 
physical truths.  
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We saw that exactly what conceptual truths are required and how they 
supposedly ground the APET is not completely clear.124 Jackson seems to 
hold a kind of descriptivism on which most concepts have a descriptive 
sense that analytically ties them to other concepts. For example, water, clear 
liquid, oceans are connected by the belief that Water is a clear liquid (at the 
usual temperatures) that fills the oceans etc., and liquid, substance, and flow 
are connected by the belief that Liquids are substances that flow, ....and so 
on. Jackson thinks that given the myriad of these analyticities we will be able 
to derive any non-fundamental truth from the full true fundamental 
description.. If the APET is correct, and if  phenomenal statements cannot be 
derived in this way from the full physical description of our world, then it 
follows that the full physical description of our world is not the full 
fundamental description. There is more in heaven and earth (specifically in 
our minds) than physicalism dreams of! 
            We have seen that this account of the relationship between 
conceivability and metaphysical possibility is motivated by Kripkean 
examples, and provides an attractive if audacious  picture of the metaphysics 
and epistemology of metaphysical modality. But we have also seen that the 
arguments for the APET are far from decisive. Given its reliance on the 
                                                 
124Recall that the primary intension of a concept is presumably 
determined by the analyticities involving that and related concepts. 
 
 
 
149 
analytic/synthetic distinction, the Jackson-Chalmers argument will 
doubtlessly be greeted in some quarters with an incredulous stare.  
For philosophers who reject the analytic/synthetic distinction, the a 
priori entailment thesis will appear to be obviously mistaken.125 And even 
some of those who think that the distinction is coherent will not think that 
there are nearly enough analyticities to sustain the a priori entailment 
thesis.126  After all, it is not all that plausible that the alleged examples of 
analyticities Jackson and Chalmers appeal to, e.g., Water is the clear liquid 
that fills the oceans... are analytic. Couldn’t it be discovered that in fact it is 
not water in the oceans and that water is not clear (we were tricked by evil 
demons into thinking so).  
I do not mean that it is metaphysically possible that water is not a 
clear liquid. That, of course, is correct, but not at issue. What I mean is that 
someone could be competent with the concept water, i.e., use it to refer to 
water, and yet not believe or even disbelieve that it is a clear liquid that fills 
                                                 
125The locus classicus for arguments against the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is Quine (1951). While Quine’s discussions are very famous and 
influential, it is a curious fact that there is little agreement concerning exactly 
what Quine’s arguments are and, although many philosophers pay lip 
service to these arguments, there isn’t much sign of their giving up the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. An exception is Fodor (1994, 1997) who rejects 
the distinction on the basis  of an atomistic account of concept individuation. 
126Block and Stalnaker (1997), e.g., attacks the conceivability 
arguments on this ground. 
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the oceans ..etc.127 I will call the view of concepts on which there are no, or 
very few, analyticities the “Quine-Fodor account” (Q-F account).128   
For philosophers who hold the Q-F account of concepts, the Jackson-
Chalmers Conceivability Argument is a non-starter. But one has the feeling 
that the physicalist cannot escape the intuitions behind the conceivability 
arguments so easily. The question then arises of how physicalism and the 
relation of phenomenal facts to physical facts look if the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is rejected. 
 
     We saw that physicalism requires the existence of supervenience bridge 
principles of the form (K⊃T). On the Jackson-Chalmers view these 
                                                 
127This is Fodor’s view. According to him it is metaphysically possible 
for someone to possess the concept water without having any of the beliefs 
that are supposed to be analytic involving the concept. There could even be, 
metaphysically speaking, a mind whose sole concept is water and has no 
beliefs. Of course, this does not mean that either of these (alleged) 
possibilities are nomologically possible. As far as anything Fodor says, it may 
be a matter of law that no one can have the concept water without believing 
that water is the clear liquid that fills the oceans....  
128Quine goes much further than Fodor, since he not only rejects the 
analytic/synthetic distinction, but also apparently rejects the view that 
reference is a substantive language-world relation. He holds a deflationary 
account of reference and truth. Quine also rejects the coherence of the 
notion of metaphysical necessity that is central to the very formulation of 
physicalism. I do not see that this rejection follows from rejection of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction. In any case, it is an interesting question how 
one should formulate physicalism, a doctrine Quine avows, without reference 
to metaphysical necessity. 
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principles are accounted for by being conceptual truths (or rather being 
entailed by conceptual truths).  Is it possible to make sense of the 
supervenience principles and physicalistic reduction on the Q-F account of 
concepts? The answer is surely affirmative.  
Consider, for example, the reductive identity Water is H2O.  The 
reason that we believe it is that it explains statements like Water dissolves 
sugar, Water expands when frozen, Water is a clear liquid, etc. These are 
not conceptual truths, but rather are central and well confirmed beliefs. On 
the Quine-Fodor view, in contrast to the Jackson-Chalmers view, the order of 
explanation is reversed. Where Jackson and Chalmers “explain” Water is 
H2O by deriving it from fundamental physical truths and conceptual truths, on 
the Q-F view  Water is H2O, together with physical truths explains why water 
is a clear liquid, etc. So far as I can see there is no incompatibility between 
the Q-F account of concepts and physicalism. 
But it is difficult to formulate a version of the conceivability argument 
on the the Q-F account of concepts. The trouble is that among the central 
and well confirmed beliefs we have involving phenomenal concepts are 
those that connect them causally to behavior, stimuli, other mental states. 
For example, Headaches cause people to take aspirin. But we have 
independent reasons to think that the causes of behavior are physical; in this 
case some neurophysiological state. The identification of headaches with 
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that state, or kind of state, will then explain why headaches cause people to 
take aspirin (or rather be part of the explanation). Thus it seems that 
Headache is h-fibre firing and Water is H2O are on a par; at least so far. 
Yet there seems as though there is an important difference between 
Headache is h-fibre firing and Water isH2O. Joe Levine (1998) has tried to 
get at the difference via the idea of the explanatory gap. Levine observes 
that sometimes we seek an explanation for an identity claim. For example, 
consider the claim that a diamond is a highly compressed lump of charcoal. 
On first hearing this one might very well ask: “How can that be, since 
diamonds are hard and brilliant, while charcoal is soft and black?”. The 
question is not a request for a justification of the claim (though one might be 
requesting that as well) but rather a puzzlement that such different properties 
are co-instantiated. But once we learn certain relevant empirical information 
concerning the behavior of carbon atoms under extreme pressure, that they 
are hard and brilliant, we no longer are puzzled.  
Levine thinks that the case is different for claims like Headaches are 
h-fibre firing. In this case we are puzzled, and no further information, at least 
none of the sort that anyone has ever proposed, dispels the puzzlement. 
Notice that learning that headaches are the cause of h-behavior and h-fibre 
firings are the cause of h-behavior does not dispel the puzzlement although it 
entails the identity Headaches are h-fibre firing.  
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     Levine calls an identity claim that admits of an intelligible request for 
explanation a “gapy identity.”129 Although he is not clear on this point, I think 
he would count both Diamonds are compressed charcoal  and Headaches 
are h-fibre firing (supposing it is true) to both be gapy identities though with 
the former the gap has been closed by further empirical information. On the 
other hand, Diamonds are diamonds is not a gappy identity. It is unintelligible 
to ask why it is so. But he nowhere offers a general account of “gapy 
identities.”  
Next Levine defines the notions of “thin conceivability” and “thick 
conceivability”. He says that a situation S is “thinly conceivable” relative to a 
representation R of S, just in case S is conceptually possible relative to R. 
This means that R is consistent with conceptual truths. A situation S is 
“thickly conceivable relative to R” iff S is thinly conceivable relative to R, and 
any derivation we can construct from R to a formally inconsistent 
representation R’ must include gappy identities. 
Levine thinks that Water is not H2O is thinly, but not thickly 
conceivable. On the other hand, he thinks that Headaches are not h-fibre 
firing (and any negation of an identity between a qualia concept and a 
physical or functional concept) is thickly conceivable. Levine does not 
                                                 
129Levine (1998), Chapter 5. 
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actually spell out the derivation of a conceptually inconsistent statement from 
Water is not  H2O, but presumably he has in mind employing premises like 
Water is the clear liquid that fills the oceans and... and H20 is the clear liquid 
that fills the oceans... It is not completely obvious to me that a complete 
explanation “from top to bottom” can always be given along these lines, but I 
will let that pass for now. Let’s suppose he is correct. 
Why then is Headache is not h-fibre firing thickly conceivable? 
Levine’s answer is that the best explanation of this is that it is metaphysically 
possible. In other words,  headache and h-fibre firing refer to distinct 
properties. Let’s call this Levine’s Principle (LP) 
(LP) Thickly conceivable situations are metaphysically possible.      
 This lead him to construct the following anti-physicalist argument: 
1) If physicalism is true, then for any true statement T, 
(K⊃T). 
 
2) There are some true statements Q to the effect that 
phenomenal conscious experience occurs (eliminativism about 
phenomenal experience is false). 
 
3) It is thickly conceivably that K⊃Q is false.  
 
4) Thickly conceivably situations are metaphysically possible.  
 
5) Physicalism is false. 
 
Levine claims that this argument is plausibly sound (though he does 
not go so far as to endorse it) and that it is plausible even if one holds the Q-
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F account of concepts that rejects analyticities. I am not so sure that this 
latter claim is correct. It depends whether he can spell out the distinction 
between non-gapy and gapy identities in a non question-begging way. But he 
never really explains exactly how to make this distinction, other than relying 
on our intuitions concerning when a request for an explanation is intelligible. 
The other worry I have about Levine’s argument is that it is not really 
clear to me that one can derive all the supervenience principles not involving 
phenomenal concepts required by physicalism from the full physical 
description and non-gapy identities. Levine has not shown how we can make 
the derivations. And if we cannot then his argument will prove too much. I will 
make it too easy to defeat physicalism.  Going further with these objections 
requires clarifying the non-gapy/gapy distinction. I will leave that to Levine.  
But it really does not matter how he clarifies it for I will show in the next 
chapter that no matter how the distinction is drawn, the Gap Argument is not 
sound. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ZOMBIE-REFUTATION 
 
 
The dualist conclusion of the Conceivability Arguments is rather 
implausible on several counts. There are powerful reasons to believe that 
Physicalism is true. Moreover, the dualist position has some internal 
problems of its own.  
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First of all, it has to account for why psycho-physical correlations 
occur even though phenomenal states do not metaphysically supervene on 
the physical. Nomological correlations have to be posited to hold the two 
realms together; but that leads to an ontology with a multitude of 
fundamental laws connecting complex physical states with apparently simple 
phenomenal states. These fundamental laws would be different from any 
laws of nature we know from science.  
Second, a dualist would either have to deny the causal closure of 
physics, countenance implausible causal overdetermination, or accept 
epiphenomenalism for phenomenal states. None of these options are very 
attractive. Chalmers seems to prefer epiphenomenalism but that would make 
it completely mysterious how we know about our own phenomenal states.130  
Third, although the new Conceivability Arguments for Dualism rely 
solely on the conceivability of worlds exactly like ours physically, but lacking 
any phenomenal properties instantiated, and not on the converse, i.e., the 
conceivability of worlds exactly like ours phenomenally, but lacking in any 
physical properties instantiated, it appears that an advocate of the 
Conceivability Argument would have to condone the existence of purely 
                                                 
130Chalmers says that a person is acquainted with her phenomenal 
states and that this relation is not a causal one. But this seems to just put a 
label on the mystery.  
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phenomenal worlds.131 It is barely intelligible what a world like that would be 
like. Fortunately,  it can actually be shown that the  arguments for Dualism 
we have been considering are unsound. 
In this chapter I will to show that the Conceivability Arguments, as well 
as the Gap Argument, fail. The reason they fail has to do with the very nature 
of phenomenal concepts that give rise to the conceivability of zombies. First I 
am going to present a rather powerful reason for doubting the soundness of 
these arguments. But we can do better than that. In the second step, I will 
formulate a definitive refutation of the Conceivability Arguments.  
 
 
4.1 CONTEMPLATING THE TRANSPARENCY THESES 
 
As we have seen, each of the Conceivability Arguments rely on their 
particular version of the Transparency Thesis. However, on the account of 
phenomenal concepts we have given in Chapter Two, it can be seen that 
there is no a priori reason to hold the Transparency Theses (as well as 
Levine’s Principle, which is not, strictly speaking, a transparency thesis).  
The theses in question are the following: 
                                                 
131Descartes actually did in the Meditations (John Cottingham; Robert 
Stoothoff; Dugald Murdoch 1984). 
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Cartesian Transparency Thesis 
(CTT) When you clearly and distinctly perceive of substance A and 
substance B, that is, you conceive of them through their whole 
essence,  and still do not see that they are the same 
substance, then they must be different.  
 
White’s Transparency Thesis 
(WTT) If the same mode of presentation is associated with two 
(coreferring) concepts, it is knowable a priori that these 
concepts corefer. 
 
Kripkean Transparency Thesis  
(KTT) it is impossible to refer to the same kind of state through rigid 
designators with essential reference fixers that have no 
conceptual connection at all. 
 
A Priori Entailment Thesis:  
(APET) if  (E) is true, for any true T, statements of the form 
K⊃T 
are conceptual truths. 
 
Necessity-Contingency Thesis  
(NCT) the primary intension of a necessary a posteriori thought  must 
be contingent. 
 
Levine’s Principle 
(LP)  Thickly conceivable situations are metaphysically 
possible. 
 
However, there is no a priori reason why the following scenario could 
not happen. We could have132 two psychologically different conceptions (say, 
a basic recognitional concept, and a neurophysiological concept) of the same 
referent, that are connected to their referent via the same property, e.g., 
                                                 
132In fact, I want to say that this scenario is actual, but for the point I 
am making all I need is that this scenario is conceptually coherent. 
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some neurophysiological property, but in different ways. They might, e.g., 
have different inferential roles. 
If this scenario is coherent (conceivable), then there is no a priori 
reason to hold the Transparency Theses, since the Transparency Theses, 
each in their own way, deny the possibility of such a scenario. They all say, 
or at least imply, that two conceptually independent terms that refer via an 
essential reference fixer, could not corefer. But in fact, if this scenario is 
coherent, there is no reason to rule out a priori that the basic recognitional 
concept in our scenario is a phenomenal concept. On the account we have 
been considering in Chapter Two, phenomenal concepts are a special kind 
of recognitional concept. There is no a priori reason to rule out that a certain 
phenomenal concept and a certain neurophysiological concept could both 
refer to pain.   
On this story the reference fixers of these terms are psychologically 
available, but in an important sense, they are not transparent. It is not always 
 knowable a priori whether two terms have the same reference fixers. So, if 
by mode of presentation we mean whatever individuates concepts, then on 
this story reference fixers and modes of presentations do not coincide. Frege 
was wrong to suppose that there is a single entity that both individuates 
concepts and fixes their reference.  
 
 
 
160 
The above considerations show that there is no a priori reason to hold 
the Transparency Theses. Since the same considerations cast doubt on 
Levine’s Principle as well, it is rather clear that, although his argument does 
not use any of the semantic machinery that the Conceivability Arguments 
apply, it still rests on the same basic intuitions. And those intuitions can 
actually be proven wrong.  
The coherence of the above scenario is the key also to the actual 
refutation of the Conceivability Arguments. I now introduce the Zombie 
Refutation. This argument is a master argument: though in its original form it 
is directed against Jackson's argument, as I will show later, it can be easily 
extended to refute all the other extant (and, I hope, possible) Conceivability 
Arguments. What the Zombie Refutation shows is that the Conceivability 
Arguments are self-undermining; that is, that with the addition of some 
plausible further premisses we can derive a contradiction from them.  
Thus, the zombies that anti-physicalists think possible in the end 
undermine the arguments that allege to establish their possibility. While 
these considerations fall short of establishing the truth of Physicalism, they 
go a long way towards defending it from some of the most influential 
arguments against it. Although I agree with Jackson and Chalmers that there 
is something puzzling about consciousness, I do not think that the puzzle 
adds up to a refutation of Physicalism. 
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4.2 THE MASTER ARGUMENT 
 
Suppose that Jackson's argument is sound. Its conclusion, that 
physical facts do not necessitate phenomenal facts, would then be true. And 
it would follow that there is a possible world which is exactly like our world 
physically, but in which no phenomenal facts obtain. Let me emphasize: I 
make this assumption only for the sake of a reductio. Of course, if 
Physicalism is true, as I think it is, then such a world is impossible. But my 
strategy is to show that the very assumption that there is such a world 
undermines the argument that lead to positing the existence of such a world. 
In the world we are imagining there exists a zombie-Jackson, 
physically just like Jackson, but not the subject of any phenomenal states. 
Zombie-Jackson appears to give a series of lectures (as Jackson did in the 
actual world), arguing for the A Priori Entailment Thesis. What are we to 
make of his words?  
First of all, notice that plausibly zombie-Jackson will have intentional 
states. When he talks, his words are not meaningless sounds. That is, it is 
plausible to assume that consciousness is not essential for intentionality; 
zombie-Jackson can have intentional states even if he lacks conscious 
states. Moreover, it is plausible to assume that zombie-Jackson’s intentional 
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states will be identical with Jackson’s intentional states except for intentional 
states that, in Jackson, involve phenomenal concepts. On this view, zombie-
Jackson’s argument will be just as meaningful as Jackson’s argument, and 
zombie-Jackson’s argument, though not quite identical to Jackson’ 
argument, will, in crucial respects, resemble it. It will go like this:  
1*) If Physicalism is true, then for any true T, thoughts of the form 
K⊃T 
are conceptual truths. 
2*) There are some true thoughts Q+ to the effect that a 
phenomenal+ state occurs (eliminativism about phenomenal+ 
states is false). 
3*) If Q+ is a phenomenal+ thought, then K⊃Q+ is not a conceptual 
truth.  
So 
4*) Physicalism is false. 
 
This argument is word by word identical to Jackson’s argument; however, 
some of the words have different meanings in Jackson’s and zombie-
Jackson’s mouth.133  
                                                 
133I marked these words with an ‘+’. We come back to the exact 
nature of the difference shortly. 
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My argument is the following. I will argue that zombie-Jackson’s 
argument is sound if Jackson's argument is. In particular, I will show that if a 
premiss of Jackson's is true, the corresponding premiss formulated by 
zombie-Jackson will be true as well.134 We know, however, by assumption, 
that the dualist conclusion of zombie-Jackson's argument is false in the 
zombie-world, consequently, we know that zombie-Jackson's argument 
cannot be sound. But then Jackson's argument is not sound either! While 
this does not necessarily mean that his conclusion is false, we can conclude 
that the argument he uses to establish it is not effective.135 
To run my argument, I will rely on a number of assumptions to 
describe the zombie-world. I am going to state these assumptions briefly 
right at the start; they will be discussed and defended in detail later after the 
argument is given. My claim is that these assumptions, taken together, are 
                                                 
134That is all I have to show since both arguments are clearly valid. 
135In fact, Chalmers (1996) comes close to giving the argument 
himself: 
 
“...one might plausibly argue that a zombie does not refer to 
consciousness in the full sense with his word 
“consciousness”... But even if he does not have the full 
concept, there is no doubt that he judges that he has some 
property over and above his structural and functional 
properties - a property that he calls “consciousness”... (p. 180) 
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more plausible then the A Priori Entailment Thesis, which, if true, would lead 
to a dualist conclusion, a very implausible result. 
Assumption 1 
If the brain-states of zombie-Jackson have the same wide functional 
roles as Jackson's brain-states do then Jackson and zombie-Jackson share 
most of their intentional states except those involving phenomenal concepts. 
 
Assumption 2 
The concept that, in the zombie, corresponds to Jackson's concept 
pain,  will refer to the same brain/functional state which, in the actual world, 
is reliably correlated with pain, and which, in the zombie-world, is also reliably 
correlated with the zombie's concept pain+.136 This means that whenever 
Jackson's thought I am in pain is true, zombie-Jackson's thought I am in 
pain+ will be true as well, being about a brain state he is in. 
 
Assumption 3 
A prioricity for thoughts supervenes on the conceptual roles of the 
constituent concepts. 
 
                                                 
136Pain+ stands for a concept of zombie-Jackson that corresponds to 
Jackson's concept pain. They will use the same words to express different 
concepts; whereas Jackson's concept is phenomenal, zombie-Jackson's 
concept, by assumption, is not. 
These assumptions will suffice for a reductio of Jackson's argument. 
As we said, zombie-Jackson, being Jackson’s physical twin, offers an 
argument that is identical, word for word, to Jackson's argument. On 
Assumptions 1 through 2, the only difference between Jackson's and 
zombie-Jackson's  argument is that where Q in Jackson’s argument refers to 
a phenomenal fact, Q+ in zombie-Jackson’s argument refers to a physical 
fact. Premiss 1*, the A Priori Entailment Thesis, if true, is necessarily true, so 
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if it was true in the actual world, it would be true in the zombie-world as well. 
On Assumption 2, we get Premiss 2*, i.e., the claim that eliminativism about 
phenomenal+ properties is false.  
Given Assumption 3, Premiss 3* of zombie-Jackson's argument,  
(3*) If Q+ is a phenomenal+ thought then K⊃Q+ is not a conceptual 
truth, 
 
has as much claim to be true as Premiss 3 in Jackson's argument. While 
K⊃Q+ has a different meaning from K⊃Q, it can be shown that if Premiss 3 is 
true then Premiss 3* is true as well. Jackson’s phenomenal concepts, and 
zombie-Jackson’s ‘phenomenal+ concepts have parallel conceptual roles.137  
Moreover, on Assumption 3, a prioricity, or conceptual necessity supervenes 
on the conceptual roles of the relevant concepts. That means that if K⊃Q is 
not derivable from conceptual truths then neither is K⊃Q+ derivable from 
conceptual truths. 
                                                 
137This is guaranteed by the epiphenomenalism with respect to qualia 
that is a consequence of Jackson’s and Chalmers’ Dualism. 
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On the assumptions I made, I have shown that zombie-Jackson's 
premisses are true if Jackson's premisses are. Premisses 1*-3* of the 
zombie-argument, however, together imply that Physicalism is false in the 
zombie-world; since this is contrary to our initial assumption, it follows that 
Jackson's argument must have a false premiss. The only candidate for that 
seems to be Premiss 1, the A Priori Entailment Thesis; the other premisses 
are extremely plausible.138 My argument, then, by showing that the 
Conceivability Arguments fail, proves that Jackson’s and Chalmers’s 
principle linking conceivability and possibility is false. 
I would like to consider some objections. First of all, one might object 
to my argument by claiming that the zombie's concept pain+ does refer to 
phenomenal pain. This would be a problem for my argument. If, contrary to 
Assumption 2, zombie-Jackson's concept pain+ referred to pain, then 
Premiss 2* would be false, since all phenomenal+ thoughts would be false in 
the zombie-world.  
                                                 
138It also follows that any argument given to support the A Priori 
Entailment Thesis must be unsound. Jackson and Chalmers used the two-
dimensional account, and in particular, what we called the A Priori Availability 
Thesis, to argue for the A Priori Entailment Thesis. This means there is good 
reason to doubt the A Priori Availability Thesis as well, i.e., there is good 
reason to doubt the very semantics that is driving the Conceivability 
Arguments. But this is subject for another discussion. 
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On this view, the first intension of pain and pain+ coincide. This is not 
Chalmers’s view: he argues persuasively that the first intension of pain and 
pain+ must be different. He points out (Chalmers 1996, p. 197)Conceivability 
Argument that, e.g., in spectrum inverted twins, phenomenal concepts must 
have different first intensions; and the zombie’s concept has to be different 
from both of these since the zombie’s concept could not distinguish between 
the two. 
But even without Chalmers’ considerations, we can see that this 
objection is very implausible.  For zombie-Jackson, unlike for Jackson, there 
will be nothing it's like to feel pain or perceive that the sky is threatening. It is 
quite implausible to assume then that when Jackson thinks that feels good, 
referring to the feelings produced by a back-rub, zombie-Jackson also refers 
to a feeling, even though there is none in his world. Of course, I am not 
saying one can never have concepts that lack actual reference. The concept 
unicorn or the concept God seem to be a perfectly good concept. All I am 
claiming is that, in the particular case of phenomenal+ concepts, like the 
concept pain+, the reference could not be non-physical qualia. 
Pain+, like pain, is a simple concept; its reference is not fixed via a 
description.139  So if it is to refer to a non-physical property, it must be in 
                                                 
139There is a slight complication here. Georges Rey (1988) suggests 
that, even if the reference of pain is not fixed descriptively, there is a 
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virtue of some causal, counterfactual, or lawful relation, a recognitional 
ability, or some other direct, non-descriptional relation. Let’s look at these 
possibilities one by one. Since there are no pains in the zombie-world, there 
could not be any causal relations between pain and the concept pain+ either. 
The putative fact that the zombie’s concept pain+ refers to pain cannot be 
constituted by counterfactuals involving the concept pain+ and pain either. 
Since Physicalism is true in the zombie-world, such counterfactual relations 
would have to be cashed out physicalistically.140 But it is hard to see how  
this can be done with enough specificity  if the counterfactuals involved are 
connecting physical and non-physical stuff.  
                                                                                                                                     
descriptive element to the concept, one that entails that the concept cannot 
refer to anything physical. It would follow then that pain+ could not refer to 
anything physical either. I do not think that our concept has this descriptive 
commitment. However, even if it did, we could always make up a concept 
that is just like pain except that its referent is not required, as a matter of 
conceptual necessity, to be non-physical.  Then the argument can be run on 
this new concept unchanged. 
140At least on Lewis’s (1886a) account of counterfactuals. 
The idea that the reference relation is constituted by lawful relations 
between the non-physical property pain and the zombie’s concept  pain+ is 
not much help either. In the physicalistic zombie-world that is the subject of 
our discussion, there are no laws involving non-physical properties. Similarly 
with recognitional capacities: the zombie is not able to recognize non-
 
 
 
169 
physical phenomenal states, there being none in his world. The only 
remaining choice is for reference to be fixed by some other direct, non-
descriptional way. Chalmers (See Chalmers 1996, p. 197) claims that,  in the 
case of phenomenal concepts, reference is constituted by acquaintance with 
the referent, where acquaintance is not to be cashed out in terms of causal, 
counterfactual, or lawful relations. However, zombie-Jackson is just not 
acquainted with phenomenal experiences in any sense of the word. 
There is another way to object to Assumption 2, that is, that  the 
zombie’s concept pain+ refers to a brain/functional state. Instead of claiming 
that pain+ refers to pain, one might try to argue that, even if  the zombie has 
some intentional states, his concept  pain+ does not refer to anything at all. 
On my view, this is wrong. The natural candidate for the reference of 
zombie-Jackson’s concept  pain+ is the physical or functional state that both 
he and Jackson occupy when the latter is having the experiences he refers 
to by the concept pain. Zombie-Jackson’s thought, e.g., that is painful+ 
attributes some brain/functional state to himself, although, of course, he does 
not conceive of it in this way, i.e., he does not think of this state qua brain-
state.  
Here are my reasons for this. Both Jackson and zombie-Jackson will 
utter the same sentences and will token the same mental representations in 
the same physical circumstances. Whenever Jackson uses the word (or 
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Mentalese expression) 'pain', zombie-Jackson will use it also; whenever 
Jackson’s behavior is influenced by thoughts involving pain, 
zombie-Jackson's behavior is influenced by what appears to be thoughts 
involving pain+; both in Jackson and in zombie-Jackson these thoughts 
engage other thoughts in a way that allows for content-involving  
explanations. So, for example, if Jackson thinks or says he has a headache 
and takes an aspirin, zombie-Jackson will also token the same mental 
representation or utter the words ‘I have a headache’ and take an aspirin, 
etc. Finally, since certain brain/functional states of Jackson are reliably 
correlated with his concept pain, the same brain/functional states of zombie-
Jackson are reliably correlated with pain+. I think these facts are highly 
suggestive of pain+  referring  to a brain/functional state.141 The burden is on 
those who claim that these facts are not enough to establish that 
zombie-Jackson's pain+ is a legitimate concept. The objector I am imagining 
here concedes that the kind of causal relations I cited in support of the claim 
that pain+ refers to a brain/functional state are sometimes sufficient for 
                                                 
141In fact, Shoemaker (1998) has similarly argued that zombies will 
refer  to a brain\functional state by their phenomenal+ concepts. He uses the 
point to a different effect, however; he argues for the view that our 
phenomenal concepts also refer to physical state, since we are physically 
identical to our zombie-Twins.  
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reference.142 She would have to give reasons why, in the particular case of 
phenomenal+ expressions, causal relations are not sufficient for reference.  
Another objection to my argument is that having phenomenal states is 
essential for having intentional states. In other words, one might object that 
because zombie-Jackson does not have phenomenal states, he does not 
really have bona fide intentional states either, and so cannot put forward any 
argument.143 The most prominent exposition of this view is due to Searle 
(1992, Ch. 7); he attempts to establish that consciousness is necessary for 
intentionality. His argument is based on considerations about the 
inscrutability of reference originally formulated by Quine (1960, Ch. 2). 
Searle puts his thesis in the following form:  
      The notion of an unconscious mental state implies accessibility to 
consciousness. We have no notion of the unconscious except as that 
which is potentially conscious. [emphasis in original] (Searle 1992, 
Ch. 7, p. 152) 
 
I think this is probably wrong, and a good case can be made that 
zombie-Jackson does have intentional states. But even if it was true that, at 
                                                 
142If one denied that those causal relations are ever sufficient for 
reference, one would have to deny Assumption 1. I will discuss that objection 
shortly. 
143The objection can be made more general by simply claiming that 
intentionality does not supervene on the physical. In this case, however, the 
argument for Dualism based on qualia would already presuppose Dualism 
about intentionality. 
 
 
 
172 
least potential, consciousness144 was necessary for intentionality,145 it would 
not damage my argument. My argument can be run in a way that would 
make the objection irrelevant.  
In fact, zombie-worlds are only introduced for expository convenience. 
They are not essential to refute Jackson and Chalmers’ argument. My 
argument against them only presupposes that it is conceivable to refer to a 
brain-state directly. I presume there is nothing incoherent about the idea of 
referring to a brain-state directly, without the mediation of any physical, 
functional, or abstract concept, and even without the mediation of a 
phenomenal feel figuring as mode of presentation or reference fixer. Even on 
the assumption that consciousness is essential to intentionality, this will allow 
me to construct an analogue of the Zombie Refutation.  
                                                 
144Searle does not distinguish between phenomenal consciousness 
and the cognitive aspects of consciousness; he probably thinks that the two 
are metaphysically connected. In any case, I take him to say that all 
intentional states have to be at least potentially phenomenally conscious. 
This is the reading on which Searle’s thesis causes a prima facie problem for 
my argument.  
145Incidentally, this thesis is perfectly compatible with Physicalism, 
even though, if true, it would render the Zombie Refutation in its present form 
ineffective. 
One way to do this is to consider a world where there are partial 
zombies. If Jackson and Chalmers is right that qualia are non-physical, then 
there is a world that is a physical duplicate of our world, but in which there 
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are creatures that have only some of our phenomenal experiences. These 
creatures will feel pleasure whenever we do, but will feel no pain at all. Since 
they do have consciousness, and, we might even stipulate, all of their 
intentional states are accompanied by phenomenal consciousness, there is 
no reason to deny that they have intentional states. However, on 
considerations discussed in reply to earlier objections, the most natural thing 
to say is that they their concept pain+ refers to a brain state. 
There is another way to make the point in a slightly different way. I 
submit that the following scenario is at least conceivable - and so, on 
Jackson’s and Chalmers’ view, possible. Imagine a world where there are 
creatures in many respects like us. They have the same physical and mental 
constitution as we have, except that there are some among them that are 
capable of forming concepts we are not capable of; let us call these people 
yogis. The yogis are capable of directly detecting certain states of their 
brains, even though they do not conceive of these states as brain-states. In 
some ways, these yogi-concepts will work like our phenomenal concepts 
work; they are applied to their referents directly, without the mediation of any 
physical, functional, or abstract concept. What is peculiar to them is that in 
the case of the yogi-concepts reference is not even mediated by a 
phenomenal feel.  
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I think there is nothing inconceivable about this scenario. The yogis 
will notice that they are capable of detecting some inner state of theirs, even 
though they do not have any idea how they are doing it. In this they will be 
somewhat  similar to actual blind-sighters; the difference is that while blind-
sighters are blindly detecting some feature of their environment, yogis blindly 
detect some feature of their own brain. For the sake of simplicity, let us 
suppose that there are two different states of their brains that they can 
detect, state A and state B, and they use the concept flurg and the concept 
florg to refer directly to these states. 
Yogis can formulate a variant of the Conceivability Argument. Using 
the A Priori Entailment Thesis, and the fact that truths involving the yogi-
concepts, e.g., Flurg occurred, are not derivable a priori from the full 
fundamental (physical, or if Dualism is true, physical cum phenomenal) 
description of their world, they argue that there is a possible world exactly 
like theirs physically and phenomenally, but where no flurgs occur. But such 
a world is impossible, since, by stipulation, the concept flurg refers to brain 
state A. The yogi’s argument is unsound. But among its premisses the only 
contentious one is the A Priori Entailment Thesis.  
This argument has the advantage of making the same point as the 
Zombie Refutation, only making it even clearer that the Conceivability 
Arguments arise not of any feature specific to phenomenal consciousness, 
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but rather because of a certain peculiarity of our phenomenal concepts, a 
peculiarity that can conceivably be shared by concepts undisputably referring 
to physical states.  
 
So, even if  the objection that consciousness is essential for 
intentionality were sound, it would not succeed in disarming my refutation of 
the Conceivability Argument. But there are grounds to think that intentionality 
is not metaphysically dependent on consciousness. It is plausible to suppose 
that zombie-Jackson has thoughts, beliefs, and other intentional states, 
although the contents of these states need not always coincide with the 
contents of Jackson's states. The reason it is plausible that zombie-Jackson 
has intentional states is that zombie-Jackson has states that have the same 
wide causal functional roles as Jackson’s intentional states, and such causal 
functional roles are plausibly sufficient for states to be intentional states. The 
concepts and thoughts entertained by Jackson and zombie-Jackson are 
identical then, except for phenomenal concepts and thoughts.146 
Zombie-Jackson will say and do exactly the same things as Jackson, and the 
hypothesis that he has intentional states will be just as explanatory of his 
                                                 
146If other concepts, e.g., red, person, etc., essentially involve 
connections to experiential concepts, as some empiricists hold, then they, 
too, will differ. However, their secondary intension, (i.e., their reference) may 
be exactly the same. 
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behavior as Jackson's intentional states are explanatory of Jackson's 
behavior. Whenever Jackson says he is thirsty and goes to the fridge for the 
beer, zombie-Jackson will utter the words ‘I am thirsty’ and reach for the 
beer, etc. So, there are good reasons to think that zombie-Jackson has bona 
fide intentional states. 
Finally, I would like to consider an objection to  Assumption 3, that is, 
the assumption that a prioricity supervenes on conceptual role. If it did not so 
supervene then it would be possible that sometimes we cannot tell, even in 
principle, of an a priori truth that it is true. If a prioricity did not supervene on 
actual and potential inferential relations, then we could not claim any special 
access to a priori truths; a paradoxical situation. Moreover, this would 
undermine whatever certainty we have in Premiss 3, i.e., the claim that,  
for any true phenomenal thought Q, K⊃Q is not a conceptual truth.  
Denying Assumption 3 would render the Conceivability Arguments extremely 
weak by making Premiss 3 contentious.  
 
The Zombie Refutation, and its analogues, the partial-Zombie 
Refutation, and the Yogi Refutation, show that there is something wrong with 
the Conceivability Argument. It is plausible even on the Zombie Refutation 
that the premiss that has to be given up is the A Priori Entailment Thesis; but 
on the Yogi Refutation this conclusion is inevitable.  
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4.3 THE EXTENSION OF THE MASTER ARGUMENT 
 
It should be clear that the Zombie Refutation applies to the other 
arguments under consideration as well. We have seen how Chalmers main 
premiss implies Jackson’s main premiss; so once we have refuted that we 
have refuted Chalmers’ premiss as well. The BAT Argument and the Mary 
Argument does not require separate treatment since, as we have seen, they 
are inconclusive as they are stated. So we are left with Descartes’, White’s, 
Kripke’s, and Levine’s arguments.147 
Zombie-Descartes is able to give a word-for-word analogue of 
Descartes’s argument. It is quite straightforward how to argue what we have 
argued in the case of Jackson’s argument, i.e., that the corresponding 
premisses in zombie-Descartes’ argument are just as plausible as the 
premisses of Descartes’s argument. The only exception is premiss 4. In 
premiss 4* of zombie-Descartes’ argument the zombie states that he can 
                                                 
147At this point I would like to refer the reader to Appendix B, where all 
the arguments appearing in the dissertation are listed.  
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clearly and distinctly conceive of body to exist without consciousness148 and 
mind to exist without extension. 
But that seems problematic. What Descartes means by clear and 
distinct perception of a substance is to conceive of them through their whole 
essence.  
The zombie, though he will say he has a clear and distinct perception of 
mind+ as having (essentially) thought and consciousness+, arguably does not 
have a clear and distinct perception of consciousness+ (since he conceives 
of it directly without a conscious mode of presentation), and so he does not 
have a clear and distinct perception of mind+. 
However, we have independent reasons to be doubtful of Descartes’ 
claim that one can have direct access to the whole essence of the referent of 
a concept just in virtue of the special features of that concept. Moreover, it 
will appear to zombie-Descartes that he has clear and distinct perceptions of 
mind+ and body, just like it appears to Descartes that he has clear and 
distinct perception of mind and body. There is no reason to suppose that 
Descartes has better access to essences than zombie-Descartes does.  
                                                 
148In the original, Descartes refers to thought, which he thinks is the 
essence of mind in general. To increase the plausibility of the argument, I 
changed the premiss to state the conceivability of bodies without 
consciousness.  
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The Property Dualism Argument does not present any challenges to 
extending the Zombie Refutation to it. Premiss 3, i.e., the claim that if the 
same mode of presentation is associated with two (coreferring) expressions, 
it is knowable a priori that these expressions corefer, if true, must be 
necessarily true. And it is clearly true in the zombie-world that there is no 
physical or functional term such that it is knowable a priori that such a term 
corefers with pain+. 
Kripke’s argument also straightforwardly lends itself to a Zombie 
Refutation. As it is prima facie possible for us that pain is not C-fibre firing, it 
is also prima facie possible for the zombies that pain+ is not C-fibre firing. 
Similarly, the principle that if a state of affairs is prima facie possible, and 
there is no way of explaining away this prima facie possibility, then this state 
of affairs is (metaphysically) possible, is, if true, necessarily true. And 
zombie-Kripke will find it just as impossible to explain away the prima facie 
possibility of pain+ not being C-fibre firing as Kripke does.  
Finally, the Gap Argument. Zombie-Levine will construct an argument 
analogous to the Gap Argument; the Gap* Argument. Again, it is rather clear 
how the premisses of the Gap* Argument will have to be true, if their 
corresponding premisses were true in the Gap Argument. One possible 
objection is that it is not thickly conceivable that K⊃Q+ is false. But if Levine 
cannot derive a contradiction from  -(K⊃Q) without the help of gapy identities, 
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zombie-Levine will not be able to derive a contradiction from -(K⊃Q+) without 
the help of gapy identities either.  
Suppose that zombie-Levine’s concept pain+ refer to C-fibre firing, so 
that -K⊃x has pain+ is true. This will be a gapy identity for zombie-Levine and 
any derivation of a contradiction from -K⊃x has pain+ must include a gapy 
identity.  
I conclude that the all the Conceivability Arguments, as well as the 
Gap Argument, fail. 
 
 
4.4 “EXPLAINING AWAY” THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM 
We have seen that the Conceivability Arguments against Physicalism 
are unsuccessful. In fact, even Jackson, one of the most forceful original 
proponents of the argument, now thinks that there must be something wrong 
with the it. He thinks that for a Dualist, epiphenomenalism is the most 
reasonable position, given the plausibility of the causal closure of physics. 
But epiphenomenalism is more implausible than any of the premisses are 
plausible, except the premiss claiming that phenomenal states exist. Jackson 
says that there must be a reply to the Conceivability Arguments, although 
one cannot quite say what. He calls this the 'There must be a reply' reply 
(Jackson 1996, pp. 134-5). 
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With the Zombie Refutation and its companion arguments, we can 
actually do better. The argument actually shows where the anti-physicalist 
went wrong. However, the physicalist, if she wants to make her position 
attractive,  must have an answer to two questions. One is the question of 
what explains the physicalistic supervenience claims captured in the 
Entailment Thesis: 
(E) For any true statement T 
(K⊃T). 
 
The explanation that Jackson puts forward of why E holds is that all 
instances of E are conceptual truths. He thought that the reduction of higher 
level concepts to lower level concepts has to be perspicuous.149 This 
however, is unwarranted; the only assumption needed to explain E is that 
metaphysical reductionism is true; that is, the only explanation needed is the 
assumption that there is some appropriate metaphysical relationship 
(identity, or  the realization relation, or perhaps some other, yet unknown 
relationship) between the referents of higher level and basic physical 
concepts.  
The other problem is this. Many of us are convinced (partly by the 
Conceivability Arguments) that there is something special about phenomenal 
                                                 
149See Chapter One for a detailed discussion of physicalism and 
reductionism. 
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statements. It seems right that it is not conceivable, after all the physical 
truths are in, that water is not H2O. But it is still conceivable that any 
phenomenal statement is false, no matter how much physical information we 
have.150 And the question of the explanatory gap remains as well. 
However, there is no mystery about all this. The explanation of this 
should be rather obvious by now. Physicalists who adopt this account of 
phenomenal concepts, will not be in the business of trying to close the gap, 
or explaining away the conceivability of zombies, since, on the account of 
phenomenal concepts we adopted in Chapter Two, it is to be expected for a 
physicalist that there will be an explanatory gap, and that zombies are 
conceivable.  
                                                 
150If you prefer the Gap Argument, think about it in terms of thin and 
thick conceivability. 
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On this account, now supplemented with physicalism, we get the 
following picture. Phenomenal concepts are direct recognitional concepts 
and they employ as their reference fixer the very state they are denoting: the 
itchy feeling of an itch serves to fix the reference of the phenomenal concept 
'itch'. Phenomenal concepts, on the other hand, refer to the very same 
property as some neurophysiological (ultimately, micro physical) concept: 
assuming that an itch just is a certain brain/functional state, there will be an 
appropriate neurophysiological/functional concept whose reference fixer will 
involve the same  property (a certain neurophysiological/functional property 
which is identical to an itch); only the reference fixer is deployed in the way 
characteristic of scientific terms. A phenomenal concept and a concept of 
micro physics, each of which pick out their referent through an essential 
reference fixer (say, some neurophysiological property) could then refer to 
the same property, even in the absence of the kind of conceptual 
connections required by the Transparency Theses.151  
But what about the persistent intuition (among lay people and 
philosophers alike) that, despite of every argument in favor of it, physicalism 
just can’t be true? I think that it can be explained by the intuitive pull of the 
                                                 
151A similar point is made by Scott Sturgeon (1994). 
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Transparency Theses.152 It is a very powerful intuition that, if we have two 
concepts, both of which refer via an essential reference fixer, then we must 
be able to tell if they corefer. After all, we have an insight into the nature of 
their referent through their reference fixers; so how could we be wrong about 
our judgement (as it is in the phenomenal/neurophysiological case) that they 
do not corefer? But we have seen in section 4.1 that this intuition is 
misplaced.  
 
                                                 
152Papineau (1993a) argues along similar lines. He gives an account  
which he claims explains why the peculiarities of our phenomenal concepts 
inevitably give rise to the illusion of Dualism. 
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One might object that this explanation does not do justice to our Yogi 
thought-experiment. In the Yogi Refutation I have hypothesized  that there 
could be beings that possess concepts directly referring  to (non-
phenomenal) physical states. Given my refutation of the Conceivability 
Arguments, I cannot claim, merely on the basis of their conceivability, that 
they are possible.153 But I see no reason why they could not be; after all, 
blind sight experiments show that actual people possess concepts that are in 
many ways similar to the yogi concepts. 154 Yogis can make statements that 
are true in their world even though these statements are not derivable a priori 
 from the full fundamental description of their world.   
Yet, it is plausible to speculate that yogis would not be inescapably 
drawn to Dualism. But shouldn’t they be, given our claim that a belief in the 
Transparency Theses is enough to explain anti-physicalist intuitions? Yogis 
are just as attracted by the Transparency Theses as ordinary humans are. 
The answer to this objection is that, when all is said and done, the yogi can 
be attracted by the Transparency Theses, and still not drawn to Dualism, just 
                                                 
153Though mere conceivability was enough to make the point against 
the Conceivability Arguments. 
154The main difference is, ignoring the fact that blind-sighters are 
reluctant to employ the recognitional abilities that constitute their blind-sight 
concepts without prompting, is that in the case of blind-sight we have direct 
recognitional concepts of external objects and properties, in the case of 
yogis, we have direct recognitional concepts of internal states (brain-states).  
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on the basis of her special conceptual repertoire. The difference between us 
vis a vis phenomenal concepts, and the yogi vis a vis the yogi concepts is 
that, as opposed to us, the yogi does not have a temptation to think that she 
has direct insight into the nature of what her concepts flurg and florg refer to. 
She does not have a real handle on the concept; the reference fixer of her 
concept might be an essential property of the referent, but she does not have 
an access to it, the way we have access to the phenomenal reference fixers 
of our phenomenal concepts.  
 
To conclude, I think we can sum up our project thus: if we have not 
completely untied the “World-knot” of the Mind-Body problem, we have 
loosened it a bit. 
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 APPENDIX A: IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS 
 
 
Conceivability 
 
(Con)  A statement S is conceivable, if it is logically consistent with 
the totality of  conceptual truths, i.e., if -S is not a conceptual 
truth.  
 
Physicalism 
 
P Among worlds where no property alien to the actual world is 
instantiated, any  two that are exactly alike with respect to their 
complete descriptions (including specification of the fundamental 
laws) in the language of the ideal fundamental physical theory are 
duplicates simpliciter.  
 
Entailment Thesis 
 
(E) For any true statement T, 
(K*&F⊃T), 
 
where K* is the full fundamental description of the world, F is the 
claim that K* is the full fundamental description of the world, and T is 
any truth. 
 
Physicalist Entailment Thesis 
 
(E) For any true statement T, 
(K&F⊃T), 
 
where K is the full physical description of the world, F is the claim the 
K is the full fundamental description of the world, and T is any truth. 
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Transparency Theses 
 
Cartesian Transparency Thesis 
(CTT) When you clearly and distinctly perceive of substance A and 
substance B, that is, you conceive of them through their whole 
essence,  and still do not see that they are the same 
substance, then they must be different.  
 
White’s Transparency Thesis 
(WTT) If the same mode of presentation is associated with two 
(coreferring) concepts, it is knowable a priori that these 
concepts corefer. 
 
Kripkean Transparency Thesis  
(KTT) it is impossible to refer to the same kind of state through rigid 
designators with essential reference fixers that have no 
conceptual connection at all. 
 
A Priori Entailment Thesis:  
(APET) if  (E) is true, for any true T, statements of the form 
K⊃T 
are conceptual truths. 
 
Conceivability-Possibility Thesis 
(C-P)  if Physicalism is true then, for any statement S, if 'K&S' 
is conceivable then it is possible. 
 
Necessity-Contingency Thesis  
(NCT) the primary intension of a necessary a posteriori thought  must 
be contingent. 
 
Levine’s Principle 
(LP)  Thickly conceivable situations are metaphysically 
possible. 
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 APPENDIX B: THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENTS 
 
DESCARTES' ARGUMENT FOR THE REAL DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN MIND AND BODY 
 
 
1) Whatever I can clearly and distinctly understand can be brought about 
by God. 
 
2)  If α belongs to the essence of A and β belongs to the essence of B, 
and  I can clearly and distinctly understand B to exist without α and A 
to exist without β, then I can clearly and distinctly understand A to 
exist without  B  and B to exist without A. 
 
3)   Thought belongs to the essence of mind, extension belongs to the 
essence of body. 
 
4) I can clearly and distinctly understand body to exist without thought 
and mind to exist without extension.  
 
5) By (1), (2), (3) and (4), mind can exist apart from body. 
 
6) If A can exist apart from B, and vice versa, A is really distinct from B. 
 
7) Hence, by (5) and (6), mind is really distinct from body. 
 
 
 
 ARGUMENT FROM DOUBT 
 
 
 
1) I am certain that my mind exists. 
 
2)  I am not certain that my body exists. 
 
3) My mind is diverse from my body. 
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 NAGEL'S BAT-ARGUMENT 
 
1) There are no physical facts that do not consist in the truth of 
propositions expressible in a human language. 
 
2) There are experiences that we cannot conceive of. 
 
3) Having an experience is a fact. 
 
4) If there are facts that we cannot conceive of then there are facts that 
do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human 
language. 
 
Lemma (by 2, 3, and 4): 
5) There are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions 
expressible in a human language. 
 
So, by 1and 5, 
6) There are non-physical facts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 JACKSON'S MARY-ARGUMENT 
 
 
1) Mary knows all the physical facts. 
 
2) Mary doesn't know what it is like to experience red. 
 
3) What it is like to experience red is a fact. 
 
Lemma:  
4) There is a fact that Mary doesn't know. 
 
Conclusion:  
5) There are non-physical facts. 
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    PROPERTY DUALISM ARGUMENT 
 
 
1) An expression refers to an entity via a mode of presentation. The 
mode of presentation provides the route by which the entity is picked 
out by the expression. 
 
2) Modes of presentation are properties of the referent. 
 
3) If the same mode of presentation is associated with two (coreferring) 
expressions, it is knowable a priori that these expressions corefer. 
 
4) The concept pain is a referring expression. 
 
5) Physical or functional concepts have as their mode of presentation 
physical or functional properties. 
 
6) There is no physical or functional term such that it is knowable a priori 
that such a term corefers with pain. 
 
Lemma: 
7) No physical or functional property of pain could provide the route by 
which pain is picked out by the expression pain. 
 
8) Properties are either physical, or functional, or irreducibly mental. 
 
Conclusion: 
9) Pain has at least one property that is irreducibly mental. 
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 KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM 
 
1) It is prima facie possible that C-fibre firing is not pain. 
 
2) If a state of affairs is prima facie possible, and there is no way of 
explaining away this prima facie possibility, then this state of affairs is 
(metaphysically) possible. 
 
3) There is no way of explaining away the prima facie possibility of C-
fibre firing not being pain. 
 
4) By 1, 2 and 3, it is (metaphysically) possible that C-fibre firing is not 
pain. 
 
5) But if it is (metaphysically) possible that pain is not C-fibre firing, then, 
since both "pain" and "C-fibre firing" are rigid designators, pain is not 
C-fibre firing.   
 
6) By 4 and 5, pain is not C-fibre firing. 
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JACKSON’S ARGUMENT 
 
 
1) If Physicalism is true, then for any true T, statements of the 
form 
K⊃T 
are conceptual truths. 
2) There are some true statements Q to the effect that 
phenomenal conscious experience occurs (eliminativism about 
phenomenal experience is false). 
3) If Q is a phenomenal statement , then 'K⊃Q' is not a 
conceptual truth.  
So 
4) Physicalism is false. 
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CHALMERS’ ARGUMENT 
 
1') If Physicalism is true, then for any true statement T 
(E) K⊃T 
is necessarily true,  
where K is the complete physical description of the world. 
2') If 'K⊃P' is not a conceptual truth then the primary intension of 
'K⊃P' expresses a contingent proposition. 
3') If Q is a statement  expressing a phenomenal fact in the 
language of psychology, then 'K⊃Q' is not a conceptual truth.  
 
So (from 2' and 3') 
4') The primary intension associated with 'K⊃Q' expresses a  
contingent proposition. 
5')The primary and secondary intension of micro-physical statements 
express the same proposition. 
 
So (from 4' and 5') 
6') 'K⊃Q_', where Q_  is the primary intension of the statement Q, 
expresses a contingent proposition. 
 
So (from 6') 
7') 'K⊃Q_' is not necessarily true. 
8') There are some true statements Q to the effect that a 
phenomenal conscious experience occurs (eliminativism about 
phenomenal experience is false). 
9') The primary proposition of a true statement is true as well.  
 
So (from 1', 7', 8' and 9') 
10') Physicalism is false. 
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THE GAP ARGUMENT 
 
1) If physicalism is true, then for any true statement T, 
(K⊃T). 
 
2) There are some true statements Q to the effect that 
phenomenal conscious experience occurs (eliminativism about 
phenomenal experience is false). 
 
3) It is thickly conceivably that K⊃Q is false.  
 
4) Thickly conceivably situations are metaphysically possible.  
 
5) Physicalism is false. 
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